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Summary 
 
This thesis provides a critical account of state transformation on one of the last 
‘frontiers’ of mineral exploration and extraction. Mongolia’s struggle to 
consolidate its extractive development strategy lies in a fundamental tension 
between the nature of global capital investment and the responsiveness of 
national democratic institutions to their political electorate. In this sense, 
Mongolia is part of a broader pattern of state formation in a global era. This 
pattern has been recognised in established Western democracies, but, as this 
thesis argues, vulnerable states in the periphery of the global economy are also 
being affected with potentially more immediate and alarming consequences. In 
the context of a transition to a development strategy reliant on the extraction 
and export of raw minerals (primary commodities) since 1997, the Mongolian 
state has entered the world of competitive international finance (as opposed to 
development loans) and investment, in which courting and preserving the 
interest and ‘confidence’ of the investor is paramount for the government. In the 
early years of the millennium (2003-2012), Mongolian citizens became 
increasingly engaged in democratic political processes and particularly vocal 
regarding the lack of perceived public benefit from mining investment and the 
damaging socio-environmental consequences of extraction in rural areas. Thus, I 
argue that a constitutional struggle played itself out between the contradictory 
impulses of the state towards investors and citizens as evidenced in the see-saw 
cycles of legal and policy reform between 1997 and 2013. Consequently, by the 
end of 2013, the general downturn in global commodity prices and the particular 
“vote of no confidence” in Mongolia’s investment environment from the majority 
of investors led to the consolidation of a cross-party ‘stability consensus’ within 
the state. The process of ‘stabilising’ the investment environment has occurred at 
the expense of the democratic constitution of the state, demonstrated in the 
curtailment of Parliamentary powers over policy-making processes, the 
limitation of self-government for sub-national administrations and the 
restriction of civil society organisations’ participation in political processes. As a 
post-socialist state adjusting to the constraints of the global economy and the 
cycles of commodity markets, Mongolia provides concrete evidence of the 
antagonistic relationship between national democracy and global economic 
integration, and the reality of the latter’s constitutional impacts.  
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Chapter One (Introduction)  
State Transformation and Transnational 
Legal Ordering in the Global Political 
Economy: New Constitutionalism on the 
“Final Frontier” 
 
Yet the critique of capitalism is out fashion.   
Ellen Meiksins Wood (1995: 1)  
Introduction 
At the time of writing, Mongolia teeters on the edge of an 
economic crisis, and many say the government has only itself to 
blame.1 Endowed with incredible mineral wealth and a small 
population, Mongolia seemed to have everything going for it 
when it emerged on the global minerals market in 1997: a major 
market for its minerals to the south (China) and the interest of the 
Western investment establishment, relative to its Central Asian 
neighbours. A pro-market, democratised state governing a 
country with vast mineral potential sparked strong investment 
interest, as it offered a largely unexplored frontier of 
accumulation. However, in the first decade of the new 
millennium, the state appeared to haplessly mismanage the 
opportunity the commodity boom afforded, by routinely changing 
its legal and policy framework for investment in its mineral 
sector. In particular, investors’ ire was provoked by measures 
which a.) designated some mineral deposits as “nationally 
strategic” (thereby permitting direct state participation as a 
shareholder), b.) introduced new screening requirements for 
investment, c.) limited further mining licenses, and d.) increased 
 
1 In late September 2016, a delegation of Mongolian state officials requested 
financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). By February 
2017, an external financing package of approximately USD 5.5 billion had been 
negotiated to support the government’s ‘Economic Stabilisation Programme’ 
(IMF, 2017). 
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taxation and royalty levies. The attempted renegotiation of a 
major investment agreement over the Oyu Tolgoi deposit, and the 
cancellation or freezing of many mining licenses under new anti-
corruption and environmental measures in 2011 further 
frustrated the mining sector as signs of ‘creeping expropriation’ 
(Schneiderman, 2005: 847) and nationalism. As this thesis will 
demonstrate, these measures reflected shifting domestic public 
sentiment about mining, particularly concerning foreign control 
of national resources, the environmental and social impacts of 
mining on rural communities, and heightened expectations for 
redistribution from the state. 
However, foreign investors framed these changes as illegitimate 
“nationalist” moves by the government, and many who had been 
previously willing to risk a frontier investment became wary in 
this allegedly “unstable” legal and political environment. By 2013, 
almost every international business or financial analysis of 
Mongolia’s mining economy was saturated with investor woes, 
predictions of economic failure, and threats of investment 
withdrawal unless the state curbed its new preference for 
“nationalist” legal reforms and policy-making. Once praised as a 
post-socialist success story in terms of adopting democratic 
institutions and market-friendly investment frameworks, 
Mongolia appeared to be losing its nerve. The state began to rack 
up huge debts as commodity prices declined, and made some 
sudden changes to its investment regime just when investor 
confidence was critical to its economic sustainability. Foreign 
direct investment in Mongolia’s mining sector dropped from an 
all-time high at 44% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2011 to 
0.8% in 2015 (Erdenebileg, 2017).  
I argue in this thesis that the crisis of FDI in Mongolia marked a 
constitutional crossroads for the state, between foreign 
investment dependence and national democracy. Ultimately, the 
14 
 
investment dependence of the state came at the expense of its 
democratic commitments. In 2014, the Mongolian government 
published a new state policy committed to ‘strengthen private 
sector development and establish a stable investment 
environment’ (Otgochuluu, 2016: 68) and made a series of 
political and legal reforms that limit the scope of democratic and 
national influence on the mining economy. The purging of 
“nationalist” law and politics from Mongolia’s mining regime after 
the crisis of foreign direct investment in 2012-2013 was achieved 
by pro-extractive actors and institutions within the state through 
a series of deft institutional, legal and financial manoeuvres 
designed to depoliticise decision-making in the mining sector.  
The constitutional implications, let alone the ‘constitution-like’ 
(Schneiderman, 2008: 4) features, of the anti-political 
commitments in the governance of Mongolia’s mining economy 
have not been addressed. I hope that the research presented here 
will fill this significant gap in the literature on the governance of 
extractive development in Mongolia, as well as provide a case 
study of an emergent form of ‘new constitutionalism’ (Gill, 1998; 
Gill & Cutler, 2014; Gill, 2015; Schneiderman, 2008, 2013) in the 
global political economy. I will expound on this concept later in 
this chapter, but new constitutionalism refers broadly ‘to the 
uneven emergence of a de facto2 constitutional governance 
structure for the world market (one that is intended to operate 
regionally, nationally and globally)’ (Cutler, 2015: 89).3 While I 
am interested in the transnational4  legal and normative 
 
2 De facto and de jure are used in this thesis to designate a ‘situation or 
condition that exists in reality’ (de facto) and ‘a situation, entitlement or claim 
that exists by right or law’ (de jure) (Gill & Cutler, 2014: 315).  
3 As Claire Cutler explains, ‘new constitutionalism involves the interaction of 
public and private power, incorporating international organizations such as 
the IMF and World Bank, as well as the organizations and legal frameworks of 
the trade and investment regime, as well as ‘domestic’ constitutional changes 
to lock in private property rights and investor freedoms’ (Cutler, 2015: 89). 
4 The transnational sphere of law and norms can be understood as a product of 
the ‘fragmentation’ of law’s relationship with the state in the context of 
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dimensions of Mongolia’s experience of global economic 
integration, I have chosen to focus on these elements in the 
context of the national state. Focusing on transnational legal 
processes without reference to the way that these are grounded 
and differentiated in specific jurisdictions obscures the state’s 
role in its “global” reconfiguration (Schneiderman, 2013: 12, 33; 
Sassen, 2007: 14-15), and the way that the national and the local 
are strategically incorporated into new global state formations 
(Sassen, 2007).  
This thesis examines the selective restructuring of the Mongolian 
state in its national democratic form to enable the globalisation of 
its economy based on foreign direct investment (FDI)5 in the 
extraction and export of primary commodities (i.e., mining). In 
particular, I explain how the national Mongolian state, 
economically dependent on natural resources, shed some of its 
democratic commitments to enable and protect foreign 
investment in the mining sector after the so-called “crisis” of 
investor confidence in 2012-2013. As attracting foreign 
investment has been seen as the key to unlocking the resource 
value of Mongolia’s mineral wealth (Mungunzul and Chang, 
2016), I argue that Mongolia’s struggle to consolidate its 
development strategy based on the extraction and export of 
minerals lies in a fundamental tension between the nature of 
global capital investment, commodity markets and the 
 
economic globalisation. While national and international law still exist, the 
global economy is now regulated by a complex range of legal processes and 
norms which break down traditional binaries between national/international, 
local/global, public/private, hard law/soft law, etc (Zumbansen, 2012). Thus, 
transnational law refers to the ‘border-crossing regulatory regimes’ (ibid: 312) 
which operate beyond the state. 
5 Foreign Direct Investment ‘refers to the investment outside the home country 
of the investing company in which control over the resources transferred 
remains with the investor’ (O’Brien & Williams, 2010: 186). It can also be 
understood as a ‘transnational production’ (ibid, 188), carried out by a range of 
firms designated by their status of working beyond national jurisdictions. 
Transnational producers may go by different names (i.e., international firms, 
multinational/transnational/global corporations) but they are essentially 
engaged in the same form of economic activity. 
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responsiveness of national democratic institutions to their 
political electorate. In this sense, Mongolia has been incorporated 
into a part of a broader pattern of contemporary state formation: 
‘the world of nation-states and national economies has been 
dissolving, or fragmenting, restructuring around intertwined 
public-corporate bureaucracies’ (Picciotto, 2016: 10). As a post-
socialist state adjusting to the constraints of the global economy 
and the cycles of commodity markets, Mongolia provides concrete 
evidence of the ultimately antagonistic relationship between 
national democracy and global capitalism (Schneiderman, 2013; 
Streeck, 2014; Wood, 1995).6 The potential of democracy to shift 
‘the permissible bounds of state action’ (Schneiderman, 2008: 7) 
in relation to the economy means that democratic power always 
has to be moderated and contained by the capitalist state to 
maintain its accumulation strategies (Wood, 1995: 204-237; 
Streeck, 2013: 16). 
In this chapter, I provide an overview of key dimensions of global 
economic integration and introduce the main concepts that I will 
be using to discuss state transformation and constitutional 
change in this context. I will then provide an overview of the 
Mongolian case study, and emphasise its relevance for the field of 
new constitutionalism. Finally, I will reflect on the methodological 
choices I made in the research process.  
The Global Economic Context of State 
Transformation and Transnational Legal Ordering 
Today’s global formations are diverse both as social 
forms and normative orders. 
 
6 While liberal democracy has historically enabled capitalism through the 
institutional protection of private property and separation of political and 
economic spheres (Wood, 1995), the institutions of liberal democracy serve to 
contain and limit democratic power as much as express it. In this sense, we can 
still maintain that democracy conceived as a form of power and capitalism are 
fundamentally antagonistic, even if institutional forms of democracy have 
enabled capitalism to some extent.  
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Saskia Sassen (2007: 12) 
As is now well known, an attractive business climate is 
likely to be a magnet for capital flow, and so states go 
out of their way to augment their own power by setting 
up havens for capital investment.  
David Harvey (2005: 105-106) 
The global organisation of production, exchange and finance since 
the early 1970s, commonly referred to in the shorthand 
“economic globalisation,” has major implications for the political 
and legal power of states (Scholte, 1997; Frieden, 2006; O’Brien & 
Williams, 2010: 6; Cutler, 1999). For the purposes of this thesis, 
the state is defined as ‘an ensemble of juridical-political 
institutions and regulatory capacities grounded in the 
territorialisation of political power’ (Brenner et al, 2003: 7), with 
a limited focus on national states. One of the reasons for focusing 
on the national state in this thesis is that it continues to be the 
most privileged site of political-juridical power, both in terms of 
its capacity to close off alternative social futures and its ongoing 
relevance as a site of contestation and resistance (Schneiderman, 
2013: 93; 164).  
Economic globalisation, as used in this thesis, refers partly to the 
‘internationalisation’ and ‘liberalisation’ of capital flows (O’Brien 
and Williams, 2010: 424) needed to enable transnational 
production and markets. However, drawing on Scholte (1997: 
429), the ‘spread of ”supraterritorial” or “transborder” relations’ 
truly distinguishes the contemporary manifestation of economic 
globalisation from previous eras of heightened international 
trade. In particular, the rise of a ‘supraterritorial constituency’ 
(ibid: 430) of transnational investors has risen to prominence in 
this period. Transnational investors can be characterised as  
18 
 
an interlocking network of state-corporate elites 
centred in North America, Europe and Asia… whose 
structural power is articulated through a 
transnationally constituted geopolitics that transcends 
the territorially embedded interests of national 
capitals’ (Woodley, 2015: 2).  
Transnational investors, not surprisingly, operate largely within 
the space of transnational law and norms (see footnote 4).  
While economic “globalisation” gives the impression of a 
systematic, evenly spread process of integration, the reality is 
much more uneven and complex (Harvey, 2005; Schneiderman, 
2013; Sassen, 2007; Woodley, 2015). The process of economic 
integration is not organised by a particular actor or institution, 
but is dependent upon many variables, particularly the 
relationship between the state and capital in a given sector. This 
relationship can be affected by a number of factors. For example, 
does the state export or import capital? To what extent is a state 
dependent upon attracting foreign as opposed to domestic 
capital? What kind of commodities does the state export? Does 
the state have experience in the economic sector? To what extent 
do value-adding processes occur prior to export? What is the 
relative strength of national currency? How strong are labour and 
citizen controls on state power? What multilateral or bilateral 
obligations does a state have? Is the state connected into global 
capital and trade networks through specific trade agreements or 
World Trade Organisation membership? What geopolitical 
context shapes the state’s economic options? 
The state-capital relation is mediated both by general 
frameworks which facilitate capital mobility,7 like multilateral 
trade agreements, as well as the strength of particular capital 
 
7 Capital mobility is ‘the ability to move funds and assets across borders 
unrestricted by policies or legislation’ (Gill & Cutler, 2014: 313).  
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agents (e.g. multinational corporations) in relation to a particular 
state (Sassen, 2007: 12) within the context of ‘common capitalist 
imperatives’ (Dunn, 2014: 80). These imperatives structure the 
conditions of capitalism as a global economic system, within 
which particular state-capital relations are negotiated. For 
example, as Dunn (ibid: 84) puts it, ‘each state itself experiences 
competitive imperatives to accumulate’ within the global 
economy. No state can be described as autonomous from the 
universal reach of global capitalism (ibid), but there are 
differentiated levels of ‘influences and power’ (ibid: 85) that 
shape the real, albeit limited, choices of the state. Thus, the 
‘relationship between [state] power and production’ may be 
‘reciprocal’ (Cox, 1987: 1) or ‘intimately interrelated and co-
constitutive’ (Jessop and Sum, 2001: 99), but remains 
undetermined. Agents of capital (e.g. investors) will respond 
differently with regard to the opportunity/risk structures of each 
state. However, as Harvey (2005: 89-91) puts it,  
Capital accumulation through price-fixing market 
exchange flourishes best in the midst of certain 
institutional structures of law, private property, 
contract and security of the money form… Capitalists 
do not absolutely require such a framework to 
function, but without it they do face greater risks… Not 
all states act in an appropriate way, of course, and 
even when they do they exhibit a variety of 
institutional arrangements that can produce quite 
different results. 
The uneven outcomes of economic globalisation are very much 
dependent on the capacity of the state to influence and 
manipulate the power of capital (Schneiderman, 2013: 35), which 
implies the state’s negotiation of its relationship with the owners 
of capital as well the “economic” mechanisms and structures of 
capital, like FDI and trade agreements (Streeck, 2014: 23). Capital 
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itself is differentiated based on ownership interests and 
concentration in particular jurisdictions (Schneiderman, 2013: 
18, 35; Harvey, 2000), which also affects state capacity to attract 
and engage investment. Thus, on one hand the state enables 
capital mobility and expansion by providing the necessary 
political and juridical architecture for its investment, but it does 
not control the flow of transnational capital.  
States can formally participate in the global economy by binding 
themselves to the global trading and financial system through 
legal commitments. These ‘regulatory infrastructures’ (Picciotto, 
2016: 5) may be in the form of bilateral investment treaties, 
investment agreements, regional trade agreements and 
multilateral treaties to enable or enhance their status as capital-
friendly jurisdictions (Gill, 1998; Schneiderman, 2013; 2008; 
Cutler, 2014; Tan, 2013).  
Investors in a global market economy typically look for stable 
currency commitments from central banks (i.e., deflationary 
monetary policy), flexible taxation rates that respond to declines 
in commodity prices, and policy stability to not only predict but 
maximise returns on investments (Stanford, 2008; Streeck, 2014; 
Polanyi, 1944/2001). The market principles of macroeconomic 
stability, competition and the legal protection of private property 
rights are thereby adopted and institutionalised by national 
states in order to expand their own access to global capital and to 
open up new frontiers of investment in return. This particular 
form of institutionalisation typically involves domestic legal 
reform (i.e., introducing a flexible rate of exchange, removing 
state controls from capital markets, allowing exceptions to 
national taxation rates for large-scale investors, introducing 
international accounting standards, reforming competition policy 
– see UNCTAD, 2009: 7), but also the entry into a complex 
‘interlocking web of rules and rule-enforcing structures’ that exist 
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beyond the scope of national political life and, once ratified, ‘place 
significant limits on state action’ (Schneiderman, 2008: 25; 
Sassen, 2007; Tan 2013). 
State participation in the structures of the global economy alone 
does not necessarily guarantee investment, as indicated by the 
varied impact of different instruments on improving investment 
levels. For example, a 2009 United Nations Committee on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD, 2009) report found that Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs) had negligible impact on improving 
FDI flows by themselves, whereas other instruments of economic 
cooperation – “Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements” – 
improved investment flows from developed to developing 
countries (ibid: xii). In fact, there is some evidence that BITs ‘do 
not attract the most development-enhancing FDI’ (Golen and 
Guariso, 2013: 156; Yackee, J. W., 2007). However, the UNCTAD 
report noted that regardless of actual direct impact from 
participation in global economic instruments, there was usually 
an indirect benefit of ‘enhancing the attractiveness of countries’ 
by adding ‘policy and institutional determinants for FDI,’ such as 
‘improv[ing] investment protection and add[ing] to the security, 
transparency, stability and predictability of the investment 
framework’ (ibid). Thus, regardless of actual capital flows, at least 
in the short-term, participation in global economic structures may 
have more intangible payoffs for the state in relation to capital 
owners, by improving the reliability of its investment framework, 
particularly in contexts where the state lacks capital or a reliable 
reputation for protecting investor rights.  
The transnational mobility of capital creates a veritable law 
market (Frerichs, 2013:48). The attractiveness of the investment 
environment (e.g., regulations, laws, codes, repatriation rules, 
etc.,) in any jurisdiction becomes part of the state’s competitive 
strategy, consistent with a market environment. The need to 
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attract investment, however, can be a much more intangible and 
political task for states than a technical one. Securing the 
confidence and trust of investors requires addressing their 
perceptions as much as adopting particular legal frameworks. As 
Streeck (2014: 23, emphasis added) puts it, 
Exactly what returns on investment capital owners and 
managers demand is not set in stone; it varies with 
time and place. Investors may become more modest if 
they have no alternatives, or more demanding if their 
profits no longer seem enough in comparison with 
what they can obtain elsewhere [legal market]… Above 
all, if they see their social environment as hostile and 
inclined to impose exaggerated obligations on them, 
they may “lose confidence” and withhold their capital – 
for example, by developing a “liquidity preference” – 
until conditions improve… Nobody can oblige them to 
invest, and determining when the profit-dependent 
class may be willing to put their capital to work is so 
difficult at this point that the latest economists give up 
their mathematics and turn to “psychology” for an 
answer. 
The psychological dimension of attracting investment has been 
recognised as a new marketing strategy for states, of which the 
relatively recent phenomenon of ‘nation branding’ (Dinnie, 2008) 
is an example. Around the world, teams of marketing experts are 
developing and promoting positive images of national 
jurisdictions to enhance the state’s global competitiveness as a 
destination for FDI. For example, South Africa has an 
International Marketing Council (IMC) with a mandate ‘to 
establish a compelling brand image for South Africa, which 
correctly positions the country in terms of its investment 
potential, credit worthiness, export opportunities, tourism 
potential and international relations’ (Johnston, 2008: 5). In 
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Mongolia’s case, a nation-branding strategy was introduced by 
President Elbegdorj at the Mongolian Economic Forum in 2013. 
Its aim was to counteract the reputation Mongolia was quickly 
gaining at the time as a risky destination for investment due to 
the re-regulation of the mining sector. The President stated that 
‘the State itself has become the biggest risk,’ noting that this 
perspective has been routinely reinforced by international 
standards agencies such as Ernst and Young (quoted in the UB 
Post, Khash-Erdene, 2013). The Minister for Economic 
Development at the time – N. Batbayer – stated at the same forum 
that, 
I believe Mongolia can not only brand its products, but 
become a global brand nation. We have vast lands, rich 
with mineral wealth. Some countries have already 
drained their natural resources but we are just 
beginning to explore them. Last year Mongolia 
successfully released its first government bonds, named 
after our Great Chinggis Khaan, worth 1.5 billion USD. 
When we ventured to promote our bonds to other 
nations, we told them that Mongolia has the eighteenth 
largest land size — land that is full of mineral wealth; 
our two great neighbours are up to 500 times larger in 
population so we are well-positioned for trade; we are 
the descendants of the great Chinggis Khan; we are 
citizens of a democratic Mongolia; we value human 
rights; and we protect private property through the 
rule of law. And we asked them to work with us and 
they agreed. When we offered to sell 1.5 billion USD of 
bonds, they proposed to buy 15 billion USD of bonds. 
This indicates rising global interest and the enormous 
potential Mongolia has. We promised those that 
purchased our bonds that we would use this money for 
great development… The time of Mongolia to establish 
its name and brand has come. 
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Thus, successful integration into the global economy requires the 
authorisation of basic institutional prerequisites for transnational 
capital investment, as it is unlikely that without them investors 
will take the risk of investing (Stanford, 2008: 145).  However, 
global economic integration also requires the sensitisation of the 
state to the perceptions of investors, in order to maintain and 
increase investment. This is particularly so in capital-importing 
states, whose “global” future is reliant on sustaining foreign 
investment interest (Schneiderman, 2013: 12).  
Global economic integration thus presents a tight weave of legal 
rules and normative expectations from economic actors (i.e., 
banks, corporations) backed by a combination of hard and soft8 
legal and financial mechanisms for their enforcement. Notably, 
international finance and economic law, as well as global 
commercial law, are amongst the most enforceable forms of 
transnational law as a result of arbitration-based dispute 
resolution. Most investment agreements and treaties include 
arbitration clauses, which means that dispute resolution can 
‘recur to international investment arbitration’ (Knottnerus and 
Olivet, 2016: 2) instead of national courts. For example, Mongolia 
is a signatory to the Energy Charter, a multilateral agreement that 
protects investor interests by ‘granting fundamental rights to 
foreign investors with regard to their investment in the host 
country’ (Energy Charter, 2015).9 Among these ‘fundamental 
rights’ are ‘protection from discrimination, expropriation and 
nationalisation, breach of individual investment contracts, 
damages due to war and similar events, and unjustified 
 
8 Soft law or mechanisms are ‘rules that do not have the binding force of 
legislation, but that are nevertheless influential in shaping behaviour’ (Gill & 
Cutler, 2014: 323).  
9 In addition to the Energy Charter, Mongolia is signatory to 43 Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (including the USA and 18 European Union States), a 
Foreign Investment Protection Agreement (FIPA) with Canada, an Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) with Japan, and trilateral EPA with Russia and 
China.  
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restrictions on the transfer of funds’ (ibid). Significantly, the 
dispute settlement provisions explicitly aim to ‘protect investor 
rights,’ ‘covering both state to state arbitration and investor-state 
dispute settlement’ (ibid). For example, in 2015, under charges of 
expropriation, a Canadian mining company – Khan Resources – 
successfully won an arbitral award of USD 80 million against 
Mongolia on the basis of the Energy Charter (Knottnerus and 
Olivet, 2016: 5). In a small economy like Mongolia, with a Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of 11.5 billion U.S. dollars (USD), an 
arbitral award such as this is significant not only in financial 
terms but also in terms of reputational damage. The perception of 
instability in the investment environment can have much more 
significant consequences in the long-term for the state. 
So far in this section I have discussed some of the structural10 and 
normative implications of global economic integration, both in 
terms of the concrete institutional steps that have to be taken for 
states to be competitive with regard to transnational capital 
flows, as well as the deeper sensitivity states have to develop with 
regard to investors as agents of capital. This, of course, is a 
simplified overview of a very complex integrative process, which 
depends a great deal upon the state and economic sector 
involved, and the power of the state in relation to capital (Harvey, 
2000; Sassen, 2007). However, it is safe to say that the process of 
global economic integration has transformative and ordering 
potential for the state, even if its effects vary in degree. This is 
because global economic integration institutionally and legally 
organises the state’s relationship with capital: the global economy 
is structured by a particular form of transnational legality 
(Schneiderman, 2013: 25). Schneiderman characterises this 
‘assemblage’ of rules and institutions by its design ‘to check 
 
10 When the term “structural” is used in this thesis, it refers to the ‘form of 
power embedded in historical structures and/or institutions that set the 
parameters or the limits and conditions of possibility for action in any given 
age’ (Gill & Cutler, 2014: 323).  
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popular political processes and isolate the economic from the 
political sphere’ (ibid). It is not a coherent system of public 
international or commercial law, given the lack of an ‘overarching 
global legal system’ (Shaffer, 2014: 7), but has emerged through 
the gap between public and private, international and national 
law, as the governance of the global economy generates new 
rules, norms and relationships between diverse legal disciplines, 
actors and adjudicators (ibid; Picciotto, 2011). These emerging 
rules and relationships have an ordering effect and contribute to 
a process of state transformation insofar as they reorient the 
state to new norms which ‘lay out behavioural prescriptions 
issued by an authoritative source, whether or not formally 
binding or backed by a dispute settlement or other enforcement 
system’ (Shaffer, 2014: 7). In his definition of transnational legal 
norms, Shaffer (ibid) includes  
‘those purported to be global and those that are more 
limited in their reach. The source of the transnational 
legal norm may be an international treaty, 
international soft law, privately created codes or 
standards, a foreign legal model promoted by 
transnational actors, or a combination of them. In 
other words, they can involve both hard and soft law; 
can be bilateral, regional, or multilateral in nature; 
can be constructed by states or non-state actors; and 
can be directed at states, corporations or individuals.’  
For the purposes of this thesis, I am only focusing on those 
aspects of transnational legal ordering that apply to national 
states in the context of global economic integration. Shaffer’s 
concept of transnational legal ordering (TLO) is useful as a 
measure of state transformation in this specific area, because it 
provides an ‘analytic means for assessing transnationally induced 
change in a globalised world’ (ibid). While I would argue that the 
state is ‘liable to recurrent redesign, restructuring, and 
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reorientation’ (Brenner et al., 2003: 5), and even subtle shifts in 
priorities can indicate “transformation” of varying degrees, it is 
helpful to be able to more accurately assess the process by which 
national states are transformed by economic integration beyond 
their borders.  
Despite the transnational nature of the global economic 
processes, the national state remains the ‘fundamental agent of 
global capitalism’ (Harvey, 2005: 91). In particular, it plays a 
central role regarding the ‘construction and maintenance of 
transnational legal norms and institutions’ (Schneiderman, 2013: 
162; see also 18, 25). As Schneiderman (2008: 7) argues,  
Economic globalisation is usually thought of as 
happening “out there,” beyond the capacity of states to 
control. At the very same time the modern state is 
being “decentred,” rendered “defective,” or “hollowed 
out” (Strange, 1994: 56-57), it is also deeply implicated 
in the process of its presumed marginalisation by 
establishing, through law, the permissible bounds of 
state action. In this process, states are important 
agents of economic globalisation. 
The state is thus not a victim of the transformative or reordering 
effects of global economic integration, nor can it even be 
considered to be retreating (Picciotto, 2011: 4), as it authorises 
the process by which the scope and scale of its authority is 
changed. However, some aspects of the state, such as the 
prominence of particular values or institutions, may be 
dismantled or distorted. Sassen (2007: 54) puts it this way: ‘we 
can say that the state maintains its level of capacity (albeit with 
some transformations) even as it may lose some of its autonomy.’  
Even though the state enables global economic integration, it does 
generate a ‘disconnect’ (Schneiderman, 2013: 13) between 
national political capacity and economic power, which operates 
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within and beyond the jurisdictions of individual states, limiting 
the state in certain ways (Scholte, 1997). I argue that the 
‘competitive imperative to accumulate’ (Dunn, 2014: 61) always 
exists in some degree of tension with democracy, as political 
norms and processes have the power to interrupt the domain of 
price mechanisms and market-based principles of exchange. 
However, this tension is exacerbated in the context of economic 
globalisation, where the distance between the national polity and 
the sphere of global exchange stretches the state’s capacity to 
balance competing interests within and beyond its national 
jurisdiction. The state’s capacity to meet the demands of capital 
without compromising its commitments to its citizens, or at least 
not appearing to, is very much dependent on the position of any 
given state in the global economic order. As Schneiderman (2013: 
31) puts it, ‘some states are better situated to exploit the 
structures of transnational legality.’ 
Thus, while the “co-constitutive” relationship between state and 
capital can be taken as given, it can manifest in a conflicted way 
when the interests of national actors and capital investors do not 
overlap neatly (Streeck, 2014). States are constituted by diverse 
forms of power, social and political, as well as economic; they are 
not ‘rigorously homogenous’ but relational, affected by the 
‘changing balance of forces within society (Schneiderman, 2013: 
12). While states almost universally participate to some degree in 
the global economy because of their co-dependent relationship 
with capital (Sassen, 2007: 15), they will have other obligations 
and interests to balance depending upon their overall political 
constitution. The strength of the state in managing the balance 
between its national (e.g. voting) and transnational (e.g. 
investing) constituents becomes a critical factor in times of 
conflict or crisis (Streeck, 2014: 81; Schneiderman, 2013). I argue 
that these times of crisis can act as a constitutional crucible for 
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the state, by determining the interests and norms which have the 
power to influence national law and politics.  
I will now turn to the case study of state transformation and 
transnational legal ordering that this thesis examines. 
Schneiderman (2013: 6) argues that the value of case studies in 
the wider field of “new constitutionalism” is their capacity to 
‘illuminate precisely the circumstances and the means by which 
transnational legality operates… [and] how transnational legal 
norms effectively institutionalise pathologies associated with 
neoliberalism, thereby legally constraining alternative paths to 
development.’ The legal web and negotiating framework which 
facilitates the mobility of capital transnationally is produced by 
states in the first instance, but also produces different kinds of 
states; when ‘securing these rights, options and powers entail[s] 
even a partial relinquishing of components of state authority, 
then we can posit that this process sets up the conditions for a 
transformation in the role of the state’ (Sassen, 2007: 34).  
Global State Transformation and Transnational 
Legal Ordering: The Case of “Conflicted 
Constitutionalism” in Mongolia 
In terms of political and economic status, Mongolia exists on the 
margins of the globe. A land-locked desert steppe sandwiched 
between the territorial boundaries of Russia and China, Mongolia 
has a rich but largely hidden history, overshadowed by the 
prominence of its neighbours in the international sphere. Its 
major claims to fame include the legendary feats of empire of 
Chinggis Khan in the 13th century, the lowest population density 
in the world (2.8 million people to 1.5 million square kilometres) 
and, more recently, its mining boom. Mongolia’s vast and largely 
unexplored mineral base was brought to the attention of foreign 
investors in the late 1990s. Some of the world’s largest deposits of 
copper, high-quality gold, iron, coking coal and fluorspar lie 
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within its territory, estimated to be worth approximately 1.3 
trillion U.S. dollars (Invest Mongolia, 2017). Not surprisingly, 
Mongolia continues to be regularly referred to as the ‘final 
frontier’ (ibid) by investors and mining companies.  
In 1991, Mongolia embarked on a major project of political and 
economic liberalisation, in the wake of a collapsing Soviet Union 
(Reinert, 2000: 16; Rossabi, 2005: 43-114; Pomfret, 2000). 
Reinert (ibid) explains that, 
In this sense, Mongolia is more similar to most Eastern 
European countries than to former planned economies 
in Asia. While the Republic of China and Vietnam 
essentially started with an economic transition only, 
Mongolia - true to tradition - looked West rather than 
South. In 1991, Mongolia embraced democracy and a 
minimalist laissez-faire market economy, in strong 
contrast to her big neighbour in the South, the People’s 
Republic of China. 
In exchange for aid and loans from international financial 
institutions (e.g. International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank) Mongolia underwent a “structural 
adjustment” process which unified distinct programmes of 
political and economic reforms regarded at the time as a 
development blueprint for post-socialist states (Sachs, 1994). 
Mongolia was praised by Western democracies, international 
development institutions and academics as a ‘model pupil’ 
(Reinert, 2000: 17) of post-socialist transition (Munkh-Erdene, 
2011: 61), as the state simultaneously adopted programmes of 
political liberalisation and economic deregulation to constitute a 
liberal democratic state and a free market economy (Fish, 2001). 
This broad-based liberalisation of the political and economic 
spheres and the limitation of state power in each was – and still is 
– conceived as part of the same picture of progress for the 
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Mongolian state: establishing a constitutional democracy based 
on the separation of powers and the election of political 
representatives, with private capital favoured as the driver of 
economic development (Munkh-Erdene, 2011).  
Mongolia was perceived by investors in the early years of the new 
millennium as a vast frontier, full of mining potential, with only 
25% of its minerals base explored by 2013 (International 
Business Publications, 2013: 145). In its national development 
strategy, the Mongolian state also recognised mineral extraction 
and export as the main driver of economic development, at least 
in the short to medium-term (Mongolia, 2008). To enable 
investment in its formerly state-owned minerals sector, the 
Mongolian state needed to demonstrate – legally, not just 
rhetorically – that the sector was open for investment. Like other 
post-socialist countries that were desperate to attract foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in the 1990s and early 2000s (Knottnerus 
and Olivet, 2016: 2), the Mongolian state – via successive 
governments – sought to elevate its standing and competitiveness 
in the sphere of investment and trade through global economic 
integration.  
In Mongolia’s first democratic constitution (Mongolia, 1992), the 
state committed to the recognition and respect ‘of all forms of 
private and public property’ (Article 5.2), intending to promote 
economic development ‘based on different forms of property 
which takes into account universal trends of world economic 
development and national specifics’ (Article 5.1). The pluralistic 
conception of property rights enshrined in Mongolia’s democratic 
constitution reflected the state’s new commitment to a market 
economy based on transferable property rights and market price 
mechanisms. The recognition and protection of private property 
was critical to Mongolia’s adherence to ‘universal trends of world 
economic development’ (ibid) and integration within the global 
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capitalist economic system which now had hegemonic status after 
the fall of the Soviet Union (Munkh-Erdene, 2011: 62; Korsun and 
Murrell, 1995; Harvey, 2005). At the same time, Mongolia’s long 
history of pastoral production necessitated state protection of 
public forms of property, such as customary use-rights in state-
owned land. The resistant attitude of Mongolians, particularly in 
rural areas, to land privatisation (Tumenbayar, 2002; Endicott, 
2012) meant that the state had to balance its new recognition of 
private property with an ongoing commitment to protecting 
public property forms. In developmental terms, this 
constitutional “compromise” legally reflects the ideological 
tension between the socialist-nationalist legacy of the state and 
its new capitalist commitment to global market-led economic 
development.  
This constitutional plurality was essentially untested until 1997, 
when the liberal 1997 Minerals Law was introduced. The 1997 
Minerals Law marked a radical departure from previous mineral 
codes, by enabling foreign private investment into Mongolian 
mineral resources. Like other historical mining booms around the 
world, some domestic and mostly foreign extractors arrived on 
this new mineral frontier, and scrambled for access to geological 
maps (also privatised in the early 1990s) and licenses from the 
Mineral Resources Authority of Mongolia (MRAM). Around the 
same time, in the early 2000s, in an unprecedented rural 
mobilisation, Mongolian citizens began to organise themselves 
into movements to protest private extractive access to land and 
water resources which had previously been held in public trust 
by the state. What had seemed like a constitutional compromise 
between the state’s support for public and private forms of 
property – or ‘national specifics’ and ‘universal trends’ in 
developmental terms – turned into a major political and legal 
conflict about the terms of access for mining companies to 
Mongolia’s minerals.  
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Between 1997 and 2014, this conflict unfolded in back-and-forth 
processes of legal reform as well as political bargaining within the 
state and beyond it, with pressure from both pro-extractive and 
public interest lobbies. Investor associations, civic environmental 
movements, international development and financial institutions, 
Western embassies, global credit rating agencies, government 
ministries and political parties all entered the fray. However, in 
2014, the government introduced a new pro-extractive mining 
policy, to resolve the national-global conflict in the governance of 
the mining sector in favour of foreign investors. The State Policy 
on the Minerals Sector 2014-2025 reflects the new consensus 
within the state (across political parties) that extractive 
development should be market-led and the state’s role should be 
to stabilise the investment environment (Otgochuluu, 2016), 
establishing a new public-private, political-economic boundary to 
structure the mining sector and its governance regime.  
The pro-investment State Policy clearly reflects the way that pro-
extractive interests eventually became dominant within the state 
itself, at the expense of alternative socio-political paths. I argue 
that the development of a globally-oriented political and legal 
regime for Mongolia’s mining industry functioned as a 
constitutional crucible, one-sidedly resolving the tension 
articulated in the 1992 Constitution between the protection of 
private property rights and integrating into the ‘world economy,’ 
and an economic system based on forms of public property and 
‘national specifics’ (Constitution of Mongolia, 1992, Article 5.1). 
The struggle for dominance in legal and political terms over the 
mode of production and the process of accumulation was 
constitutional in two distinct ways. Firstly, it engaged Mongolia’s 
diverse base of constituent power (popular as well as economic) 
and its outcome determined the form of the state’s relationship 
with its democratic constituency and its market constituency, as 
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well as its social orientation towards national and global 
priorities. It was consequently “constitutional” in a very real 
sense because the outcome of this struggle reordered the state in 
terms of its socio-political priorities and its practices.  
Secondly, it is constitutional in the sense that this reordering has 
‘constitution-like’ (Schneiderman, 2008: 8) features, namely the 
delineation of a new legal boundary between what is considered 
“political” (public) and what is “economic” (private). As 
Schneiderman (2008: 4) puts it, political and legal 
transformations may be considered constitution-like in the sense 
that they entail ‘placing legal limits on the authority of 
government, isolating economic from political power, and 
assigning to investment interests the highest possible protection.’ 
This observation is reinforced by the general legacy of liberal 
constitutionalism to delineate an economic sphere away from the 
purview of government (Anderson, 2005: 123). Again, following 
Schneiderman (2008: 8, citing McIlwain, 1966: 21), ‘if 
constitutionalism is traditionally considered to be, “by definition,” 
about limited government, it is also about distributing authority 
between public and private power.’ Thus, at its root, the tension 
around the boundaries of appropriate state action in relation to 
the mining economy reflects a fundamental tension in Mongolia’s 
post-socialist transition in becoming a “market democracy.”  
Mongolia’s transition to a mineral-exporting economy has been 
routinely conceived in both the academic and development policy 
literatures as a distinctly economic transformation. While this 
transformation may have consequences for nation-building 
(Jackson, 2015), local communities and civil society (Byambajav, 
2012, 2014, 2015; Danaasuren, 2012), indigenous pastoralists’ 
rights (Tumenbayar, 2002; Upton, 2012), new shadow economies 
(i.e., artisanal mining) (High, 2012), resource distribution (Blunt, 
2014), the governance of land use (Endicott, 2012), ecosystems 
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and climate change (Yakamura et al, 2013), national politics 
(Combellick-Bidney, 2012), governance norms and the role of 
multilateral institutions (Hatcher, 2014), the constitutional 
dimension of global economic integration for Mongolia has not 
been recognised or thoroughly explored.  While Hatcher’s (2014) 
case study on the transmission of multilateral regulatory norms 
into Mongolia’s mining regime touches upon aspects of a 
transnational legal ordering process, her analysis largely stays 
“outside” the state, focusing on the role of the World Bank as a 
transnational norm-transmitter. I argue, however, that it is not 
only regulatory norms that are at stake but the orientation of the 
Mongolian state to global capital, which should be understood as 
a form of de facto constitutionalism (Cutler, 2015: 89). 
Thus, this extended case study of Mongolia’s transition to a 
globally-oriented mining economy offers an empirical critique of 
the constitutional effects of global economic integration within 
the national democratic state in contexts where the state has very 
limited leverage with investors. This reconstitutionalisation does 
not threaten the state per se, which is thoroughly entangled in 
enabling “globalisation,” but rather disrupt the responsive 
capabilities of the state to its citizens. Consequently, the 
capabilities for public responsiveness in the state are the real 
“victims” of this form of state transformation, not the state itself. I 
argue that the antagonism between national democracy and the 
global economy is revealed in times of economic crisis, when the 
state has to balance the interests of its national political 
constituents and its global economic constituents (Streeck, 2014). 
This balancing act is all the more fragile in vulnerable states 
which lack capital clout and are dependent upon their capacity to 
attract the interest of foreign investors. The ‘relative strength of 
the state’ and the internal character of national political 
economies has been shown to be a central factor in mediating the 
social disruptions associated with changes in production and 
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accumulation (Dunn, 2014: 26).  While similar patterns of 
democratic-market antagonism have been observed even in 
wealthy democratic states, particularly in the context of financial 
crises (Leys, 2001; Brown, 2015; Streeck; 2014), I am specifically 
interested in the implications of this antagonism in contexts 
where the state is more immediately exposed to the pressure to 
conform to investor expectations for market regulation through 
its dependence on foreign capital. Only by looking at the margins 
of the global economy can we see the full force of its disruptive 
power and develop a more realistic perspective on the political 
and legal dimensions of global economic integration. 
Origins of the Research Project, Lines of Inquiry and 
Development of Research Questions 
In October 2012, a group of semi-nomadic Mongolian herders 
submitted a claim to the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) 
of the World Bank Group against a copper and gold mining 
project (Oyu Tolgoi) located in the South Gobi (CAO, 2017). Their 
claim was made on the basis of the Social and Environmental 
Performance Standards of the World Bank’s International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), which had partly financed the Oyu Tolgoi 
project, as well as the contractual provisions of the Oyu Tolgoi 
investment agreement regarding socio-environmental protection. 
Their concerns specifically focused on the ‘impacts [of the mine] 
to land and water, indigenous culture and livelihoods, 
compensation and relocation, [and] project due diligence’ (CAO, 
2017). After reading this “social and environmental” claim at the 
time, I was struck by the way that a multilateral financial 
institution was mediating a case that posed distinctly political 
problems around the recognition of a pastoral “indigenous” 
minority and their land rights, as well as evaluating their claim for 
effective redistribution from the project through compensation 
for losses and community investment.  
37 
 
The system of rules governing this public claim was derived from 
the investment agreements that structured the financing and the 
implementation of the project, adjudicated by a team of World 
Bank professionals in the CAO office. The advocates of the claim 
before this panel of experts were not lawyers, but non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), who assisted the group of 
herders to lodge their claim. In the end, as a result of ‘stakeholder 
discussions conducted as part of the CAO Assessment, the 
complainants and company agreed to work with CAO’s Dispute 
Resolution function to try to resolve the issues raised in the 
complaint using a collaborative approach’ (ibid). From start to 
finish, this claim-making process against a nationally strategic 
mining project hardly referred to the state.  
The fact that the national state and a discourse of national 
citizenship or constitutional rights was conspicuously absent in 
this case led me initially to the question of how state-society 
relations were being affected by Mongolia’s transition to an 
extractive economy driven by foreign investment (Research 
Question One). I began with the “society” question in order to 
understand how citizens were organising themselves in relation 
to the mining industry, and analysed some of the claim-making 
strategies and discourses of Mongolian activist NGOs. However, it 
was virtually impossible to understand the organisation and 
coordination of NGO activity without reference to their 
transnational civil society network, which acted as major donors 
for smaller-scale national and local organisations. Focusing upon 
the formation of mining-critical civil society was only the 
beginning, because I soon realised the interconnections between 
the environmental NGO and corporate discourses of responsible 
mining (see Chapter 5). At this point I started to engage with the 
question of how mining companies positioned themselves in 
relation to civil society and the state (Research Question Two), and 
analysed the mineral sector’s responses to civil activism and 
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policy and legislative change between 1997 and 2014 (see 
Chapter Three).   
The immense frustration and dissatisfaction of the corporate 
sector with the Mongolian government’s regulation of the mining 
sector, and their self-perception as economic victims of political 
processes, finally led me to the question of the state as the 
primary focus of the thesis, into which I wove the other two 
“social” and “economic” dimensions of the research agenda. In 
fact, in asking the question of how the transition to an extractive 
economy based on the export of minerals has shaped the state 
(Research Question Three), I have come to understand the way 
that “common-sense” conceptual boundaries between “social”, 
“economic” and “political” are neither natural nor inevitable, but 
reflect a particular configuration of power. The state is the central 
institutional locus which mediates this configuration, drawing 
boundaries and erasing others, as it structures – through political 
and legal means – the scope and shape of productive and 
accumulative processes (i.e., “the economy”). This political and 
legal process of restructuring is a continuous and active process, 
at times incremental and at other times dramatic. In this way, as 
Jessop (1990: 10) puts it, the state is the crucial ‘site of strategic 
action’ when it comes to the way in which the state ‘privilege[s] 
some strategies over others… the access of some forces over 
others, some interests over others, some time horizons over 
others, some coalition possibilities over others.’ Thus, this thesis 
maintains that Mongolia’s transition to a mineral exporting 
economy is equally a process of state transformation and re-
formation. It provides empirical evidence of the selective 
restructuring of the state to enable the extraction of Mongolian 
minerals, redrawing the boundaries of the political and the 
economic in the process, with negative implications for furthering 
the democratisation of both the state and the market.  
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This socio-legal analysis of how the aforementioned process of 
restructuring and redrawing occurs within and by the state has at 
least three concrete contributions to make to the academic 
literature on state formation in the context of economic 
globalisation. Firstly, it sheds empirical light on specific processes 
of change as well as a holistic analysis of local-national-global 
interactions between actors and institutions in context, to 
complement the numerous volumes of more general and 
conceptual work theorising implications of economic 
globalisation for the state. Secondly, the thesis has comparative 
value. While the Mongolian case exhibits particular features 
relating to its state history that may not be generalizable, the case 
can be a useful point of reference for others researching or doing 
advocacy work in similarly vulnerable states, where the same 
global pressures are being exerted in relation to primary 
commodities. In particular, Mongolia can be a useful regional 
reference for other states in Central and South-East Asia, for 
example Kyrgyzstan and Laos, that are undergoing rapid 
economic change, concentrated in primary commodities and 
energy sectors. Additionally, the author’s interdisciplinary and 
qualitative methodology may be a useful point of reference for 
other socio-legal researchers working in the fields of law and 
political economy more broadly. Finally, this thesis not only 
works beyond disciplinary boundaries in its empirical focus, but 
transcends the division between description and critique. It is 
concerned both with facts and values, and offers a critical 
judgment of state transformation in this context as ultimately an 
exercise of capitalist domination over the meaning and the 
process of law-making and politics, which is disruptive to the 
democratisation of the state.  
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Socio-Legal Methodology and Thesis Structure  
I have already indicated the manner in which lines of inquiry 
were established for this thesis, which was very much based on 
starting with a particular incident and “moving out” from that 
point to identify what factors produced that phenomena in the 
first place. However, it is important to flesh out the methodology 
of the research. While I am primarily interested in the political 
and juridical aspects of global capitalism, the only way to develop 
an understanding of these fundamentally social processes is to 
investigate a particular social context. Thus, I started with one 
instance of claim-making against a mining company in the Gobi 
Desert, and ended up analysing the political and legal structure of 
Mongolia’s mining regime, the political and economic history of 
the Mongolian state, the context and content of mining 
investment agreements, national development policy, NGO 
interventions and the perceptions of activists, investors and 
government about the process of regime formation and the role of 
the state in that process. 
For example, I started the thesis with a particular question about 
a particular place (“why and how are Mongolian herders engaged 
in claim-making around mining impacts in the South Gobi?”) but 
it immediately required me to consider how mining investment 
operates globally, both within and beyond Mongolia as a legal and 
political jurisdiction. A similar pattern recurred through each 
phase of thesis development. Each line of inquiry, focused on 
contextual instantiations of state-society and market-state 
relations, required reference not only to the particular evidence 
of Mongolia, but also attention to the question of its relationship 
with broader patterns of economic, political and legal formation. I 
wanted to produce an historically accurate and nuanced account 
of the impact of global economic integration on aspects of the 
Mongolian state and society (vis-à-vis democratic institutions and 
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processes), which entailed bringing contextual dynamics and 
awareness of global patterns to bear on the analysis. At the same 
time, I wanted to expose the drive of capital to the periphery to 
find new frontiers of investment, and identify some of its tactics 
of political co-optation in “peripheral” places, like Mongolia, 
whose investment potential has yet to be fully “optimised.” 
In this sense, Mongolia was not a “test-case” for a preconceived 
hypothesis about the effect of global economic integration on the 
state. My preliminary instinct based on the review of critical 
literature about economic globalisation and the state (e.g. Sassen, 
2007; Harvey, 2005; Schneiderman, 2008, 2013) was that aspects 
of the state could be strengthened and weakened simultaneously, 
and that a means of exploring these dynamics was to situate them 
within a longer time frame. Methodologically, this entailed the 
development of an historical perspective about the Mongolian 
state. The purpose was to understand the current political and 
economic “moment” for the state, which entailed the analysis of 
elements of continuity and change in Mongolian state formation. 
Yet, how does one analyse continuity and change? Which facts 
provide the material of analysis, and against which values should 
the material be evaluated?  
What I mainly wanted to comprehend historically was the mutual 
constitution of the political and the economic over time, and the 
role of law in that constitutional process.  The purpose of 
developing an historical perspective was to determine whether or 
not Mongolia’s extractive transition was consolidating or eroding 
the political control of the state over processes of accumulation. I 
selected historical facts on the basis of whether they shed light on 
this co-constitutive relation, using primarily Western and 
translated historical and anthropological sources to provide 
accounts of early Mongolian history (see Chapter Two). I was able 
to use a combination of Western and translated Soviet sources for 
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Mongolia’s socialist history, as well as translations of Mongolia’s 
socialist constitutions and legal commentaries. Fully cognisant of 
the limitations of external sources on Mongolian history, I limited 
my analysis to identifying broad patterns of political-economic 
change. 
The primacy of the historical and, consequently, the emphasis on 
the process of institutional transformation entailed an integrated 
approach to data collection and analysis, where the purpose of 
explicating a seemingly singular issue (e.g. the construction of 
Mongolia’s mining regime) is located ‘in a relation of mutual 
determination with an external field of social forces’ (Burawoy, 
1998: 20). The approach I employed was similar to Burawoy’s 
‘extended case method’ (1998: 5) which aims ‘to extract the 
general from the unique, to move from the “micro” to the “macro,” 
and to the connect the present to the past in anticipation of the 
future, all by building on pre-existing theory.’ This sounds nice 
and straightforward, as if a straight line could be drawn from the 
particular to the general, but in my experience, there was much 
to-ing and fro-ing between the poles. However, at the beginning, 
and in line with Burawoy’s method, I began the research process 
with a theoretical concern11 and then proceeded to analyse a 
particular phenomenon. After analysing a handful of community 
claims against mining companies, I found that the theoretical 
terms of my inquiry were not producing interesting results, as the 
claims were fairly generic.  
In October 2014, I entered the fieldwork stage, with a few 
hunches but mostly questions about how civil society had come to 
organise itself in relation to the mining industry, why investment 
had dried up so suddenly in 2013, and how the state was 
responding to the social and environmental impacts of mining. As 
 
11 Initially the question of recognition and belonging in the Mongolian nation-
state with the advent of ‘global’ claim-making processes by “local 
communities” vis-à-vis mining companies. 
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I was interested in gathering data from the ground up, using an 
inductive approach, I gathered contacts using the “snowball” 
method and gradually developing a network of contacts. My 
concerns at this stage were still in the state-society nexus, 
focusing on questions of citizenship, civic activism and the state 
as a mediator between corporate and community interests. I 
spent two months in Mongolia, mainly in Ulaanbaatar, conducting 
a few semi-structured interviews and observing various civil 
society forums about mining. I interviewed representatives from 
socio-environmental NGOs, consulting companies, mining 
companies and international financial institutions. I observed 
three civil society forums about the social and environmental 
impacts of mining and one government-sponsored forum about 
Community Development Agreements (see Appendix One). 
In the year that followed the first exploratory phase of fieldwork, 
I mapped out different social and environmental governance 
initiatives by the state, international institutions (i.e., the World 
Bank) and mining companies, as well as civil activism strategies. I 
identified the discourses of problem-identification and problem-
solving espoused by the various types of actors involved, 
examining both primary documents and interview data for 
implicit and explicit narratives. What surprised me was that 
where I had expected antagonism and conflict between the 
governance paradigms of the state, corporate and NGO sector, 
there was in fact a surprising degree of unity, apart from a 
minority of environmental activists. The focus of each 
“stakeholder” group seemed to be on public-private 
“collaboration” in governance and legal (as opposed to overtly 
political) solutions to corporate-community conflict. In 2014, the 
same year that I left for the first round of fieldwork, the 
Mongolian government had published a new state policy on the 
minerals sector, which explicitly set out the priorities of mining 
governance as the stability of the investment environment, and 
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proceeded to outline how the mining sector, the government and 
civil society were all supposed to work together amicably to this 
end. This intrigued me because it seemed to indicate that 
resistant elements, which had been visible between 2004 and 
2013 particularly, had quite suddenly been submerged or 
disappeared altogether. How had this apparent “consensus” been 
so suddenly reached? 
In October 2015, I returned to the field and set out to learn more 
about how state institutions and actors were interfacing with 
mining companies and civil society, not as passive mediators but 
with their own strategic focus. Using the network I had previously 
established, which led me to further contacts, I met with more 
representatives from mining companies, investor associations, 
policy-makers and state officials, particularly focused on 
interviews with government officials from the Ministry of Mining, 
the Mineral Resources Agency of Mongolia, the State Inspection 
Agency, officials from sub-national administrations, and Erdenes 
Mongol (a state-owned enterprise (SOEs) which manages the 
state’s shares in mining projects).  I also pursued more interviews 
with civil society organisations and institutions during this 
fieldtrip as well, although my focus had shifted towards 
government/investment representatives in contrast with my 
initial fieldtrip. The interviews were semi-structured, in that I 
pursued a line of questioning but digressions from that line were 
welcomed since part of the intention of the interview was to learn 
not only about the formation of the mining regime, but also to 
become aware of new issues and legal developments. During the 
second field trip, I also observed three forums (two national level, 
one regional level) which focused upon different aspects of 
mining governance (transparency, corporate social responsibility, 
and local economic impacts respectively). 
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In total, I conducted thirty-four interviews: seventeen interviews 
with representatives from key government ministries, agencies 
and administrations; eleven interviews with representatives from 
organised civil society, governance consultancies, and 
international financial institutions; and six interviews with 
representatives from the mining/investment sector (see 
Appendix One for interview schedule). Broadly categorised, these 
interviews fall into three clusters: government, NGOs and 
international organisations, and business. However, I hope that it 
becomes evident how these groupings of actors transcend the 
political, social and economic categories associated with them 
respectively. I cite the interviewees by role rather than by name 
The interview questions (see samples, Appendix Two) were 
broad and typically asked the interviewee to describe the 2012-
2013 investment crisis, identify its causes and evaluate the state’s 
response to it. While I “knew” this history quite well myself, I was 
interested in the interviewees’ framing of the “problem” and to 
what extent the state’s role was portrayed as the source of the 
crisis, or whether the nature of capital investment itself was 
identified as a problem. I typically also asked the interviewee to 
share their perceptions of other “stakeholders” in the mining 
regime, and the relationships between them (i.e., environmental 
activists and the government and/or mining companies, the 
government and mining companies and/or international financial 
institutions (IFIs)). This interview technique was chosen to 
generate insights into the framing of power within the mining 
regime as “political”, “economic” and “social”, and I asked 
questions about the extent to which economic actors were 
perceived as having political influence and the appropriate role 
for each “type” of actor. Similarly, I sought to generate reflection 
on legal developments as an historical process, whether progress 
was seen to have been made and why, and what the role of law 
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was seen to be in relation to the categorisation of power 
(economic/political) and the role of the state.  
Tracking the trajectory of Mongolia’s mining regime through the 
lens of legal developments provides a crucial insight into the 
social struggle for power over the process of extractive 
development. The law has played an ambivalent role in the sense 
that its conflicts reveal the balance of power between competing 
interests in the bid to develop an export-oriented extractive 
development strategy. The law also empirically attests to the 
state’s negotiation with global capital(ists), and simultaneous 
struggle to maintain political legitimacy with its national 
constituency (Streeck, 2014). As the case of Mongolia 
demonstrates, these battles for hegemony12 within the state are 
fought out over time. Consequently, examining the historical 
development of law from a socio-legal perspective was an 
appropriate and illuminating methodological choice to 
understand not only the framework but the dynamics of conflict 
over Mongolia’s resource wealth. 
From a socio-legal methodological perspective, the relatively 
submerged nature of law does not render it any less central to the 
analysis, because the context and sub-text of law may be given as 
much if not more analytical emphasis as the legal texts 
themselves (Frerichs, 2012; Perry-Kessaris, 2013). This is the 
central distinction between a “socio-legal” and “legal” approach, 
the latter reading law from the standpoint of doctrinal coherency. 
As Amanda Perry-Kessaris writes in Approaches to the Study of 
International Economic Law, ‘socio-legal approaches consider not 
only legal texts, but also the contexts in which they are created, 
destroyed, abused, avoided, and so on; and sometimes their sub-
 
12 Hegemony contrasts with ‘supremacy’ or outright domination in that sense 
that it ‘combines coercion and consent, force and persuasion in an ethical, 
cultural and political process whereby the principal ideals, institutions and 
material potentials of the leading social forces are legitimised’ (Gill & Cutler, 
2014: 317).  
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texts’ (2013: 6). Perry-Kessaris then goes on to quote Sabine 
Frehrichs at length, which I include in full because it strikes at the 
heart of the socio-legal methodology that I have used:  
By text I mean the legal text, that is, the written rules 
and doctrines, or what can be considered black letter 
law. By subtext I refer to the moral subtext of a legal 
text, that is, its implied or deeper meaning. This 
includes the different notions of justice underlying a 
legal argument which make it necessary also to read 
between the lines. By context I refer to the social 
context of a legal text, that is, its forceful link with 
reality. In this perspective, law is not a self-contained 
discourse but a powerful social institution. (2012: 9 
cited in ibid: 6-7) 
In this thesis, I have partly focused on developing the historical, 
political and economic context for Mongolia’s mining regime, 
setting the stages of legal development within a broader 
trajectory of political and economic change. Chapter Two 
historicises Mongolia’s emergence as a market democracy, 
highlighting the gradual distinction of the state from the 
economic sphere and broad patterns of political-economy 
through the aristocratic-pastoralist (12th – 20th century), 
communist-industrialist (20th century), and the post-1991 
democratic-free market periods. In this analysis, I highlight the 
symbiosis between the form of state and patterns of 
accumulation, maintaining the centrality of the state as an enabler 
of “economic” production.  
In Chapter Three, I look to recent history to analyse different 
phases of contemporary legal development in Mongolia’s mining 
regime, focusing on both the content of the minerals legislation 
itself and the context of political influences that shaped it at 
different points between 1994 and 2014. Chapter Four analyses 
the post-2014 stability consensus that has been institutionalised 
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to reinvigorate failing market confidence in Mongolia’s extractive 
sector, entailing a selective restructuring of democratic features 
of the state. Two “axes of reordering” are observed, notably the 
redistribution of decision-making power between the executive 
and the legislative within the central state, and the restriction of 
self-government in favour of central state management at the 
sub-national level of government. In Chapter Five, I shift focus 
away from state institutions towards the relationship between 
the state and organised civil society, highlighting a third axis of 
reordering as a result of the emerging stability consensus: the 
exclusion of conflictual social movements from formal mining 
governance processes and debates. The reordering processes 
described were largely achieved through legal mechanisms, 
constraining the kind of political and social power that had been 
perceived as disruptive to investor confidence.13 Chapter Six 
focuses on the practical and normative implications of these 
textual and contextual legal developments for the democratic 
state, fleshing out the concrete risks for democratic institutions 
and values in Mongolia. I conclude with a cautionary reflection 
about the constitutional tension within FDI-dependent 
democracies. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I introduced the thesis research context, 
conceptual framework, and case study, as well as highlighted key 
aspects of the research process and socio-legal methodology. I 
argued that Mongolia’s transition to a mineral-exporting economy 
should be understood in the context of the re-constitution of state 
power in relation to transnational capital. A critical constitutional 
perspective denaturalises the separation of the political and the 
 
13 The fact that this reordering process was largely unaffected by the 
parliamentary election cycle (June, 2016) when the opposition party won, 
reinforces my claim that a constitutional change, as opposed to a mere policy 
shift, occurred during the 2014 reform process to stabilise the investment 
environment. 
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economic in the governance of market economies (Anderson, 
2014: 281-282), in order to explicate the way that legal, political 
and economic relations constitute a broader social order 
(Frehrichs, 2011: 68). 
In sum, global economic integration necessitates the state’s 
alignment with the structures and agents of transnational capital 
(Schneiderman, 2013; Tan, 2013; Sassen, 2007). To enhance their 
competitiveness, states may enter into bilateral, regional or 
multilateral trade and investment agreements, undertake 
domestic legal reform to remove barriers to capital investment 
and engage in more discursive “nation branding” exercises. Global 
economic integration can have a transformative, or reordering, 
effect on national states by creating ‘constitution-like’ 
(Schneiderman, 2008: 8) limits on state action in relation to the 
economy, redistributing power between public and private 
actors, and shifting the normative priorities of the state. These 
fundamentally constitutional dimensions of economic 
“development” are under-recognised in global and national 
policy-making and by mainstream academic literature on the 
subjects of economic development, democratisation, international 
economic and investment law, and constitutional law. The 
Mongolian case provides an in-depth perspective on the 
transformative potential of global economic integration for 
vulnerable, capital-importing states, by demonstrating the way 
that certain aspects of national democratic politics and law have 
had to be constrained in order to ensure a “stable” investment 
environment for FDI.  
Later chapters (Three, Four, Five) will demonstrate the way that 
the transnational legal norm of stability (for the investment 
environment) became hegemonic in Mongolia’s mining 
governance regime after 2014, which was part of the overall 
renegotiation of the scope of legitimate state action in the 
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economy. However, it is first necessary to establish the historical 
context of Mongolian state formation, to see how this most recent 
phase of reordering fits into a longer continuum of state-capital 
relations. This is the subject of the following chapter.  
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Chapter Two 
The Co-Constitutive Dynamic of the 
Mongolian State and Economy in Historical 
Perspective 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an historical foundation for the thesis that 
Mongolia’s “extractive turn” towards a mining economy (1994-
2014) has been equally a process of state transformation and de 
facto constitutionalism; a new boundary between the political 
and the economic has been demarcated over time through legal 
and institutional change. As I indicated in the previous chapter, 
the division of the political and economic into separate spheres, a 
fundamentally constitutional exercise, has been consolidated and 
deepened within Mongolia’s mining regime. The institutional 
separation of the economic from the political in the context of 
global economic integrations functions to ‘prevent national 
interference with the property rights and exit and entry options 
of holders of mobile capital’ (Gill, 2008: 132), thereby limiting the 
democratic power of the state to regulate the economy according 
to national preferences. Furthermore, the bureaucratic and 
administrative power of the state has been reorganised to 
incorporate Mongolia’s mineral wealth into the global minerals 
market. This ‘neoliberal configuration’ (Schneiderman, 2015: 66), 
where ‘the economy functions as an internal limit on government’ 
(ibid) 14  marks a substantial development within Mongolia’s 
longer history of state-economic relations. I argue that Mongolia’s 
extractive transformation must be regarded in terms of a de facto 
constitutional process in order to adequately conceptualise the 
 
14 Elsewhere, Schneiderman (2013: 35, citing Harvey, 2005: 2) defines 
neoliberalism as ‘a theory of political economy which hypothesises that human 
well-being will be advanced by the practices associated with the free market. It 
is the role of the state to “create and preserve and institutional framework 
appropriate to such practices.”’ 
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more fundamental reordering that is at stake in this “economic” 
change.  
The fact that there is a political-legal dimension to Mongolia’s 
contemporary “economic” transformation as a mining economy is 
not unique to this particular reordering process, but the extent to 
which it marks continuities and breaks in historical patterns of 
state-economic formation is significant. Each major shift in the 
organisation of economic production in the territory of Mongolia 
has been accompanied by a reorganisation of state power, and 
vice versa, reinforcing the co-constitutive pattern of relations of 
production and state. The ‘instituted’ nature of economic systems 
in general (Polanyi, 1957: 248) makes historical analysis of power 
and production not only interesting, but a vital component to 
understanding the meaning and implications of any current 
development. For example, with regard to Mongolia’s emerging 
mining economy, the alienation of public state-owned land for the 
purposes of “extractive development” (i.e., mining of minerals) by 
private companies marks a strong break with the past, when the 
state had exclusive control over territory. The opening up of 
Mongolia’s minerals to foreign investment also led to the 
renegotiation of the relationship between the central government 
and sub-national administrations. This axis of state governance 
has historically played a strategic role in consolidating state 
authority over semi-nomadic rural subjects, as will be discussed 
later in this chapter; local governments have historically played a 
critical role in relation to rural administration.  
Furthermore, the creation of a legal and institutional framework 
to enable and protect foreign capital investment legally and 
politically under the 1997 Minerals Law was no minor policy 
shift. It involved a substantial ‘denationalisation’ of state 
functions and the ‘internationalisation’ of law and policy (Jessop, 
1999: 7, 10), as the Mongolian state oriented to global capital. 
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‘Denationalisation,’ in Jessop’s (ibid: 7) terms, ‘involves the active 
re-articulation of the various functions of the national state’ 
(ibid), such as ‘shifts in the relative power of the executive, 
legislature, and judiciary… [and] the reordering of relations 
among different political tiers’ (ibid). In addition to the 
‘structural’ (ibid: 6) aspects of denationalisation, 
‘internationalisation’ (ibid: 10) concerns the ‘strategic orientation 
[of the state] and the changing nature of policy-making.’ More 
specifically, it refers  
to the increased strategic significance of the 
international context of domestic state action and the 
latter’s extension to a wide range of extraterritorial 
and transnational factors and processes. It involves 
both a change in the balance of the state’s strategic 
orientations to different scales of political action and a 
change in the relative importance of national and 
international sources of policy. This shift blurs the 
distinction between domestic and foreign policy, and 
widens the territorial bases of actors who are either 
directly involved in decision-making and/or whose 
opinions and likely reactions are taken into account’ 
(ibid: 10).  
Thus, the growing influence of transnational actors and processes 
on “national” governance in Mongolia in the context of the mining 
economy has structural and strategic implications for the state.  
However, while I argue that the denationalisation and 
internationalisation of the state is unique to Mongolia’s current 
period of “global” state transformation, similar structural and 
strategic shifts have taken place at other significant junctures in 
Mongolia’s history. In particular, Mongolia’s socialist 
transformation in the early twentieth century occurred in much 
the same way, except that it involved the nationalisation and 
regionalisation of the state in terms of structure and strategic 
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orientation. The Mongolian state broke away from Han Chinese 
influence and found a new position as a socialist-nationalist 
“aligned” state with the Soviet Union. Again, this was not simply a 
geo-political shift, but played a crucial role in the Mongolian 
state’s capitalist transformation through Soviet industrialisation 
programmes.  
In light of these conceptual considerations, I put forward an 
alternate reading of Mongolian history in this chapter by 
examining the co-constitutive nature of political-legal institutions 
and economic systems over time. The majority of development 
literature and narratives about Mongolia contrast the socialist 
and democratic periods of history as antitheses in terms of state-
economy relations (Rossabi, 2005; Korsun & Murrell, 1995; 
Reinert, 2000). While there were definitive changes at the point 
of transition in the early 1990s, I argue that there has been a 
gradual “dis-embedding” (Polanyi, 1944/2001: 60) of the 
economy from the political-institutional sphere through the 
aristocratic-pastoralist, communist-industrialist and democratic-
market periods. In this process, there are a number of significant 
continuities and changes. The historical role of sub-national 
administrations as key axes of state governance continues to have 
contemporary significance. At the same time, there are some 
“breaks” with past state formations, as the Mongolian state 
adjusts to the regulatory preferences of foreign private capital, as 
well as a renewed geo-economic dependency upon China. These 
continuities and changes highlight the ways that the state in 
Mongolia continues to adapt rather than decline overall. 
Conceptual Foundations: Instituted Economy and 
the Role of the State  
In the previous chapter, I outlined the conceptual framework for 
the thesis as state transformation and legal ordering in its global 
and transnational modes, situating the Mongolian case study 
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within the broader literature on new constitutionalism. This 
literature is characterised by concern with ‘the uneven 
emergence of a de facto constitutional governance structure for 
the world market (one that is intended to operate regionally, 
nationally and globally)’ (Cutler, 2015: 89), which primarily 
serves to protect the preferences of capital investors (e.g., 
property rights, capital mobility, commercial dispute resolution 
forms, etc.,). New constitutionalism is concerned with 
institutional developments, as well as normative questions about 
the governance of the global political economy: ‘[it] asks what 
values get promoted and who benefits from the institutional 
arrangements promoting global economic integration’ 
(Schneiderman, 2015: 67, citing Strange, 1988: 18). I am 
particularly interested in the way that the preferences of foreign 
investors have been ‘locked’ (Gill, 1998) into Mongolia’s national 
system of law and policy-making through a strategic combination 
of institutional mechanisms, financial incentives and anti-political 
pressures.  
In this thesis, the recurring question underlying its methodology 
relates to the way that state-economic orders are instituted 
politically and legally. When it comes to Mongolia’s extractive 
economy, how has it been instituted in terms of political and legal 
action? Who or what facilitates the reorganisation of productive 
forces, or fails to prevent it? As a site of dominant political-
juridical power, the state is a fundamental reference point in 
order to understand the process and implications of economic 
change. More specifically, conceiving of the state as a ‘site of 
strategic action’ (Jessop, 1990: 10) is useful as a means of 
exploring various social conditions (political, legal, ideological) 
that shape the reorganisation of production because it 
emphasises the role of authoritative action. The focus on the state 
as the most privileged site of political-juridical power further 
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emphasises the way in which alternative social futures are being 
actively closed off and ‘forgotten’ (Schneiderman, 2013: 35, 18). 
This is an important sub-text of this chapter and the two 
following, which seek to explain the manner in which particular 
state forms and economic organisation have come to dominate 
over alternatives.  
The contemporary literature on constitutional or ‘constitution-
like’ (Schneiderman, 2008: 8; 2015: 67) processes and 
transnational forms of ordering within the global political 
economy has proliferated within the context of a “Polanyian turn” 
in the study of law, institutions and ‘transnational markets’ 
(Joerges & Falke, 2011: 1). As Joerges & Falke (ibid: 2) put it, Karl 
Polanyi’s ‘notion of embeddedness’ critiques the understanding  
of any organic, let alone harmonious, evolution of 
modern economies and societies… The capitalist 
economy is, instead, characterised as a product of 
deliberate, inherently contradictory, political action, 
with movement promoting a disembedding of the 
economy from social institutions, on the one hand, and 
counter-movements striving for protection against the 
destructive implications of such dis-embedment, on the 
other. 
The role of the state in relation to the institutionalisation of the 
economy will be briefly outlined below, before moving on to the 
substantive discussion of the Mongolian case.  
Karl Polanyi’s seminal work – The Great Transformation 
(1944/2001) – critiques the abstract conceptualisation of the 
market economy in neoclassical economics, epitomised in the 
work of Friedrich von Hayek. Polanyi carefully constructed an 
historical account of the formation of a “self-regulating” market 
economy in England, as well as a global financial system based on 
the Gold Standard, in the late nineteenth century. Polanyi’s 
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account provides ample and definitive evidence of the way that 
the state actively constructs and maintains the domain of the 
market economy through legal and political institutions, such as 
guaranteeing the ‘continuity of titles to property’ upon which the 
market system depends (ibid: 243). Polanyi understood the 
separation of political and economic spheres as a distinctive 
product of the historical institutionalisation of the ‘self-regulating 
market’ (1944/2001: 74; Ebner, 2011: 22-23). In his words, ‘a 
self-regulating market demands nothing less than the 
institutional separation of society into an economic and political 
sphere’ (Polanyi, 1944/2001: 74). Polanyi emphasised the 
historically constructed nature of this apparent separation in 
order to denaturalise it, contra Hayek (1944/2001), for whom the 
formation of markets independent of the political sphere was a 
sign of civilisation and organic progress.  
Crucially, Polanyi recognised the role of the state in the formation 
of a sphere of economic exchange based on price mechanisms, 
economic value and the law of contract, as well as the state’s 
potential to help ameliorate the social ‘dislocations’ associated 
with the commodification15 of labour, the environment and 
money within the market framework of exchange (Polanyi, 
1944/2001: 59-60, 71-80; Ebner, 2011: 21). Markets presume 
certain types of social relations, notably characterised by 
commercial motivations and contractual relationships (Ebner, 
2011: 30). As Polanyi (1944/2001: 71) puts it, ‘a market economy 
is an economic system controlled, regulated and directed by 
market prices.’ He adds that, 
A further group of assumptions follows in respect to the 
state and its policy. Nothing must be allowed to inhibit 
 
15 Commodification can be defined as ‘the process of transforming social 
relations and processes, things (e.g. life-forms, land, natural resources) or ideas 
into commodities or good that can be bought and sold in capitalist markets’ 
(Gill & Cutler, 2014: 314).  
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the formation of markets… Neither price, nor supply, 
nor demand must be fixed or regulated; only such 
policies and measures are in order which help to 
ensure the self-regulation of the market by creating 
conditions which make the market the only organising 
power in the economic sphere (ibid). 
In this sense, ‘markets are never fully disembedded, for they 
always require some institutional scaffold to sustain their 
operation’ (Ebner, 2011: 27; Polanyi, 1944/2001: 71). However, 
the social basis of that ‘institutional scaffold’ (Ebner, 2011: 27) is 
crucial in terms of distinguishing what type of social relations the 
market is embedded in. For instance, while markets can be said to 
always be ‘politically embedded in distinct legal rules and 
institutions’ (ibid), these legal rules and institutions, depending 
on their location and motives, might reinforce rather the idea that 
the economy should be ‘organised in separate [economic] 
institutions, based on specific [economic] motives and conferring 
a special status’ (Polanyi 1944/2001: 60). This type of 
“embeddedness,” referring to the institutional architecture that 
supports the functioning of a market economy, is essentially a 
form of social ordering based on the market (ibid), where ‘rules 
and norms institutionalise the competitive order of market 
exchange’ (Ebner, 2011: 28).  
Embeddedness, in the normative sense in which Polanyi uses the 
term, refers to the economy being embedded in non-economic 
social relations, which effectively disrupts the commodification of 
people, land and money. Thus, while markets do involve a 
particular kind of sociality, Polanyi’s understanding of the “social” 
is a specifically de-commodified notion, where relations are 
regulated by non-economic institutions and norms. As Ebner 
argues (2011: 33), Polanyi’s connection between embeddedness 
and decommodification is a ‘crucial’ dimension of Polanyi’s 
normative contribution to the study of the ‘formation of 
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transnational markets’: the description of the political-legal 
coordination of markets is part of a critique of the particular kind 
of social relations involved. In fact, as Schneiderman points out 
(2008: 4), Polanyi was one of the first to link the idea of liberal 
constitutionalism with its function as a ‘device for securing 
uniformity and homogeneity in state practices’ for the purposes 
of instituting a separate economic sphere.  
The historical rendering of the instituted nature of the economy, 
inspired by Polanyi’s approach, dovetails neatly with the working 
definition of the state given in the first chapter, described as ‘an 
ensemble of juridical-political institutions and regulatory 
capacities grounded in the territorialisation of political power’ 
(Brenner et al, 2003: 7). The idea of state power as an ‘ensemble’ 
helpfully breaks down the concept of the state as a unitary 
institution. For example, the power of the state is constituted by 
diverse forms of power (e.g., administrative, legislative, 
bureaucratic, authoritarian, democratic), political and economic 
constituents (e.g., voters, financiers) and mediated by different 
institutions. The following exposition of Mongolian history will 
examine the role of the state in relation to the organisation of the 
economy during three distinct periods (aristocratic pastoralist, 
communist-industrialist, democratic-market) in order to 
illuminate the way in which state-economic relations have shifted 
over time, with reference to geopolitical context, socio-political 
constitution and normative-juridical structure. I argue that, prior 
to state socialism in the twentieth century, the economic sphere 
was firmly entangled within political relations, but became 
gradually ‘disembedded’ from that position. The industrialising 
impetus of the socialist state gradually distinguished the economy 
from the state, as will be demonstrated in due course, but it was 
only in the context of the post-socialist transition that the 
creation of a “free” market economy (i.e., outside of the state’s 
direct control) was attempted. This historical background lays the 
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foundation for the development of my argument that Mongolia’s 
extractive transformation since the late 1990s has been 
consolidated institutionally through the protection of the mining 
regime from national “political” influences that could challenge 
the interests of transnational capitalists.  
Before embarking on the next section, it must be stated at the 
outset of the substantive portion of this chapter that I am heavily 
indebted to the work of David Sneath and other political 
anthropologists for the analysis of early (pre-socialist) Mongolian 
statecraft. Favouring methods that examine the complexity of 
historical social relations, anthropological sources have been 
invaluable for deconstructing the developmentalist assumptions 
that have characterised both Western (capitalist) and Soviet 
(technological Marxist) renderings of Mongolian history in the 
twentieth century. This chapter is a re-reading of mostly 
secondary historical sources with regard to pre-socialist state 
forms, although I do work with primary legal and policy texts 
from the socialist and democratic periods in the latter part of the 
chapter. Aware of the paucity of literature by Mongolians about 
their history and the limitation of my Mongolian language ability, 
I only attempt a modest overview of state-economic nexus as 
relevant to my thesis, in order to show systemic trends.  
State-Economic Relations Prior to the National State: 
An Overview of the Mongol Aristocratic-Pastoral 
Order (Twelfth – Twentieth Centuries) 
Without the a priori separation of the social forms into 
tribe or state by their presumed essences, we can see 
state and state-conditioned processes distributed 
through the lifeworlds of those subject to all manner of 
political authorities. This appears to have been as true 
of pastoral aristocratic orders as it is of the industrial 
“governmental” state.  
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– David Sneath (2007: 4) 
There has been a strong tendency in Western anthropological and 
political theory, as well as popular culture, to idealise the 
nomadic culture of the steppe as egalitarian and opposed to the 
hierarchical, bureaucratic structures of sedentary states (Sneath, 
2007). Through the lenses of evolutionary political theory, 
nomadic societies have typically been cast within the framework 
of tribalism. In the Mongolian case this is particularly so: Mongol 
society has regularly been designated as “tribal” (ibid: 53-54), 
characterised by an egalitarian political culture and simple modes 
of production (pastoral nomadism), or as a form of feudalism 
(Bold, 2001; Sneath, 2007: 125-131). As will be discussed later in 
the chapter, the feudalist frame served a critical narrative 
purpose for the communist revolutionaries in the early twentieth 
century, who portrayed the political and religious nobility as 
feudal overlords to be overthrown. In the anthropological 
literature, Mongols have also been regularly portrayed as fiercely 
independent, horizontally organised social groups lacking 
centralised authority or the type of stratification needed for class 
formation (Sneath, 2007: 2-5). The presumed lack of hierarchy 
was based on an assumption that nomadic, mobile societies were 
a pre-political form of social organisation, having not acquired the 
complex political structures found in sedentary societies, such as 
stratification, centralisation and class formation (ibid: 53, citing 
Burnham, 1979: 349-360, Dahl, 1979: 261-280; Bold, 2001). In 
many ways, these perceptions have informed contemporary 
popular representations of Mongolia, both Western and 
Mongolian. The image of independent nomads with complete 
freedom of movement has powerful “pre-political” (i.e., pre-
territorial) connotations, feeding modern national pride about 
Mongolians as “close to nature” and independent (Orhon, 2011), 
as well as reinforcing more negative tropes (i.e., “lazy”, 
“disorganised,” “distrustful”). 
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Notably, this “ideal-type” perspective about the nomad as 
wandering boundless and free (Sneath and Humphrey, 1990) is 
linked with the treatment of pastoralism as a simple subsistence 
mode of production, portrayed as both pre-political and pre-
economic. However, this simplistic understanding of early Mongol 
society simply lacks evidence after a closer analysis of primary 
historical texts and critical anthropological engagements with 
Mongol political and economic history. The movements of Mongol 
nomads have always been embedded within not only relations 
but institutions of rule (Sneath and Humphrey, 1999; Sneath, 
2010). While the establishment of the first Mongol nation-state in 
1921 – the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR)–manifested 
particularly modern territorial and national state characteristics, 
it was not the first instance of statecraft on the steppes of Inner 
Asia (Sneath, 2007). As far as we know, ethno-linguistic ‘house 
societies’ (Sneath, 2007: 111) have inhabited the region of Inner 
Asia from at least 200 B.C. with the Xiongnu Empire (ibid: 114; di 
Cosmo, 1994). Furthermore, as Sneath (2007: 16) emphasises, 
mobile pastoralism should be understood ‘as a political economy,’ 
in contrast to the tribal narrative that frames it ‘as a simple 
subsistence economy unable to support great complexity or 
hierarchy’ (ibid; 20). He argues that (ibid: 17), 
Mobile pastoralism is framed and transformed by 
political power just as sedentary agriculture is, and, 
while clearly different, it allows just as many 
possibilities for the accumulation of wealth and the 
construction of large-scale systems as agricultural 
techniques do. In both cases, the economic possibilities 
depend upon the nature of the property regimes that 
exist for resources and products and the wider political 
systems that frame them. 
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Map Two: Mongol Territories in the Twelfth Century prior to 
Chinggis Khan’s Empire (Source: Sneath, 2007: x) 
 
Socio-Political Constitution of the Early Mongol 
State 
Essentially, Sneath (2007, 2006) argues that the pre-socialist 
Mongol state was distinguished by its complex aristocratic 
political formation. Against the tribal construction of early 
Mongol society, he argues that Levi-Strauss’s idea of the ‘house 
society’ is more appropriate for understanding political forms in 
the Inner Asian region: tribal terminology inaccurately 
perpetuates the ‘mythical’ imagination of early Mongol society as 
‘the ideal-typical pastoral nomadic society, composed of 
egalitarian clans of fierce and free tribesmen’ (Sneath, 2007: 156; 
Sneath, 2009). Similarly, he uses the notion of ‘ruling houses’ to 
counteract the simplistic frame of feudalism that characterises 
much of the literature about Mongol statecraft during the 
Chinggisid and Qing empires. The feudal bias in the literature is 
argued both by Sneath and Skrynnikova to reflect a simplistic 
interpretation of Mongol ‘vocabularies of power’ (Sneath, 2006: 
11; Skrynnikova, 2006: 85-115), by primarily understanding the 
early Mongol state in kinship/tribal or feudal terms. A primary 
example of this oversimplification can be seen in the treatment of 
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the terms qarachu and bo’ol which are commonly translated 
respectively as “commoner” and “slave” (Skrynnikova, 2006: 87-
115). When translated, these terms fit neatly into a feudal 
imagination, close as they are to the notion of a vassal. However, a 
feudal order based on lord-vassal relations obscures the 
particular ‘institutions of submission-dominance’ (Sneath, 2006: 
12; Skrynnikova: 2006) that actually characterised political 
relations at the time. In contrast to the absolute nature of the 
lord-vassal relationship, the Mongol aristocratic order was based 
on relative and multiple layers of hierarchy:  
‘”Submission” as “slaves” did not mean the total 
deprivation of rights… the term bo’ol, then, does not 
mark a unit of the class structure [but] it models 
relations inside the unfolding political organisation… 
the terms bo’ol as well as qarachu (‘commoner’) mark 
hierarchy inside the political community and form part 
of the mechanism for socio-political integration. Bo’ol 
status gives both material benefit (transfer of 
allegiance to a stronger suzerain provides, 
correspondingly, a higher level of protection and 
patronage) and social status in a prestigious 
community. In no way did the term bo’ol mark a 
certain type of dependence. Dependence supposes an 
indispensable non-equality of the sides: the 
subordinated side receives partial compensation in the 
form of patronage, protection and help because it is 
not in a state to secure its existence independently; 
while the senior side demands recognition of 
dependence in some form (social and material). This is 
what we see in Mongolian society of pre-empire and 
empire periods. (Ibid: 101)  
This is important because it demonstrates that ‘pre-eminently 
political formations’ (Sneath, 2007) existed prior to the socialist 
nation-state, supported by a unique mode of production: pastoral 
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nomadism. To belong in the early Mongol polities was neither 
based purely on familial association or feudal domination, but 
reflected a complex “social contract” characterised by a 
distinctive form of statecraft itself, not simply a developmental 
step towards the formation of a “real” state (Sneath, 2007). 
Kinship relations were certainly an historical part of the social 
order of Inner Asia, but like class and ethnicity, not its principal 
basis (Sneath and Humphrey, 1999: 15). For example, even prior 
to the Mongol Empire in what is typically referred to as the “tribal 
era” of Mongolian history, ‘ruling houses or lineages were not 
related by descent to the people they ruled,’ (Sneath, 2006: 14), 
thus undermining the notion that kinship relations were primary 
in early political formations. As Sneath argues, Mongol 
aristocratic statecraft included a variety of ‘power technologies’ 
that we associate with states in political theory, such as 
stratification, forms of territorialisation, taxation and military 
service (Sneath, 2006: 16; 2007: 5).  
It is vital to note the centrality of the pastoral economy within 
this aristocratic system of rule; relations of production were 
thoroughly embedded within the socio-political relations of the 
state. The political and economic viability of both the aristocratic 
houses and, later, the monasteries depended upon the control of 
nomadic subjects and the productivity of livestock raising. 
Pastoral production was thus absolutely embedded within this 
political formation. This was partly due to the way that the 
control of nomadic subjects was critical to the legitimacy of the 
early Mongol state. Despite changes in the wider geopolitical 
environment in which Mongol ruling houses existed, the 
fundamental intertwining of the aristocracy and pastoral 
production meant that mobile pastoralism continued as a 
politically embedded economy up until the socialist period. The 
symbiosis of the political and economic during this period meant 
that it is not possible to draw a distinct line between state and the 
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pastoral economy, in the sense that the ‘property regime’ (Sneath, 
2007: 17) was fixed firmly within aristocratic power relations.  
 
Thus, the ‘allocation of subjects to domains of power was a key 
feature of aristocratic power’ (Sneath, 2006: 17). Against feudal 
forms of rule, however, this allocation occurred in a context 
where the nobility did not own land but exercised ‘collective 
sovereignty’ (ibid: 7) in the administration of pastoral production. 
According to Sneath (ibid), collective sovereignty conceptualises 
the way in which Mongol aristocracies treated rule as a ‘common 
project of the ruling house’ and consequently entailed a strong 
sense of loyalty among their nomadic subjects, who were 
integrated into the aristocratic order through the relative 
hierarchies of bo’ol and qarachu. “Economic” production was thus 
thoroughly embedded and difficult to differentiate within the 
socio-political hierarchy.  
Chinggis Khan’s conquest of Eastern and Central Asia in the 13th 
century, through the Middle East to the border of Western 
Europe, continues to be the most significant era of Mongolian 
history in terms of consolidating a strong sense of Mongol 
identity and territory. There are a number of reasons for this. 
Chinggis Khan united the fragmented ‘khanates’ (Sneath, 2010: 
110) into what we know of now as the ‘Chinggisid polity’ (Sneath, 
2010: 100) through military coercion, but also through the 
introduction of a written Mongolian script and the promulgation 
of a politico-religious myth on his divine ‘right to rule’ 
(Rachewiltz, 1973/2010: 167) based on the commonly-held 
shamanist worldview of Inner Asian pastoralists. Rachewiltz 
(ibid: 168) argues that this politico-religious myth was a critical 
ideological tool to the formation of a territorial Empire. 
Confounding expectations of the “boundless, wandering nomad,” 
the Mongolian identity that was forged through the Mongol 
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Empire was both mobile and territorial, with ‘intertwined’ 
(Munkh-Erdene, 2006: 57) ethno-linguistic and politico-religious 
discourses that imply a ‘conception of political unity’ between the 
Mongol people and early Mongol statecraft (Barthold, 1961: 21-
22 quoted in Rachewiltz 1973/2010: 168).  According to Munkh-
Erdene (2006: 60-61), the coincidence of these two discourses 
existed throughout the era of the Chinggisid polity through the 
Qing empire up until the socialist revolution of 1921. This strong 
sense of Mongol identity preceding the development of a national 
state explains the initial popular resistance to the secularisation 
and socialisation policies and purges of the socialist Party in the 
late 1920s and 1930s (Bawden, 1989: Chapter 7 and 8), as will be 
discussed in a later section. 
Map Three: Mongol Territory at the Height of the Mongol Empire 
(source: mongols.eu)  
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g the reign of Kubilai Khan,16 whose rule of the Mongol Empire 
has been characterised as a time of peace, disputes between the 
Mongol nobility destabilised the Empire as a whole. The Inner 
Asian region was fragmented into princedoms under the various 
Mongol nobles who had been given authority over portions of 
land by the Khan. In the second half of the sixteenth century, the 
 
16 Chinggis Khan’s grandson, who ruled the Mongol Empire at its height (1260-
1294). 
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adoption of Buddhism as the official religion of the Empire, 
following the conversion of Altan Khan (Bawden, 1968/1989: 28) 
added the power of Buddhist religious establishments to the 
interlocking milieu of political authorities of the period. In 
particular, the monasteries functioned in similar ways to the 
aristocratic ruling houses, imposing taxes upon the subjects of 
their domains and perpetuating a similar form of political 
relations based upon relative hierarchy and collective 
sovereignty. However, the rise of Buddhism also added strength 
to the growing sense of boundaries around what legitimately 
constituted Mongol identity.17 Integrated as it was into the 
political ideology of the state, the rise of Buddhist institutions was 
achieved not only through missionary activity by Tibetan 
Buddhist lamas but also through anti-shamanist violence, which 
forced the majority of Mongols to abandon their traditional 
beliefs (ibid: 32-33). As Bawden (ibid: 33) notes, 
While missionizing against the shamans, the lamas 
took care to identify themselves with the ruling class, 
with the result that while Buddhism thoroughly 
penetrated all levels of Mongol society in the coming 
centuries, organisationally it developed almost as a 
state within a state. It was a body distributing high 
titles, owning enormous wealth in flocks and herds and 
in serfs, and enjoying such political prestige that the 
Manchu emperors tacitly recognised the supreme head 
of the faith… the “Living Buddha” of Urga, as a quasi-
ruler over the people… From very early on the nobility 
and the higher clergy saw in mutual identification of 
interests the way to continuing power (see also ibid: 
69). 
 
17 The rise of Buddhism in Mongolia occurred at the expense of shamanism, 
which was gradually forced ‘underground’ or synthesised within a Buddhist 
framework (Bawden, 1968/1989: 32-33).  
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Map Four: Mongol Territory in the Manchu Qing Empire (Source: 
Sneath, 2007: xi) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The establishment of smaller domains of authority with the 
demise of the Mongol Empire and the rise of the Manchu Empire 
(also referred to as Qing Empire) imposed new limits upon the 
mobility of pastoral nomads. Fernandez-Gimenez (1999: 319) 
argues that this was ‘the first time that groups of herders were 
associated with fixed or specific territories.’ While this may be the 
case, it is important not to over-state this restriction of movement 
upon Mongol nomads seeing as extensive customary legal norms 
had existed around pasture rotation during the pre-Empire era 
(Sneath, 2001; Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999). It is not as if this 
establishment was the first “limit” for Mongol nomads, rather it 
reflected a deepened centralisation of authority which had always 
existed to varying degrees (Sneath, 2006: 17). Sneath (ibid) 
explains that, 
Certainly since the time of the Mongol Empire, and 
perhaps from long before it, the steppe aristocracy and 
its distinctive form of military-civil administration can 
be seen as the ‘sub-strata of power’ upon which 
grander imperial designs were based… the broader 
picture that emerges is of power structures more 
centralised… or less centralised, interacting in various 
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modes of articulation, competition and 
superimposition as part of contingent historical 
processes. 
For example, even in the ‘relatively decentralised political 
landscape’ (ibid: 17) of the 17th century when the Mongol empire 
had become properly factionalised between aristocratic groups 
(i.e., the Oirat and the Chinggisid nobility) and religious 
establishments, the system of rule retained its distinctly 
aristocratic hierarchy. The pastoral subjects of the ‘ruling houses’ 
were governed through administrative regulations to ‘[prevent] 
commoners defecting to the jurisdictions of other nobles’ (ibid; 
Natsagdorj, 1967/2010: 695). Despite the factional nature of 
post-Empire statecraft, there appears to have been a sense of 
administrative consensus between ruling houses, which was 
mutually reinforced. For example, the Mongol-Oirat Regulations 
of 1640, an agreement between competing noble groups, ‘reveal a 
mutual concern’ (ibid) to maintain the administrative boundaries 
of khoshuun (district) and aimag (province) and punish 
disobedient subjects who abandon their ‘allotted nutag (pastoral 
district)’ (ibid).  
When the Mongol nobles submitted to Manchu rule in 1691, 
Mongol territories were overlaid with a “colonial” administrative 
structure based on the boundaries – ‘banners’ – of the nobles’ 
land (Kaplonski, 2010: 639) and expanded the imperial 
architecture of statecraft again where it had contracted into 
smaller units with the demise of the Mongol Empire. Under 
Manchu authority, the boundaries of the khoshuun were 
reformulated into tighter ‘territorial-administrative units’ 
(Sneath, 2001: 44; Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999: 320). The 
administrative framework of khoshuun was incorporated by 
Manchu imperialists as a critical mechanism of local governance 
that enabled the ongoing functioning of the pastoral economy, 
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reflective of the way that ‘pastoralism and the political hierarchy 
were inextricably combined’ (Sneath, 2001: 47). Critically, 
Kaplonski (2010: 639; Sneath, 2001: 44) notes that these areas 
were divided into units and sub-units - soums and baghs - 
wherein the people were ‘divided into commoners and “personal 
retainers of the nobility.”’18 While the khoshuun reflected 
formalised boundaries by the Qing administration, customary 
flexibility was retained in the sense that the boundaries of the 
baghs (sub-districts) were more blurred, depending on the 
varying pasture needs of the small herding groups of around two 
to twelve families – khot ail – who moved together within the area 
(Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999: 320; Upton, 2009: 1401).  
Sustaining the Aristocratic State: Embedded 
Economy and Customary Norms 
The imposition of Manchu authority was colonial in the sense that 
it was a foreign power, but the aristocratic ‘sub-strata of power’ 
(Sneath, 2007: 4) remained fundamentally undisturbed, 
particularly in Outer Mongol lands.19 As Sneath (2006: 17) argues,  
The local power relations of aristocracy had all that 
was required to operate both the local political and 
economic formations of the khoshuu districts, and the 
wider Manchu imperial state into which they were 
later fitted. 
Under Manchu rule, customary Mongol law was codified, meaning 
that the regulation of pastureland and water were gradually 
brought under the auspices of the Qing Empire’s legal system 
(Kaplonski, 2010: 639). The law of custom and empire allegedly 
 
18 The institutionalisation of hierarchy within the baghs is similar to a 
governance strategy practiced during the Mongol Empire in conquered Chinese 
regions where an ‘intermediary structure composed of both Mongols and 
Chinese’ was established to maintain control over peasants and those most 
likely to escape the rule of the administration (Kaplonski, 2010: 639). 
19 In Inner Mongolia leagues were established in addition to the khoshuun ruled 
by the princes, which enabled the top-down rotation of authority designated 
by the Emperor. 
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operated side by side under the Qing Dynasty (Fernandez-
Gimenez, 1999: 231); it appears that the Manchu authorities had 
final authority and installed formal dispute settlement 
mechanisms, but generally allowed pastoralists to maintain 
customary practice within those formal boundaries. The 
‘administrative division’ (Sneath, 2001: 44) between the Inner 
and Outer Mongol lands established by the Manchu meant that 
the Qing Dynasty exercised less direct control over the latter. 
While each bagh (sub-district) had a tax-collector and an 
administrative office to resolve disputes, it appears that few 
formal disputes were recorded as the customary ‘first-come-first-
served law of the steppe’ (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999: 321) 
continued to prevail regarding campsites (Sneath, 2001: 44).  
This is an important observation because it demonstrates the way 
in which access to institutions of state entailed access to the mode 
of production: land, animals and pastoral labour. It reflects the 
way in which the control of state institutions – the nobility – was 
central to accessing productive processes, to the extent that there 
was no significant differentiation between the “political” and the 
“economic.” This is evident in the Mongolian term for government 
– zasagiin gazar – which can be understood as the place (gazar) 
from where pastoral land is administered (Sneath, 2001: 47). 
Additionally, it affirms the continuity of adaptive statecraft on the 
Mongol steppe, even in periods of conquest by foreign powers. 
The addition of layers of imperialism did not undermine the 
power per se of Mongol nobles, but resituated it within further 
layers of governance: the aristocracy was the ‘raw material for 
empire builders’ (Sneath, 2006: 18).20 This points to the tenacity 
of Mongol institutions in the context of changing political milieus, 
 
20 For example, Sneath and Boldbaatar (2006: 298-299) points out that Mongol 
princes were treated with exemplary regard by the Manchu administration and 
continued their aristocratic modes of governance despite becoming an 
auxiliary aspect of the overarching governance strategy of the Qing Empire. See 
also Di Cosmo, 2006.  
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and the importance of local institutions in a pastoral society. As 
the following sections will demonstrate, we can see the ways in 
which Mongolian state institutions have continued to adapt under 
new political and economic conditions, despite expressing 
varying degrees of centralised and decentralised authority 
(Sneath, 2007: 4). The significant axis of change relates to the 
state’s relationship to the economy, which became increasingly 
developed as a distinct area of state management following the 
1921 socialist revolution. The industrialisation of Mongolia’s 
economy during the period of state socialism laid the foundation 
for the “liberation” of the market from the direct control of the 
state during the transition to a market economy in the early 
1990s.  
However, the fact that herders themselves had ‘personal’ (if not 
private) property rights in the livestock (Sneath, 2001) prevented 
relations of total domination between the nobility and the 
“common” herder, as the latter were key to wealth creation. In 
this sense, the labour of herders was not fully alienated from the 
means of production. The inter-dependency of noble and 
commoner, reflected in property relations (Sneath, 2007: 17), 
entailed a position of significance for the nomadic subject. For 
example, it is debated as to whether princes had the right to 
alienate land or control land exclusively (Fernandez-Gimenez, 
1999: 321), as the rights to winter camps and pastures tended to 
be allocated based on customary use (ibid: 323). Even where 
princes were granted formal rights to pasture, Sneath (2001: 45; 
Bawden, 1968: 90-91) notes that customary norms of land use by 
“commoners” often overrode the Emperor’s law in practice as 
some herders were known to physically resist the arrival of 
princes claiming their pasture, suggesting that property was 
viewed as commonly held rather than exclusively held by the 
nobility (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999: 323). While the boundaries 
of nutag – the Mongol concept of territory – were enforced by the 
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nobility, the nutag itself as a geographical concept is based on the 
four customary seasonal pastures required in Mongol pastoral 
practice (ibid: 321).  
In this sense, then, the basic needs of the pastoral economy 
informed state governance and vice versa. The fact that the 
governance of pastureland and the mobility of pastoralists was 
central to the economic viability of early expressions of the 
Mongol state is an important insight into state-economy relations 
prior to the formation of the MPR in 1921. The economy was 
thoroughly integrated into the political system and sustained the 
aristocratic hierarchy. The economy did not exist in its own right 
as a “sphere” separate to the state.  
While it is not the purpose of this chapter to develop this era of 
Mongolian history in great detail, it is accurate to say that the 
pastoral mode of production was intertwined with state 
formation as opposed to existing prior to it. Customary norms 
were reinforced by Empire’s power, suggesting that at that time 
the political, juridical-normative and economic were part of the 
same social whole. The subject-state dynamic was not The Nomad 
vs. The Noble, but rather both were imbricated within the 
aristocratic-pastoral political economy. As Endicott (2012: 44) 
argues regarding early Mongol history (thirteenth century), 
responsibility for the nobility, or the Khan, was directly linked to 
his capacity to ensure ‘that pastureland and water [were] at least 
sufficient, if not abundant, for his own people.’ Authority to 
administrate land, water and mobility did not reflect the 
ownership of land (ibid), and the exercise of political authority 
appears to have been complementary with the requirements of 
pastoral nomadism. The governance of land, herds and pastoral 
labour thus perpetuated pastoralism as an embedded economy 
within Mongol social and state structures, as pastoralism 
sustained early Mongol polities.  
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Distinguishing the Economic from the Political: State 
Socialism, National Industrialisation and Regional 
Integration in the Soviet Union (1924 – 1990)  
Considering Mongolia’s history until the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the conceptual separation of political and 
economic life under the post-1990 market-democracy model 
reflects a rapid pace of social change. In the literature on 
Mongolia’s post-socialist transition, scholars emphasise the 
contrast between the socialist and democratic eras, especially 
highlighting the shift from a command economy to a deregulated 
market economy (Orhon, 2003; Rossabi, 2005). The latter binary 
view creates a false antagonism between the two, obscuring the 
way in which the socialist state prepared the foundation for 
market-based capitalist economic development by introducing 
the concept of labour, currency, surplus value extraction, 
investment, basic finance (i.e., banks and monetary policy) and 
industrial production. Rather than a radical break with the past, 
the marketization of the Mongolian economy since 1990 
represents a transformation within an industrial model of 
development, in which the state-economy distinction had already 
been firmly established.  
The socialist period was fundamental in terms of establishing the 
“economy” as a distinct institution from the political sphere to be 
governed by the state, a barely recognised legacy of that time. 
Despite being heavily regulated and under the command of the 
state, the creation of a separate economic sphere, in which the 
state acted with increasing displays of a distinctly economic 
rationality (efficiency, competition, profit maximisation), is 
significant in terms of breaking the pre-socialist conceptual unity 
between productive and political power. This section will outline 
the way in which an agrarian-industrial economy was established 
in outer Mongolia under the tutelage of the Soviet Union and how 
the country was integrated into a regional market. The creation of 
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a distinct economic sphere and limited market integration were 
essential stepping stones for Mongolia’s post-1990 economic 
integration into the global minerals sector.  
A Shifting Situation: New Geopolitical Challenges in 
the Early Twentieth Century 
The beginning of the twentieth century intensified the triangular 
competition for control over and access to Mongol resources and 
territory between Russia, China and Japan with the rise of 
nationalist statecraft (Kotkin, 1999: 3; Bawden, 1968/1989).21 
Mongol territory had been shaped by Qing-Russian border 
disputes as early as 1727, when the Qing-Russian Treaty of 
Khiatka established the outer boundary of Mongol (Qing) 
territory. The Qing Empire and Tsarist Russia began to 
disintegrate in the early years of the twentieth century with the 
rise of Han nationalism against the authority of the Manchu and 
the agitation of communist movements in Russia. Sino-Russian 
rivalry over Mongol territory intensified, as the Chinese began to 
pursue a policy of sovereign land acquisition and cultural 
assimilation in this region that had been historically governed 
under conditions of suzerainty (i.e., tributary relations).  
With the decline of the Qing Empire, the policy of the new Chinese 
authorities shifted from prohibition to promotion of land 
appropriation (Sneath, 2001: 54) particularly in Inner Mongolia 
where land was increasingly alienated for permanent agricultural 
settlements. Under Manchu leadership of the Qing Dynasty, 
customary Mongol practices of land use required by mobile 
 
21 This geopolitical dynamic has ongoing relevance for Mongolian state 
formation, in relation to China and Russia’s competition over access to 
Mongolian mineral resources in the early twenty-first century. One historian, 
Stephen Kotkin (1999, 17), emphasises that, ‘Mongol history, for better or 
worse, is Russian history and it is Chinese history.’ At the same time, he argues 
that such a recognition ‘must not degenerate into a one-way search for the 
influence of outsiders on the Mongols.’ As B. Baabar (1989/2010: 1037), 
arguably Mongolia’s most famous living historian, stated vehemently in Buu 
Mart: ‘Whether in Moscow or Beijing, let there never be a fashion to share 
jokes about a dying tribe called the Mongols!’  
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pastoralism had been generally respected. As Sneath notes (2001: 
51), ‘Mongolians had occupied a relatively privileged place in the 
social order.’ However, the emergence of Han Chinese nationalism 
changed this “soft” approach to the governance of territory. In 
particular, the scale of land appropriation – ‘land booms’ (Sneath, 
2001: 52) – by the Han-Manchu elites sparked a revolutionary 
reaction from Mongols. Lan (1999: 50) notes that ‘the Mongols 
demonstrated their opposition openly and repeatedly against the 
New Administration’: ‘creating Chinese administrative units, 
reducing the power of banner jasags (i.e., the power of the Mongol 
nobility and monasteries), and replacing Mongolian garrisons 
with Chinese troops’ along the border with Russia. Despite 
intense resistance and armed revolts in Inner Mongolia,22 the 
enclosure of land for cultivation was carried out under Manchu 
military coercion. In part, according to Lan (ibid: 53), the 
inefficacy of resistance in Inner Mongol territory was due to the 
lack of unity between the Mongol aristocracy:  
Most of their ruling princes were already partly 
sinicised and some of the Inner Mongolian princes 
approved the New Administration. 
 Observing the loss of relative autonomy and the violent 
disruption of the pastoral economy in Inner Mongolia, a more 
coordinated and unified group in Outer Mongolia sought to cut off 
their ‘alliance’ (ibid: 52) with the Qing Empire by seeking Russian 
support.  
Owen Lattimore (1934: 126 quoted in Sneath, 2001: 51) observed 
that ‘the futility of mere resistance as a method of preserving the 
integrity of Mongol territory and Mongol people’ led to the 
formation of an armed separatist movement in the Outer Mongol 
 
22 Strategies deployed included both indirect and direct forms of resistance: 
signing petitions, impeding land surveys, refusing to pay contract fees and land 
taxes, armed attacks on Chinese officials and the raiding of Chinese local 
governments (Lan, 1999: 49). 
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lands. For Mongols in the Inner Mongol area of the old Qing 
Dynasty, the new Han authorities ‘standardized’ (Sneath, 2001: 
52) what was once a semi-autonomous region (amban) of the 
Empire into a closely administered province of the Chinese state. 
The ‘assimilationist’ (ibid) approach of the new Chinese state was 
instrumental in the development of a Mongol nation-state in the 
Outer Mongol lands and the claiming of Mongolian national 
identity. Lattimore (ibid) poignantly remarks that it was at this 
point in history that Mongol leaders recognised ‘the fact that 
independence cannot be maintained without the creation of social 
forms adequate to the life of a modern nation in a modern world.’ 
Thus, while mobile pastoralism has been shown to be 
‘inextricably combined’ (Sneath, 2001: 47) with the constitution 
of political authority and economy in Inner Asia, the 
establishment of a national, territorial state in response to the 
imperial expansionism of the Chinese state implied significant 
discontinuities in the administration of nomadic pastoralism. 
Specifically, the ‘broad strata of authority’ (Nisbet, 1974: 612) 
typifying the space between the nomadic subject and the 
sovereign which had enabled far more fluid boundaries collapsed 
as the state became defined by national borders.  
As the Qing Dynasty was steadily transformed into a Han 
nationalist state (Sneath, 2001: 49-53), the Mongol separatists 
faced the dilemma of safeguarding the Outer Mongol region from 
Chinese acquisition, as well as preventing Japanese economic 
interests and Russian warlords from threatening new forms of 
colonisation (ibid: 53). The Chinese threat at that time was the 
most pressing.23 A group of Mongol princes and senior Buddhist 
lamas organised a secret delegation to Russia to ask for 
 
23 In 1907, a Department of Colonisation was established in Beijing to enable 
the export of Han Chinese to Mongol territories and permit the acquisition of 
land (Kotkin and Elleman, 1999: 30). In 1911, the level of threat was 
heightened with the establishment of a ‘colonisation bureau’ (ibid) in 
Ulaanbaatar. 
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protection and assistance in July 1911 (Tatsuo, 1999: 71-72). 
There appears to have been no clear consensus about which form 
this assistance was to take, as some of the princes wanted 
independence from the Chinese and others wanted a restoration 
of their previous position within the Qing Empire. Fundamentally, 
Russian assistance was invited to prevent the New 
Administration but did not necessarily entail becoming a 
protectorate of Russia nor achieving full national independence in 
the minds of the Mongol drafters (ibid). In the letter delivered by 
the delegation to the Russian government, the perspective of the 
Mongol delegation was that they were no longer able to submit to 
the Manchu Emperor as they had peacefully done for 200 years, 
because of the new Qing policies of land appropriation, blaming 
the ‘”Han Chinese bureaucrats”’ for taking political power and 
bringing ‘”confusion and discord to the affairs of the state”’ 
(Khalka Delegation Letter, 1911 quoted in ibid: 72). According to 
Tatsuo’s translation (ibid: 73),  
the letter pointed out, “we cannot bear” the new policy 
of government, which was designed to “search out 
ways to turn Mongol land into farmland, which, if 
accomplished, will inevitably destroy our traditional 
way of life.” 
The emphasis of the delegation was upon preserving ‘peace and 
tranquillity’ and, above all, ‘our traditional way of life’ (ibid); it 
appears to have been more of a request for guaranteeing political 
space and the boundaries of a place in which the Mongol state 
(aristocratic and religious institutions) and society (nomadic) 
could continue. Between 1912 and 1921, a bargain was struck 
between Russia, Outer Mongolia and China whereby Russia would 
support the establishment of an autonomous Outer Mongolian 
region under Chinese suzerainty, led by the Mongol religious and 
political leader known as the Bogd Khan (ibid: 75; Bawden, 
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1968/1989). However, this set-up proved to be too weak to 
protect Mongolia from its southern neighbour. In 1918, the 
Chinese army returned ‘to prevent Soviet aggression feared from 
the north’ (Bawden, 1968/1989: 202), which led to the complete 
reinstatement of Chinese authority in 1920 in what Bawden (ibid) 
has described as ‘humiliating circumstances’ for the Mongols.  
While there is neither space nor necessity to cover this period of 
Mongolian state history in more detail, it must be said that this 
was a complex political moment for the Mongols. While Russia 
was clearly the preferred option to China, it is not equally clear 
that the Mongol revolutionaries were particularly inspired by 
Leninist-Marxism, apart from a few notable leaders such as 
Sukhbaatar and Choibalsen who have, in hindsight, been credited 
as the most influential actors on the revolutionary process. The 
narrative that emphasises these individuals’ commitment to 
socialist ideology obscures the lack of unity within the 
revolutionary leadership, between ‘rightist’ nationalists who 
prioritised Mongolian independence and ‘leftist’ revolutionaries 
who allegedly prioritised the wholesale “emancipation” of 
Mongolia from not only China but aristocratic-religious 
“feudalism” (see Bawden, 1968/1989: 277).  
Between 1921 and 1923, the Red Army drove out the Chinese and 
“White” Russians, and established sufficient territoriality to 
declare Mongolia an independent state. Rather than immediately 
socialising Mongolia’s only means of production – livestock – the 
new Mongolian state initially encouraged a form of managed 
capitalism in line with Lenin’s New Economic Policy to boost 
economic recovery. In 1924, the Mongol State Bank was 
established, with the tugrig as the national currency. 
Interestingly, some currency speculation was permitted at this 
time and commercial transactions were taking place without 
significant interference from the state (ibid: 274). Mongolia’s 
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limited industry (a handful of factories) and services sector was 
primarily driven by foreign companies; Mongols themselves were 
primarily occupied in the pastoral sector. While Mongolia’s 
socialist transition was narrated later by socialist historians – 
Mongolian and Russian – as a triumph of the peasant over the 
feudal lord, the historical reality suggests a much more complex 
and violent picture, driven by geopolitical necessity.  
Socialist Constitutionalism: New Institutions and 
Revolutionary Legality for the Mongol People’s 
Republic 
In 1920, D. Sukhbaatar and a small group of revolutionary Mongol 
leaders sought the assistance of the Red Army in securing the 
borders of the Outer Mongol territories and established a 
revolutionary government that operated through a compact with 
the Bogd Khan, the presiding Buddhist suzerain (Butler & 
Nathanson, 1982: 174). After the Bogd Khan’s death in 1924, the 
new Mongolian Peoples’ Republic no longer required a 
compromise with the religious establishment and declared its 
independence as an aligned state of the Soviet Union, following 
the successful demarcation of its southern border with China. 
While the MPR maintained its formal independence from the 
Soviet Union, the group of revolutionary leaders adopted Leninist 
socialism as the governing ideology of the new Mongolian nation-
state. Caroline Humphrey (1978: 139), an eminent Mongolist, 
explains that it is essential to ‘take into consideration the political 
position of Mongolia as a nation-state’ following the declaration of 
its “independence” in 1921: 
Neither China nor the Soviet Union were going to 
follow a Mongolian policy. The Mongols had to decide 
which of their two neighbours offered the best 
prospects as protector and they then had no option but 
to act as an ally, loyal not only in foreign affairs but 
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also as a true follower of the ideology and social 
reconstruction.  
The introduction of Buddhism as an imperial religion had 
ultimately reinforced the cohesiveness of aristocratic socio-
political order by perpetuating the ‘intertwined’ ethno-linguistic 
and political-religious discourses that had come to define the 
‘conception of political unity’ between Mongol people and early 
Mongol statecraft (Munkh-Erdene, 2006: 55-57). Consequently, 
for the purposes of the more radical socialist revolutionaries, the 
destruction of the Buddhist church was seen as the key to the 
establishment of the socialist state. This was not only because 
Buddhism challenged socialism as a competing ideology, despite 
initial attempts to accommodate both (Bawden, 1968/1989: 264-
273), but because of the economic power vested in the 
lamaseries. While the new established Mongolian People’s 
Revolutionary Party (MPRP) had Soviet backing, the clergy 
outflanked the new political leadership both in terms of numbers 
and distribution throughout the country. According to Kaplonski 
(2011: 434), there were initially only 100-150 party members 
against 80,000-100,000 lamas, and the party members were 
mostly based in the capital city. Furthermore, the indigenisation 
of Buddhism among Mongols and the entrenched nature of the 
aristocratic-clerical order meant that ordinary Mongols, 
particularly outside of Ulaanbaatar, were deeply resistant to the 
destruction of clerical institutions. 
The death of the Bogd Khan provided a political opening for the 
adoption of socialist institutions (1924 Constitution of the 
Mongolian People’s Republic, Annex 1). In 1924, Mongolia 
adopted its first socialist constitution that called for the 
reorganisation of political and economic power in the name of the 
‘labouring people’ (ibid). Compared to later constitutions, this 
initial constitution bears limited resemblance to its Soviet 
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counterpart and is more nationalist in its language than socialist: 
‘the unified economic policy is in the hand of the Government’ 
(Article 3d). While the Constitution contextualises its ‘Declaration 
of the Rights of Labouring People’ with the acknowledgement that 
‘the labouring masses of the whole world are striving to uproot 
capitalism and to attain socialism’ (Article 3n), this 
internationalist statement is immediately followed by a 
nationalist ‘Note’:  
Nevertheless, as circumstances may demand, the 
possibility of entering into friendly relations with 
diverse foreign Powers is not excluded, provided, 
however, that any attempt against the independence of 
the Mongolian People’s Republic shall meet with 
decisive resistance in all circumstances. 
In fact, the text of the 1924 Constitution clearly reflects a 
Mongolian national adaptation of socialism. Private property in 
livestock was still permitted, while property in land, minerals, 
forests and waters were common property (Article 3a). The role 
of the state in relation to the economy had more a regulatory 
character than a completely socialised one,24 based on the fact 
that the basis of the new national economy – livestock – was 
personally owned. There was little surplus value to extract from 
herding, given that it had not been organised in a way to generate 
economic growth or maximise surplus value. Thus, while the ‘first 
real object of the Mongol Republic consists in the abolition of the 
remains of the feudal theocratic order’ (Article 2), consensus was 
initially absent as to the precise manner in which the new notion 
 
24 In Article 5 of the 1924 Constitution, the attributes of the ‘supreme organs of 
the Mongol People’s Republic’ included raising foreign and domestic loans 
(5a), to regulate foreign and domestic trade (5d), public economic planning 
(5e), to approve the Republic’s budget and establish taxes and revenues (5h), 
to organise currency and credit (5i), and to ‘establish the general principles of 
the use of land,’ define provincial boundaries, and ‘regulate the exploitation of 
mineral wealth, forests,’ etc (5j).  
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of a national economy should be governed, although that quickly 
changed. 
Developing a socialist legal system and institutional base was a 
critical step in consolidating the new state. Within the first ten 
years of the MPR’s formation, ‘revolutionary-democratic law and 
its system were fundamentally formed and established’ 
(Dashniam, 1974 in Butler & Nathanson, 1982: 167). Statutes 
mandating and governing the establishment of state agencies, 
judicial institutions, central and local khurals (parliaments) were 
enforced, and legislation passed in the areas of labor, family, 
criminal, and civil law. Similar to the 1924 Constitution, 
‘revolutionary-democratic law’ (ibid) has been portrayed by 
Mongol socialist legal scholars as an intermediary between the 
rejection of ‘feudal and capitalist law’ and ‘socialist law’ (ibid: 
168). It was rationalised as an ‘embodiment in law of the 
aspirations of socially progressive and revolutionary classes’ 
(ibid: 168) and to make socialist social relations normative:  
Revolutionary-democratic law played a vital role in 
developing the forces of production, in providing 
citizens’ needs, in educating workers with 
revolutionary ideology, in the struggle by people 
against remnants of the past, in respecting and 
observing revolutionary legality, and in strengthening 
new labour discipline (ibid: 169).  
A critical part of establishing the MPR as a socialist, Soviet Union-
aligned state was the dissolution of the monasteries and the 
purging of political dissent from the clerical class (Kaplonski, 
2012). As Kaplonski argues, the ‘question of the lamas’ (ibid: 72-
73) reflected a fundamentally political, as opposed to religious, 
conflict between the new socialist government and the Buddhist 
establishment. The Buddhist church not only had a strong 
legitimacy in Mongol society based on the fervent religiosity of 
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the population, but through their central role in ‘economics, 
livestock, education and healthcare’ (ibid: 73). Consequently, the 
lamaseries posed a fundamental threat and roadblock to the 
strategic interests of the new socialist state. Supported by 
Moscow and the Red Army, the socialist political leadership took 
drastic action to dissolve clerical power and institutions in the 
late 1930s, following a decade of efforts to undermine them 
through taxation, incentives, prohibitions and prosecutions (ibid: 
74). Significantly, Kaplonski argues that the failure of these 
methods in the 1920s and early 1930s created the conditions for 
the use of brutal force by the state, which would have been 
delegitimised if exercised earlier by a ‘contingent’25 (ibid) state 
which had yet to consolidate its sovereignty over the Mongolian 
population. Between 1937 and 1939, approximately 18,000 lamas 
were purged by national and Soviet armed forces, and virtually all 
of the lamaseries (700) were destroyed (ibid: 73).  
The destruction of the Buddhist establishment enabled the MPR 
to consolidate its modernist and secular programme of 
development. Productivity, modernisation and nationalism were 
the core impetus of the new state ideology. Notably, there was, 
despite this rhetoric, some overlap between “feudal” and 
“revolutionary” legal norms in the early period of the socialist 
state, which arguably reflects the new state’s need to borrow 
legitimacy from the previous order. However, the inclusion of 
some norms from ‘feudal legislation’ (ibid) was justified in 
hindsight by socialist legal scholars: ‘the utilisation of old legal 
norms meant putting new meanings into old forms of law, and… 
destroying these laws from within’ (ibid).  
 
25 Kaplonski (2012: 74) describes the MPR in the 1920s and 1930s as a 
‘contingent state,‘ a phrase he argues is a ‘useful shorthand to argue that 
socialist Mongolia was not a well-established, uncontested state widely 
recognised as legitimate by the majority of the population.’ 
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The MPR’s trajectory of constitutional development was to 
become consistently more aligned with that of the Soviet Union. 
Following the disastrous first attempts at collectivisation, as will 
be discussed later, it was not until 1940 that Mongolia was 
‘formally committed’ to a ‘”non-capitalist development path”’ 
(Butler & Nathanson, 1982: 176) when the 1940 Constitution 
made an explicit commitment to state planning (ibid).26 By 1960, 
Mongolia was fully committed to socialist state forms and 
Marxist-Leninist ideology; the latter was described as ‘all 
triumphant’ in the preamble of the 1960 Constitution (1960 
Constitution printed in Butler & Nathanson, 1982: 179-193), with 
Labour Power as the driving force of socialist accumulation 
strategies.  
Institutions of “democratic centralism” were established, with 
clear distributions of administrative responsibility and 
subsidiarity between central and provincial administrations. In 
particular, the provincial, district and sub-district khurals and 
executive offices were charged with specific responsibilities in 
political and economic management. Article 55 obligated these 
sub-central administrations to: 
Direct economic and cultural political construction on 
[its] territory; 
Direct and control the work of economic and 
cooperative organisations; 
Confirm the economic plan and local budget; take 
measures to fulfil them; 
 
26 The MPR continued to adapt some aspects of Soviet constitutionalism in 
ways that indicate a “softer” mode of authoritarianism. For example, the Soviet 
provision “he who does not work, neither does he eat” (Article 12) was 
interpreted more positively in the Mongolian constitution mas ‘honest and 
conscientious labour is the basis of the development of the national economy’ 
(Hazard, 1948: 164). 
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Direct the activity of agencies of administration 
subordinate to them; 
Ensure observance of the rule of socialist community 
life, protect the rights and interests of state enterprises 
and institutions, agricultural associations, and other 
cooperatives, and also protect the rights of citizens; 
Ensure the precise observance of laws, and also the 
strict fulfilment of decisions of superior agencies; 
Ensure the extensive and active participation of the 
working people in all domains of state, economic and 
cultural construction.  
Clearly, the state had formed the institutions and legal-normative 
framework to execute and legitimise a specifically socialist 
regime of accumulation. However, how was an “economy” to be 
actually formed out of the aristocratic-pastoralist entanglement? 
How were herders to be made into a “productive” labour force? 
These questions, crucial to understanding the socialist political 
economy and the role of the state therein, will be examined in the 
following section. 
Map Five: The Mongol People’s Republic in 1966 (Source: 
Bawden, 1968: 449) 
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Introducing “Economic Development” into Mongol 
Steppe Society 
Unlike other polities where pastoralism was practiced alongside 
other forms of production, pastoralism was the only basis of what 
could be described as a “national economy” in the MPR, as most 
Mongols within the newly established borders were herders 
(Humphrey, 1978: 139). According to Humphrey (ibid), this 
unique position ‘leant distinction to the Mongolian socialist 
revolution.’ It also generated conflict between the revolutionaries 
about the new Republic’s pathway towards economic 
development, as there was no prior state of capitalism for the 
“proletariat” to rise up against. In fact, as Bawden (1968/1989: 
244) puts it, 
There was no working class, and no native capitalist 
class either, for though there were recognisable groups 
within the populations these did not coincide with 
social classes in the Marxist sense. Divisions were 
vertical rather than horizontal. It was the work of 
years to engineer class consciousness and a class 
struggle. Delegates to the important Third Party 
Congress in 1924 to lay down the lines on which the 
new republic was to develop, were confused by talk of 
classes. As one of them put it: “Whom are we to 
consider as capitalists, as middle herdsmen and as poor 
herdsmen? And how are we to distinguish them?”’ 
The vertical divisions that structured the relative hierarchies of 
the aristocratic-clerical social order gave it a particularly 
tenacious character because its inequalities were so layered that 
they did not produce resistance to the whole order per se. While 
there were inequalities in decision-making power and clear 
hierarchies of status between the nobility and the ‘common’ 
people, the dependency of the whole political system upon 
livestock herding gave herders economic self-sufficiency and 
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autonomy to operate within the boundaries of the ruling house. 
Livestock was also not alienated from the herder; systems of 
personal ownership were operative within the ‘jurisdiction of the 
local political authority that regulated their use’ (Sneath, 2001: 
43).  
The MPRP was faced with the unforeseen challenge of turning 
herders into an industrial labour force. By the end of the 1920s, 
however, the MPRP had articulated a strategy for reorganising 
production (Boikova, 1999: 107) in conjunction with the Soviet 
Union. The 1929 Soviet-Mongolian Agreement ‘stated that the 
working people of Mongolia had made a decision on the non-
capitalist development of their country by promoting their own 
industry, enlarging and further developing their own cattle-
breeding and agriculture, collectivising agriculture, developing 
cooperative and state trade,27 and having the government 
regulate the economy’ (ibid: 108). Part of the legitimising 
narrative of the socialist reformers was a critique of pre-socialist 
“feudalism” where nobles and clerics were framed as holders of 
private property at the expense of the ‘exploited class’ of arat 
(commoner) (Dashniam, 1974 in Butler & Nathanson, 1977: 168; 
Mönkhjargal, 1977 in Butler & Nathanson, 1982: 499;). In the 
words of a socialist Mongol legal scholar, T. Monkhjargal (ibid), 
‘an important factor in developing a non-capitalist path was 
liquidating the economic power of the feudal class and forcing 
foreign exploitative capital out of the nation’s economy.’ 
In reality, the “working people of Mongolia” were uninformed 
about the intention to “socialise” the means of production (i.e., 
livestock), as the MPRP in Ulaanbaatar operated apart from the 
majority of the rural Mongol population. Consequently, the first 
 
27 As Boikova (1999: 109) accurately points out, the Agreement also essentially 
gave the Soviet Union monopoly access to economic relationships with 
Mongolia by granting the Soviet Union Most-Favoured Nation status, 
reinforced by the clause stating that ‘the exceptional privileges which the USSR 
and Mongolia granted to each other should not be applied to other countries.’ 
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phase of collectivisation of the herds (1929-1932) was a complete 
disaster. As Lattimore (1949: xxxvi-xxxvii) observed,  
The attempted forced march toward socialisation and 
collectivisation frightened and antagonised the 
herdsmen who formed the main bulk of the population 
and who owned its chief economic resource, the flocks 
and herds. They regarded collectivisation not as a new 
form of ownership but as deprivation of ownership, and 
in resistance to it they slaughtered their cattle by the 
thousand. The whole attempt had to be abandoned, 
and the country returned to private ownership of 
livestock, modified by a strong emphasis on 
cooperative enterprises of all kinds as a means of 
turning the minds of the people toward the potential 
advantages of group enterprise in contrast with sole 
reliance on the enterprise of the individual or the 
household. 
Initial collectivisation was a failure because the anti-feudal 
premise of the endeavour was miscalculated: the aristocratic-
clerical order was hierarchical but property was not 
fundamentally alienated from the “commoner.” Land was 
organised on the basis of personal use-rights within a custodial 
framework (Sneath, 2001: 43) rather than private property rights, 
and herders owned their own livestock. Thus, given that they 
were owners of Mongolia’s sole “means of production,” herders 
were able to resist collectivisation unlike other pastoralists in the 
Soviet Union. The Party soon realised that by sending herds over 
the border into China or slaughtering them, herders had the 
power to ‘deplete the country’s productive capital’ (Dupuy and 
Blanchard, 1970: 299). Many animals also died due to a lack of a 
sense of ownership and responsibility in the newly formed 
collectives. Between 1930 and 1932, the number of livestock 
dropped dramatically from 24 million to 16.2 million (Endicott, 
91 
 
2012: 68). Following this initial failure to immediately collectivise 
the herders, it was acknowledged that completely skipping the 
capitalist phase of development had been idealistic. The New 
Turn Policy, instigated to repair the political and economic fall-
out from forced collectivisation, can be understood as an 
‘ideological retreat from socialism in that it was publicly admitted 
that only by fostering private enterprise could prosperity and 
confidence be restored. The new motto was “raise high private 
initiative, and bring the private cattle-herding economy to a new 
level”’ (Bawden, 1968/1989: 352).  
Specific steps were taken in order to transform the herding 
population into an organised force of labour and to ‘rationalise’ 
(Bawden, 1968/1989: 310) production so that surplus value 
could be generated and extracted to increase the yield of the 
economy and sustain the new nation-state. Industrial 
development was now dependent upon diverse capital inputs, 
whereas previously ‘livestock represented both capital and 
income as well as a measure of wealth, a medium of exchange, 
and almost the only source of food, clothing and shelter’ (Dupuy 
and Blanchard, 1970: 297). In a limited sense, the socialist period 
introduced a capitalistic economy by organising production in a 
way intended to ‘generate the expansion of capital’ (Cox, 1987: 
57) albeit for the purposes of the state. This was a gradual 
process of incorporating herders into the logic of industrial 
production. Until the 1950s, herders were simply encouraged to 
pool their labour and increasing levels of support were granted to 
herders to incentivise them to work together and increase their 
“industrial” outputs of wool, meat, and dairy products. The state 
enabled this process by providing tax incentives and tangible 
support to herders, such as repairing winter sheds and providing 
Soviet-purchase machines to assist with haymaking. A 
compromise was also struck by granting nomads permission to 
have some private livestock in the context of the negdel. By the 
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early 1960s, the majority of herders had been incorporated into 
negdels, reflecting both a change in social mind-set and the reality 
of ‘propaganda and economic compulsion’ (Bawden, 1968/1989: 
399).  
The modernising impetus of the socialist state cannot be 
understated. Writing in 1970, Dupuy and Blanchard (ibid: V) 
explained that ‘one goal constantly preached is the conversion 
“from an agricultural-industrial society to an industrial-
agricultural state” – by which is meant the eventual dominance of 
industry over stockraising.’ The desire to collectivise the herds 
and ‘rationalise’ pastoral production was part of a broader vision 
of gradually creating a sedentary “modern” workforce primarily 
engaged in factory production. In the 1960s and 70s, the livestock 
collectives (negdels) modelled an almost Fordist division of 
labour, with specialised tasks assigned to different groups of 
herders, who had formerly attended to all aspects of the 
production process prior to collectivisation. In a similar way, 
herds were also “specialised” into one type of livestock rather 
than the customary five-animal herds (i.e., sheep, goats, camels, 
horses, cows) (Endicott, 2012: 73). As Endicott (ibid) notes, the 
negdels were given specific ‘production goals’ under the Five-Year 
Development Plans, adding that ‘this external source of authority 
reduced herders to state employees without much scope for 
independent decision-making vis-à-vis pasture use.’ Land, 
however, remained public: unfenced and uncommodified, as the 
negdels still depended on nomadism, although now under 
bureaucratic supervision (ibid: 78-79). Humphreys (1978: 156) 
also observed that the herding collectives tended to reflect the 
pre-socialist territories of the khoshuun, as ‘many negdel centres 
were on the sites of disbanded lamaseries.’ Thus, despite huge 
change, there were elements of continuity with aristocratic forms 
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of statecraft in the governance of pastoralism and territory in the 
socialist period.  
The state also introduced specific legal forms to enhance 
productivity as national development accelerated, which 
reinforced the formation of an economic sphere distinguished 
from but governed explicitly by the state. A good example of 
introducing distinctly economic legality was the case of economic 
contracts, which were ‘especially influential and significant in 
perfecting economic relations’ (Mönkhjargal, 1977 in Butler & 
Nathanson, 1982: 499), according to a socialist jurist of the time. 
In 1961, the General Conditions for Economic Contracts were 
introduced by the Council of Ministers. Economic contracts had a 
‘planned character’ (Aiuush, 1976 in Butler & Nathanson, 1982: 
498) in the sense that ‘the money-commodity relationship’ (ibid: 
497) was planned, but they created the possibility of private (i.e., 
non-state) economic exchanges and added another layer of 
distance between direct state control and the productive sphere. 
As Aiuush (ibid: 498) puts it, 
Capitalist theorists consider that contracts during the 
period of socialism are the technical instrument of 
planning. This denies the independent and increasing 
role of contracts… Planning is one way to provide the 
national economy with unified guidance by the state, 
and economic contracts are one way to develop the 
initiative of economic organisations.  
This quote from Aiuush, a Mongol socialist jurist, reflects a 
blurred boundary between socialist and capitalist economic 
governance in the late socialist period. From Aiuush’s 
perspective, contracts enable some private freedom in the 
economic sphere and have efficiency-enhancing utility, which 
runs counter to classical socialist economic theory. Although the 
adoption of a (private) legal form to enhance productivity and 
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initiative is intuitively capitalist, it was in fact planted firmly 
within socialist rationality: ‘In order to perfect socialist economic 
relations the role of legal coordination must constantly increase’ 
(Aiuush, 1976b: 501). Within the first five years of planning, the 
number of economic contracts increased by fifteen times (ibid), 
demonstrating the incorporation of capitalist legality within a 
socialist framework to enhance accumulation.  
By 1970, approximately 60% of the population were still 
employed in livestock herding (Dupuy and Blanchard, 1970: 308). 
However, by the end of the 1980s, that number had declined to 
under 20% (Fratkin and Mearns, 2003: 117), following 
heightened industrial development of the 1960s and 70s (Bumaa, 
2001: 54). This remarkable social shift from a “simple” pastoralist 
mode of production in the 1920s to a mixed economy controlled 
by the state (manufacturing, agriculture and mining) was a 
product of the centralisation of state power. After 1948, following 
the disastrous first effort at collectivisation, the purges of 
“dissidents” and clerics, and the second world war, the MPRP 
began to produce Five Year Plans, following Soviet development 
models. This heightened developmentalism was enabled by a 
deepening aid and trade relationship with the Soviet Union in the 
1950s (ibid: 293), with large-scale exports of manufacturing 
equipment and personnel to the MPR. The Soviets had an interest 
in maintaining Mongolia as an effective buffer state, and therefore 
were willing to invest in the country’s self-sufficiency.  
The Soviet Union was also the primary beneficiary of Mongolian 
industrial development, having a monopoly on its foreign trade. 
Mongolia exported mostly raw commodities to the Soviet Union 
(i.e., copper, coal, meat, dairy products and wool) in exchange for 
processed imports. In terms of economic and social outcomes, the 
Soviet era of Mongolian history caused a remarkable shift in 
Mongolian society. In 1978, Humphreys (1978: 158) wrote that 
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Mongolia had one of the highest standards of living in Asia, as the 
country was virtually self-sufficient in terms of food production. 
Pastoral products such as meat and wool were exported to 
market on the Soviet trading bloc – the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA) – and the discovery of copper 
deposits near Erdenet lead to the establishment of a state-owned 
copper mine. Mass education was enforced and widespread 
literacy was achieved; the children of herders were sent to 
boarding schools in the urban centres of aimags to learn new 
herding techniques or other skills (ibid: 145). According to 
Humphreys (ibid: 149), the dominant perception of nomadic 
pastoralists under Soviet socialism was that they were 
‘unsystematic,’ ‘inefficient’ and ‘idle.’ The explicit intent of 
collectivisation and mass education was to instil an industrial 
work ethic into Mongolians (ibid). 
Mining minerals to export to Russia became a significant portion 
of industrial production in the late socialist period. In 1978, a 
Russian-Mongolian joint venture in copper extraction began 
operations in Erdenet, a small urban centre north of Ulaanbaatar. 
The Nailaikh coal mine on the outskirts of Ulaanbaatar was 
similarly a stalwart of coal production at the time. The industry 
was tightly controlled, mainly exploited by joint venture projects 
with Russia, and served domestic consumption and Soviet 
demand. Prices were fixed by the state, with preferential 
purchasing rates for the Soviet Union. While this might have 
changed if the Soviet Union had not collapsed, mining remained a 
relatively small focus in Mongolia, although geological mapping 
was undertaken for future exploitation and was part of an overall 
evaluation of Mongolia’s productive assets. Notably, these maps 
provided the basis for the “minerals rush” in the mid-late 1990s 
in the wake of the liberalisation of the economy. The introduction 
of private property interests in land through extractive industries 
was thus avoided at this time, as the state alone had the right to 
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explore and extract minerals. Copper ore became Mongolia’s most 
lucrative export from the 1970s onwards (Goyal, 1999: 634). 
As indicated in the section on socialist constitutionalism, the 
ability of the state to effectively extract surplus value and 
“develop” the economy was critically enabled by local 
government branches, which were key loci to teach ‘Communist 
industrial discipline’ to former nomads (Dupuy and Blanchard, 
1970: 294). The sheer scale of Mongolian territory and the 
challenge of governing a remote population required the 
systematic diffusion of central authority through administrative 
sub-divisions. Just as the Qing rulers had overlaid customary 
boundaries established within the Mongol Empire with the 
khoshuun, the socialist political engineers in Ulaanbaatar and 
Moscow also chose an adaptive regulatory strategy, to some 
extent a ‘new formulation of earlier political relations’ (Sneath, 
2001: 47). While they reconfigured the boundaries of the 
provinces (aimags) and established new districts (soums) in line 
with the administrative requirements of new industry (i.e., the 
negdels) (Endicott, 2012: 74), they capitalised on the cultural 
inheritance of Mongolian familiarity with local institutions as a 
means of achieving state national goals. While the socialist state 
was unitary, elections were held at district and provincial levels, 
although in reality these “elections” were political appointments. 
To conclude this section, the period of socialist state formation 
evidences significant continuities and discontinuities with the 
pre-socialist era of Mongol statecraft. The central aspect of 
socialist statecraft in Mongolia in political-economic terms was 
related to the governance of labour and livestock; similarly, 
pastoralism was at the heart of pre-socialist state forms. 
However, the governance of pastoralism in the socialist period 
was no longer an end in itself, but a means to industrial 
development. Livestock was commodified as a capital asset for 
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the state in the name of the “people,” and the work of the new 
socialist subjects was converted into a pool of labour, organised 
to enable industrial production (although it was not subordinated 
to a free market system of price-based supply and demand). 
However, despite the introduction of a distinctively economic 
rationality within the state, it was contained within the political 
discourse of Soviet socialism. While we could describe the pre-
socialist era as a completely politicised economy – with 
production and statecraft ‘intertwined’ to use Munkh-Erdene’s 
phrase (2006: 56) – the socialist state was a loosened braid, in the 
sense that the political-institutional and economic production 
became two distinctive fields of social life. However, economic 
production was still embedded within the political sphere, as the 
government actively organised trade, exchange and price values. 
Democratising the Government, Depoliticising the 
Economy? The Post-Socialist Mongolian State 
Surprisingly, Mongolia’s democratic revolution in 1990 has many 
parallels with its socialist counterpart. Just as the socialist 
revolution began in Ulaanbaatar in the wake of the collapsing 
Qing Empire, Mongolia’s democratic revolution was initiated by 
young, urban and predominantly male Mongolians as the Soviet 
Union crumbled at the end of the 1980s. The democratisation of 
the Mongolian state occurred in similar conditions of 
emergency,28 where the ‘rules of the game’ (Swyngedouw, 2005: 
 
28 From 1990-1992, the purchasing power of consumers diminished severely 
with annual inflation rates leaping to 325.2% in 1992. Unemployment 
compounded the capacity of most Mongolians to afford basic provisions as it 
rose from 1.3% in 1989 to around 20% by 1994 (World Bank, 1996: v). 
Government spending on social welfare declined rapidly during Mongolia’s 
transition to a market democracy, from 40% of government expenditure 
before the transition to 11.1% of GDP in 1993 (ADB, 2008: 1-2). Under the 
Soviet-style command economy, Mongolians had enjoyed universal health care, 
employment, education and pension schemes, in addition to the provision of 
benefits to vulnerable groups (ibid). Following the market transition, real 
expenditure on health was reduced 46% from 1990 to 1992 and the education 
budget was reduced by 56% (Sneath, 2006b: 149-150). The sudden decline in 
living standards combined with the cash poverty of most Mongolians resulted 
in rising levels of inequality: the earliest Gini coefficient data shows an increase 
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1991) fundamentally shifted with the hegemonic rise of self-
regulating market capitalism and the demise of alternatives (i.e., 
the Soviet Union). Once again, Mongolia needed to politically re-
orient itself in order to survive economically without Soviet 
assistance or access to its regional market, as well as to maintain 
its independence, thereby facing the same geopolitical 
predicament of asymmetrical relationships with its neighbours. 
The social violence accompanying this period of revolution, 
however, was economic rather than political. While the revolution 
was peaceful in the sense that there were no outbreaks of 
physical violence, the majority of the Mongolian population 
endured a seismic shift in their social environment, as the 
economy was forcibly rent from direct state control.  
(Re)Constitutionalisation Part I: A New Blueprint 
for Accumulation 
The measures that constitute shock therapy do not by 
themselves create ‘agonizing pain’ in the body politic. 
The image of plummeting living standards as a result 
of rapid economic reforms is completely wrong-
headed...  
– Jeffrey Sachs in ‘Understanding Shock Therapy’ 
(1994: 25) 
Mongolia’s path to nation-state status had depended in large 
degree upon the Soviet Union. When the latter began to crumble 
in the late 1980s, so did the bulwark of aid, trade support and 
investment that had enabled the Mongolian economy to 
industrialise. Similar to the early 1920s, maintaining Mongolian 
independence required a new orientation to prevent re-
 
from 0.31 in 1995 to 0.35 in 1998 (ibid). The lack of available data from the 
Soviet era and the early years of the transition makes the original levels of pre-
transition inequality levels difficult to determine in terms of the Gini 
coefficient, but they were generally considered to be low. See Rossabi, 2005: 
35. 
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colonisation by China, with which Mongolia had maintained a 
tense and fragile relationship. The demise of the Soviet Union 
ushered in an era of Western hegemony, laden with “End of 
History” optimism about the future of market democracy. 
Mongolia was one of many post-socialist states in Central Asia 
and Eastern Europe caught up in waves of local and global 
optimism about the transformative power of liberal institutions 
to effectively mediate the political and economic spheres: 
separation of powers doctrine, constitutional democracy, private 
enterprise and (the liberal version of) the rule of law.29  
Mongolia’s democratic revolution was driven by both pragmatic 
necessity and ideological fervour, similar to its socialist 
predecessor. Led politically by young idealists caught up in the 
narrative of openness in the late 1980s (following the movements 
for perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet Union), the post-socialist 
transition was also pushed hastily along by forces of economic 
crisis. Educated in Russian and Eastern European universities, the 
young, urban and elite leaders of the reform movement had been 
exposed in varying degrees to the principles of multi-party 
elections, democracy and the market economy (Rossabi, 2005: 4-
5). The young Mongolians who lead the democratic revolution did 
not topple socialist party rule, but managed to erode its monopoly 
on power through the introduction of multi-party elections and 
the removal of hard-line members of the MPRP. The MPRP won 
the first democratic election in 1990 because of the failure of the 
democratic reform movement to adequately reach out to the rural 
electorate. However, the MPRP tactically offered some leadership 
positions to the democratic reformers, allowing a peaceful 
transition to multi-party elections. A strong contingent of the 
 
29 The rule of law is a contested concept, but at its most basic refers to the 
universal application of fairly drafted and defined laws, as opposed to arbitrary 
exercises of power. In liberal legal theory, which plays the strongest role in 
terms of affecting global rule of law norms (Jayasuriya, 2001), the rule of law is 
explicitly associated with the protection of private property rights (May, 2014: 
68; 2014b).  
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reform group, led by D. Ganbold and others known as the “Club of 
Young Economists” (Fritz, 2008: 771), were inspired by the 
‘creative destruction’ (Harvey, 2005b: 23) model of the neoliberal 
Washington Consensus (ibid: 27; Klein, 2007: 155-170), where a 
minimally-involved government facilitates a rapid transition to a 
market economy through privatisation and economic 
liberalisation. The new leaders of the MPRP following the July 
1990 elections were more moderate and somewhat conciliatory 
towards the reformers; the first democratically elected Prime 
Minister offered Ganbold the influential cabinet role as First 
Deputy Premier (Rossabi, 2005: 28).  
The “new” government of the democratic Mongolia that emerged 
in the wake of a crumbling Soviet Union was a genuine ideological 
hybrid, comprised of both the MPRP and the new democratic 
parties, the more powerful of which advocated a hasty transition 
to a market-economy in line with the advice of International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs). The political leadership of Mongolia 
did not have much time to work through their differences or 
come to a compromise as the collapse of the Soviet Union 
precipitated an economic crisis that required hasty political re-
alignment. The sudden removal of all Soviet financing – 30-35% 
of Mongolia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – by the beginning of 
1991 (Goyal, 1999: 644) and the dissolution of the CMEA meant 
that Mongolia’s economy not only contracted suddenly but lost 
most of its export markets within the space of two years. Exports 
declined from USD 832 million in 1989 to USD 370 million in 
1991 (Sneath, 2006b: 150). The government introduced rationing 
for basic foodstuffs in 1991 and began printing tugriks to make up 
for its sudden shortfall in budget (Goyal, 1999: 643). Inflation 
skyrocketed from virtually nil in 1989 to 121.2% in 1991 and 
321% in 1992 (ibid). With little credit, high levels of debt 
obligation to the Soviet Union (Heaton, 1992: 53), rapidly 
declining revenues, and its northern neighbour demanding hard 
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currency for fuel and other vital materials (Rossabi, 2005: 35), 
Mongolia was on the brink of an economic and social disaster. 
Despite improved relations with China since the 1980s, Mongolia 
was reticent to seek Chinese assistance due to the long history of 
colonization and geopolitical tension between the two states; the 
government looked towards the West for new sources of 
assistance and trade (ibid: 36). 
One of the main goals of post-socialist Mongolian foreign policy 
was to steer a path clear of its two neighbours – Russia and China 
– through alignment with Western powers. Mongolia’s “Third 
Neighbour Policy” struck a delicate ‘balance between its two 
neighbours… by declaring itself neutral as between Moscow and 
Beijing’ (Wachman, 2010: 589), while reaching out to new allies. 
The negotiation of this balancing and distancing strategy was to 
‘avoid being subordinated to either of the two, whilst benefiting 
from the munificence and commercial opportunities each might 
provide’ (ibid). While not overcoming its asymmetrical position in 
relation to its neighbours, Mongolia carefully achieved relative 
autonomy in the 1990s and early 2000s. During this time, 
Mongolia was primarily indebted to international financial 
institutions, such as the World Bank, the IMF and the Asian 
Development Bank (Rossabi, 2005), and was a beneficiary of 
significant Euro-American aid, particularly from the U.S. and 
Germany.   
In early 1991, Mongolia was admitted to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and 
the World Bank, following a visit from the U.S. Secretary of State 
in 1990 (ibid: 37). From 1990-1992, a series of economic reforms 
were undertaken by the government of Mongolia to fulfil the 
conditions placed on its receipt of assistance from international 
donor agencies. These conditionalities followed the six tenets of 
shock therapy by requiring price liberalisation, linking the 
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Mongolian tugrik to international currency, eliminating 
government subsidies, privatising state assets and banking, 
selling most SOEs and liberalizing tariffs on trade (ibid). 
According to Sachs in ‘Understanding Shock Therapy,’ the triad of 
crises – state bankruptcy, system collapse, and structural 
transformation – were to be addressed through ‘the rapid 
introduction of the six core institutions of capitalism’ (Sachs, 
1994: 29):  
1.) A monetary system based on a stable, convertible 
currency; 2.) Freedom of international trade and 
foreign investment; 3.) Private property rights...; 4.) 
Private ownership of a high proportion of national 
assets; 5.) Corporate control of large enterprises...; and 
6.) A social safety net.  
Other reforms undertaken by the government included 
introducing a floating exchange rate and setting up a Stock 
Exchange, as well as a commercialised banking system (IMF, 
2003: 1). The optimism of the Mongolian reformers and the goals 
of international financial advisers converged at least on practical 
aspects of institutional transformation, which satisfied the aims of 
both: the continued survival of an independent nation-state and 
the incorporation of post-socialist states into the capitalist market 
economy. The role of IFIs, particularly the IMF, the World Bank, 
and the ADB in this process was marked. As Fenwick (2007: 182) 
puts it, 
In supporting the new ‘rules of the game’ in Mongolia, 
the ADB alone supported the development of several 
major pieces of legislation in the early-to-mid 1990s, 
including a Bank Law and a Central Bank Law… and 
the review of laws relating to business entities, 
contracts, secured transactions, bankruptcy, and 
foreign investment. In total, more than 25 pieces of 
legislation were passed in Mongolia in the four years 
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from 1991 that related in some way to transition. This 
included a new Civil Code (of approximately 400 
articles) incorporating the important underpinnings of 
commercial life – contractual and property rights. 
In terms of economic reforms, Mongolia was a model student of 
the Washington Consensus, instituting the privatisation, 
liberalisation and deregulation of its economy without delay 
(Sukhbaatar, 2012; Munkh-Erdene, 2011). Mongolia initiated its 
privatisation programme in the first year of its post-socialist 
transition (Korsun & Murrell, 1995: 473), starting with public 
assets, state-subsidized industries, welfare systems and 
importantly, the rural herding collectives – negdels (Sneath, 2003: 
441-442). While requiring a huge amount of effort to legislate and 
implement this marketisation mandate, it also marked a shift in 
Mongolia’s political and economic history because the public 
administration of pastoral land use was no longer a central 
governance concern. The economic vision of the new democratic 
Mongolia was a continuation of the industrial development 
narrative of Soviet socialism, where “traditional” economic modes 
were to be bypassed to make way for more “developed” forms of 
economy.  
Privatisation played a critical role in Mongolia’s post-socialist 
transition, ‘leading as it did to an irreversible shift in productive 
assets from the state to the private sector, with the intention of 
creating a pluralist, liberal, capitalist market economy’ (Nixson 
and Walters, 2006: 1558). Mongolia’s national development 
strategy in these early days of reform was focused on enabling the 
‘active participation’ (Goyal, 1999: 641) of the private sector to 
stimulate efficient economic growth and to create self-reliant 
citizens ‘who had the mentality of private property owners’ 
(Korsun & Murrell, 1995: 474). Mongolia’s extensive privatisation 
programme embodied these aspirations, making it the most 
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critical feature of all the market reforms undertaken (ibid: 472-
474). The “new” democratic government systematically 
privatised 470 state-owned enterprises including the negdels; 
55% of this privatisation occurred in 1992 alone (Anderson, 
Young & Murrell, 2000: 530). By 1995, 95% of livestock, trade 
and services had been privatised (Goyal, 1999: 636). The 
dividends derived from the privatisation of SOEs were supposed 
to be divided among the public equally in the form of vouchers 
that could be exchanged on the Stock Exchange or at auctions for 
shares in the new private company (Korsun & Murrell, 1995: 475-
476). The voucher system was promulgated on the basis of an 
inclusive approach to Mongolia’s national assets in addition to 
‘providing the laboratory in which the Mongolian people would 
learn the psychology of capitalism’ (ibid: 476). While egalitarian 
in theory, the shares were concentrated in the hands of a few and 
had the effect of increasing inequality; Rossabi points out that 
‘many citizens who were not conversant with a market economy 
sold their vouchers at depressed prices and thus gained very little 
from the redistribution of public assets’ (Rossabi, 2005: 51).30  
The privatisation of SOEs and the negdels shrunk Mongolia’s 
industrial base by exposing inefficient industries to free market 
mechanisms, causing most of them to collapse (UNIDO, 2011: 51). 
While some commentators saw this as inevitable, others 
perceived active underdevelopment of post-socialist states as a 
result of “shock therapy” and privatisation (Reinert, 2000). As 
Reinert (ibid: 3) forcefully puts it, ‘fifty years of industry-building 
was virtually annihilated over a period of only four years, from 
1991 to 1995.’ While Mongolia did not inherit a particularly wide 
industrial base from the Soviet era, it had ‘slowly, but 
successfully, built a diversified industrial sector’ (ibid; 
Honeychurch, 2010: 410). Critically, the negdels had functioned as 
 
30 Rossabi also notes that by 2003, 0.5% of the population owned over 70% of 
the shares of the privatised companies.  
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agricultural industries during the Soviet era, producing meat and 
dairy products for export as well as subsistence. Declining 
demand for Mongolian meat products as a result of the collapsed 
CMEA and the privatisation of the negdels transformed 
pastoralism into a predominantly subsistence economy (Sneath, 
2003: 448). The impact of privatisation displaced agricultural 
products as Mongolia’s largest export (Worden & Savada, 1989), 
given the emphasis of Mongolia’s reformers, both domestic and 
international, on developing Mongolia’s global comparative 
advantage: minerals (Honeychurch, 2010: 409-410).  
Following widespread privatisation measures in the 1990s, the 
deregulated pastoral economy became both a form of subsistence 
and a social safety net for the thousands of Mongolians facing 
unemployment as it provided at least subsistence and the 
possibility of some cash by selling meat, dairy and wool products 
(Pomfret, 2000: 154). The number of semi-nomadic herders 
swelled to over 30% of the total population and 50% of the 
working population (Mearns, 2004: 108), undoing all the 
“progress” made to gradually urbanise and settle Mongolia’s 
nomadic population in the socialist period. This was the first time 
that herding operated outside of an intricate system of 
administration, either under customary law (which had been 
eroded in the twentieth century) or state law (ibid: 139). In 
contrast to previous eras where political authority over the 
Mongolian population was inevitably related to the governance of 
pastoral land use, the democratic state of Mongolia can almost be 
defined by its devolving relationship with pastoralism as an 
economic system; as Mearns put it in 2004 (ibid: emphasis 
added),  
Institutional arrangements governing pasture-land 
management have undergone profound 
transformation over the past decade in ways that 
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reflect a virtual abdication of public administration 
rather than decentralisation or purposive intervention. 
The deregulation of the pastoral economy goes hand-in-hand with 
the intent of Mongolia’s democratic reformers to change the 
collectivised mentality of Mongolians to that of ‘private property 
owners’ (Korsun & Murrell, 1995: 474). This intent to develop the 
‘psychology of capitalism’ (ibid: 476) in Mongolians was 
embodied in the process of privatisation of the negdels and state 
farms, where herders were given shares in the form of vouchers 
in these SOEs to be traded on the new Stock Exchange. Where the 
Socialist period had initially tried to force the “psychology” of 
communalisation upon herders in the 1920s and 30s to no avail, 
the capitalist ambitions of the democratic reformers for herders 
also produced disappointing and mixed results (Rossabi, 2005: 
51). The lack of practical state support combined with the influx 
of new herders on the land has led to a remarkable disintegration 
of ‘established co-ordination norms’ (Mearns, 2004: 139) rising 
inequality between wealthy and poor herders, and pastureland 
degradation (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2000: 1320).  
(Re)Constitutionalisation Part II: A New Political-
Legal Regime  
The economic reforms that have been described would not have 
been possible without a liberal democratic constitution 
recognising private property rights and mandating institutional 
reform for the rule of law to protect them. The drafting of the 
1992 constitution was the first necessary inroad into the 
‘monolithic’ (Bedeski, 2006: 82) centralized socialist state: in a 
series of committee meetings (Fritz, 2008: 775), it abolished one-
party rule, established the separation of executive, judicial and 
legislative powers, installed a semi-presidential system (ibid), 
and established a basic framework for electoral democracy (ibid: 
771). These basic liberal constitutional structures were arguably 
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necessary for Mongolia to undertake a national privatisation 
programme by introducing the formal rights of contract and 
ownership of private property (Korsun & Murrell, 1995: 473). 
The constitution, however, was a highly contested documented; it 
was drafted in a series of ‘marathon sessions’ (Fish, 1998: 129) 
over a period of 71 days by a constitutional committee appointed 
by the democratically-elected interim government. While Fish 
argues that its emergence out of a ‘process of genuine 
deliberation and struggle within the national legislature’ (ibid) is 
a sign of its legitimacy, the deliberation was arguably under the 
duress of an extreme recession.31 This secondary argument could 
explain why some of the more contentious points that the 
drafters faced were not resolved, particularly relating to land use 
and property rights (Fritz, 2008: 775).  
For example, in paragraph two of Article Six of the constitution, 
the state remains vested with the ownership of all land as in the 
socialist era, ‘except that given to the citizens of Mongolia for 
private ownership’ (Constitution of Mongolia, 1992, Article Six, 
emphasis added). Yet paragraph three, which describes the 
ownership entitlements of Mongolian citizens, maintains state 
ownership of ‘public’ pastureland and subsoil. Thus, citizens’ land 
possession rights are thereby limited to rights of usus and fructus 
– to use and collect the fruits of the land. This is consistent with 
customary legal norms of land entitlements based on use rather 
than exclusive ownership. The preceding Article (Five) of the 
Constitution, however, affirms that Mongolia shall develop its 
economy ‘based on all forms of property’ – both private and 
public – and uphold the rule of law to protect the owner’s rights. 
Articles Five and Six of the Constitution contain deeply 
incompatible ideological clauses regarding property rights; the 
 
31 Some scholars argue that the recession Mongolia faced in the collapse of the 
Soviet Union was more severe than that faced by any country in the Great 
Depression – see Korsun and Murrell (1995: 473-474), Boone (1994: 314-
328).  
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Constitution is supposed to facilitate ‘different forms of property 
consistent to universal trends of world economic development 
and country specifics’ (Article 5:1, emphasis added). The 
contradiction and limitation of this pluralistic recognition in a 
capitalist market economy will be explored in the following 
chapter when we turn to Mongolia’s mining economy.  
Mongolia as a Model Market Democracy?  
In sum, Mongolia’s democratisation and incorporation into the 
global capitalist order was accompanied by a radical break 
between the political and economic spheres. In particular, this 
break was characterised by the introduction of institutions to 
both legitimise and execute this unprecedented diremption in the 
organisation of political and economic power. Where the socialist 
state had created some basic institutions of capitalist production 
but set them within a specifically socialised framework, the 
‘emancipation of the economy from the political structure’ 
(Sneath, 2003: 441-442) became a goal in its own right for the 
post-socialist state. This reflected the assumption of the 
international development consensus at the time (i.e., the 
Washington Consensus) that the market would naturally produce 
positive outcomes for society. The political sphere was not simply 
restricted from controlling the economy, but its very fabric was 
forcefully reorganised so that any prospect of regaining economic 
control would not only be “unconstitutional” but unthinkable 
within the terms of liberal democracy. The scope of Mongolian 
democracy has consequently been limited by the fact that ‘the 
people were only granted rights when the awful adjustment had 
been made’ (Polanyi, 1944/2001: 234); the democratisation of 
the Mongolian state under liberal democratic terms did not 
include the democratisation of economic power since it had been 
conveniently transferred to a separate “private” sphere.  
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Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to establish an historical 
narrative of the co-constitutive relationship between the state 
and the economy in Mongolia. Using Karl Polanyi’s idea that all 
economies are ‘instituted’ but some are ‘disembedded’ (i.e., self-
regulating market economies), I have attempted to outline some 
of the key continuities and changes in the state-economy 
relationship. The aristocratic-pastoralist period was 
characterised by a general integrity of production within the 
fabric of the political system, imbued with customary legal norms 
overlaid by the more bureaucratic laws of Empire. A strong 
ethno-linguistic and religious narrative reinforced the political 
authority of the aristocracy and, later, the Buddhist monasteries, 
although this authority was tempered by the latter’s reliance on 
common herders to sustain pastoral accumulation. In the early 
twentieth century, the Mongol state primarily responded to 
regional geopolitical forces, leading to an independence 
movement and the formation of an independent nation-state. The 
unity of the aristocratic-pastoral social order was at times 
violently and at other times gradually dismantled during the 
socialist period, where the economy was formed as a separate 
sphere to the state, although governed within an explicitly 
political framework. Collectivisation and the making of a labour 
force out of the predominantly pastoralist population was a feat 
of long-term social planning and coercion by the state. Somewhat 
ironically, the socialist period introduced the basic mechanics for 
a market economy, including the (regulated) principles of ‘truck, 
barter and exchange’ (Polanyi, 1944/2001: 59), labour, currency, 
surplus value extraction and, in later years, economic contracts. 
Despite this period of state-economic formation being described 
in its constitutions as ‘non-capitalist,’ it actually provided the 
material market basis to establish an economy outside of the 
direct control of the state after the fall of the Soviet Union. 
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However, as Polanyi (1944/2001: 60) puts it, ‘the step which 
makes regulated markets into a self-regulating market, is indeed 
crucial.’  
In contrast to the two previous eras, Mongolia’s democratic-free 
market transformation did not push it towards one of its 
neighbours but to the West. Rather than Soviet advisors, 
Mongolia sought out the advice of IFIs. While this involved a 
political realignment with the “global” values of human rights, 
constitutionalism and a (liberal) democratic political system, it is 
significant that Mongolia’s main sources of support at the 
beginning of the 1990s were economic organisations. For 
example, the United States, Germany and other Western countries 
became part of Mongolia’s geopolitical reorientation through its 
“Third Neighbour Policy,”32 but their role was usually mediated 
under the aegis of economic development institutions, such as the 
IMF, the World Bank, and USAID. The institutionalisation of a 
boundary between the political and economic spheres – mediated 
by the rule of law – within the liberal constitutional framework 
neatly matched Mongolia’s new imperative to adjust to a global 
market economy, with few viable alternatives.  
In terms of its national norms, Mongolia was in a great deal of flux 
in the early 1990s, lacking a concrete narrative for itself apart 
from the international (Western) applause at its ‘remarkable’ 
adoption of liberal political and economic institutions (Fish, 1998; 
2001). The reality in Mongolia was much more chaotic, and most 
Mongolians remember it as a time of disarray and economic 
devastation. At the same time, it is widely remembered as a time 
of optimism for the possibilities of a democratic future, capitalist 
economic development and the rule of law. Drawing on this 
context, the following two chapters will engage with the 
 
32 Mongolia’s “Third Neighbour Policy” is the foundational approach of the 
state’s post-socialist foreign policy to seek political and economic allies beyond 
Russia and China.  
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institutionalisation of an extractive economy in Mongolia (1994-
2014) and the way that state power has been reorganised to 
facilitate foreign direct investment in the mining sector, with 
significant implications for Mongolian democracy.  
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Chapter Three 
Mongolia’s Transition to a Mineral Exporting 
Economy 1994-2014: An Overview of a Global 
Reordering Project  
Introduction 
 “There is no other way: Mongolia was hurt by what we 
did in the past… There was no predictable investment 
almost at all.” 
– President of the Mongolian National Mining 
Association (author interview) 
“Now we have a clear policy that says the economy 
should be based on the private sector and it should be 
liberalised.” – Managing Director of Erdenes Mongol 
LLC (author interview) 
This chapter provides a chronological overview of Mongolia’s 
integration into the global minerals economy (1994-2014), in 
order to highlight the tensions and challenges of the national 
state’s orientation towards transnational capital. The driving 
pressure to become globally competitive and attract foreign 
capital investment in a “frontier” sector (i.e., perceived as 
particularly “high-risk” by foreign investors) has reordering 
potential for the constitution of the state.  Mongolia’s experience 
of global economic integration in the minerals sector gives a 
concrete example of the powerful effects that this transformative 
potential can produce, evidenced in significant legal and political 
change enacted within the Mongolian state and civil society. As 
discussed in the first chapter, states in a position of dependence 
on foreign investment often find it in their own interests to create 
a stable legal-political infrastructure to attract and maintain 
investor interest in commodity sectors that are considered “high 
risk” (e.g. vulnerable to volatile commodity prices).  
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As I explained in the first chapter, the priorities and capacities of 
national states in general are vulnerable to being reordered and 
redirected to enable, sustain and protect markets because of their 
interdependent relationship with capital. However, the extent to 
which this reordering process transforms the state depends upon 
the state’s dependencies and vulnerabilities when it comes to 
capital investment. States which have limited adaptation options 
due to the lack of state capital (i.e., dependent on foreign 
investment) or type of sector (i.e., primary commodity exporter) 
are particularly vulnerable to structural pressures to use their 
political and legal resources to stabilise conditions for markets to 
flourish and expand. A stable legal and political environment in 
these terms means that the state eases the conditions for 
investment by offsetting some of the financial and political risks 
of global market integration.  
In the Mongolian context, I argue that we can see the 
transformative effects upon the state of integrating into the global 
minerals market, as its priorities and practices became 
increasingly coordinated and unified around the goal of creating a 
stable investment environment after the crisis of FDI in 2012-
2103. The de jure rights of the state have been subordinated to a 
new market principle in practice: stability in the national 
investment environment. The gap that developed between the 
legitimate scope for state activity as defined by the written 
constitution and the increasingly limited scope for state 
intervention in the minerals economy between 1994-2014 – in 
practice – suggests a deeper shift in the constitution of the state.  
For example, Article 5.1 of the 1992 Constitution states that 
‘Mongolia shall have an economy based on different forms of 
property which takes into account universal trends of world 
economic development and national specifics.’ Article 5.4 further 
establishes the state prerogative to ‘regulate the economy of the 
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country with a view to ensure the nation’s economic security, the 
development of all modes of production, and social development 
of the population.’ (Article 5.4, emphasis mine).  
In this chapter, I demonstrate the ways in which ‘national 
specifics’ have been subordinated to ‘universal trends’ of 
economic development. Furthermore, the attempt to reregulate 
the mining sector based on national priorities has been 
fundamentally delegitimised, unless ‘the national’ dovetails with 
the creation of a stable political-legal environment for the market. 
This hierarchy between the national and the global in Mongolia’s 
mineral sector limits the state’s autonomy to regulate the 
economy in a way that upholds plural forms of production and 
protects the public interest of citizens in natural resources that 
are vested in the State (Article 6.1 and 6.2). I argue that the state’s 
impoverishment and growing dependence on foreign direct 
investment ‘locks in’ (Gill, 1998) reforms that affect critical 
aspects of the state’s norms and capacity – in practice – to 
support diverse modes of production, take responsibility for 
national economic security (Article 5.1, 5.2 and 5.4) and to assert 
public ownership rights of natural resource wealth (Article 6.1 
and 6.2). It limits the national expression of the state by 
institutionalising stability (of the investment environment) as a 
normative prerequisite to state action in the economy 
(Schneiderman, 2013; May, 2014). On one hand, this process can 
be understood as “destructive” to a national articulation of the 
state in the minerals sector because the national political 
interests of the state can no longer provide sufficient justification 
for changes to the regulatory environment. However, it also 
generates a new expression of the state in which its position in 
the global economy becomes the paramount “political” value that 
shapes it; the state’s role becomes primarily defined by its 
facilitation of transnational capital.  
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The purpose of this chapter is to provide an historical overview of 
the powerful influence of market discipline – its mechanisms and 
norms – on the Mongolian state since integrating into the global 
minerals economy in the late 1990s. I posit that market 
mechanisms, particularly foreign direct investment, in Mongolia 
have been disciplinary in two senses. Firstly, they have affected 
concrete practice in terms of decision-making and the 
reorganisation of state institutions according to market 
preferences. Secondly, the discipline of the market has challenged 
the principles of the state, establishing normative boundaries for 
the state in relation to the market. The state’s apparent adoption 
of values which depoliticise decision-making in relation to the 
mining sector suggests that market discipline has normative 
power, as well as power to affect institutional behaviour within 
the state. However, the discipline of the state must be understood, 
at least partially, as self-discipline: the transnational legal and 
political norm of stability has been internalised and implemented 
by national institutions and actors (Shaffer, 2014). The 
subordination of political values to economic ones in Mongolia’s 
mining regime occurred through forceful financial mechanisms 
after the crisis of foreign investment in 2012-2013, although the 
state has been exposed to the legal-political logic of self-
regulating markets since the post-socialist transition. 
This chapter is structured chronologically, focusing on major 
points of legal and policy change in the mining sector from 1997-
2015. It demonstrates the way that the state’s policy and legal 
autonomy to regulate the minerals sector has been challenged, 
and explains the changing terrain of legitimacy for state 
regulation of the minerals economy in relation to the state’s 
dependence on mining investment. This new terrain has been 
predominantly shaped by a conflict between public interest 
activism by Mongolian citizens and private interest activism by 
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investors, in which the latter have demonstrated their de facto 
power as the gatekeepers of the economy against the de jure 
rights of citizens to appeal to the national state’s legally 
constituted obligations.  
1994 – 2002: Making a Minerals Market on the 
“Final Frontier” 
As described in the previous chapter, Mongolia suffered a 
devastating economic crisis following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Mongolia moved suddenly from the position of a middle-
income country with a fairly diversified economy based on 
national industry (agriculture, manufacturing and mining) to an 
impoverished “developing” country whose industry base was too 
small to compete in the global capitalist economy (Reinert, 2000; 
Rossabi, 2005). Mongolian manufacturing lost its primary export 
market, the Soviet Union, and could not compete against other 
regional producers. The only base for Mongolia to develop 
competitive exports was in the mining and cashmere sectors, and 
Mongolia’s new development financiers and advisors, such as the 
World Bank, actively promoted foreign-invested mining as a 
development strategy for the new democracy (Hatcher, 2014; 
Rossabi, 2005).  
Consequently, in 1994, the newly constituted democratic 
government of Mongolia initiated the Gold Programme to 
stimulate investment in the mining sector. This programme was 
the first of its kind in Mongolia, where private companies had the 
right to gain access to geological information previously 
monopolised by the state and to hold mining permits for 
exploration and exploitation activities (Byambajav, 2012: 17). 
The Gold Programme was legally enabled by the democratic 
Constitution’s recognition of private property rights, giving the 
state the option of using private investment to overcome its ‘cash 
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deficit’ (Byambajav, 2014: 2). The 1994 Minerals Law provided a 
basic legal framework for prospecting, exploring and exploiting 
minerals but did not incite serious interest from foreign investors 
because it maintained a significant degree of potential for state 
involvement and discretion. Specifically, it introduced three 
categories of minerals – common, special and strategic (Article 
4)33 – with varying degrees of regulation depending on their 
importance to the state budget and the national economy.  In line 
with this state-centric emphasis, the law recognised the state as 
having priority purchasing rights (Article 5.4). It also granted 
significant discretionary power to Parliament to limit the level of 
“strategic” minerals mining, ‘taking fully into account the 
interests of future generations to inherit non-renewable natural 
resources and pursuing the principle of thrifty and rational use’ 
(Article 6.2). The approval of Parliament was mandatory to the 
granting of strategic mining licenses to foreign legal persons 
(Article 7.5). Furthermore, the 1994 Law only permitted one 
extension for licenses (up to twenty years) (Article 15.5), gave the 
state the right to participate in joint investment and co-sharing of 
products and revenues (Article 12.1), and included state costs of 
exploration in the valuation of deposits (Article 12.4). Licence-
holders were prohibited from transferring their license to third 
parties without state authorisation (Article 14), which was 
perceived by investors as a major barrier to competition. As 
Husband and Songwe (2004: 52) explain in their World Bank 
report – Mining in Mongolia: Managing the Future: 
 
33 According to Article 4 of the 1994 Minerals Law, ‘strategic minerals include 
gold ore, silver ore, and ores of platinum and other metals of its group…ruby, 
diamond, emerald, sapphire, uranium ore, oil, and hard coal’ (4.3). 
Additionally, ‘special minerals are minerals ores and non-metallic minerals’ 
except those designated as strategic or common (4.4). Finally, ‘common 
minerals include sand, gravel, sandstone, quartzite, clay, argillite, aluerite, 
chalk, limestone, dolomite, marl, intrusive rock, volcanic rock, altered rock and 
shale’ (4.5).  
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[T]he right to transfer or pledge licenses to and/or 
with other parties… is essential for project financing… 
[it] is one of the fundamental premises that has driven 
the success of the world’s dominant mining 
jurisdictions – such as the USA, Australia, Canada – 
from the very beginning of their modern mining 
histories. It is now an essential “entrepreneurial” 
component in all successful mining legislation. 
Thus, prior to 1997, Mongolia’s mining regime was not perceived 
as attractive or competitive for foreign investors. Mining was still 
an important economic sector for Mongolia, but the industry was 
still largely state-owned and operated. A limited amount of 
mining co-existed with manufacturing and pastoralism, with 
12.7% of the total landmass available for minerals exploration 
(Wu, 1997: 1). 
Similar to the 1992 Constitution, the 1994 Minerals Law reflected 
the tension between the socialist power-holders and free market 
reformers in establishing basic juridical frameworks around the 
role of the state in the economy in the wake of the democratic 
transition (President of the National Mongolian Mining 
Association, author interview). The 1994 Minerals Law liberalised 
Mongolia’s mineral sector in the sense that it recognised the 
validity of private property rights to extraction and ownership 
but within a framework that gave preference to the state. In short, 
it did not create the framework for systematic flows of foreign 
direct investment. However, it seems that Mongolia’s status as a 
transitional market democracy spared the 1994 Law some of the 
scrutiny that would characterise future mineral legislation. Not 
only was the Mongolian context struggling to cope with the social 
change created by the post-socialist transition, but global 
commodity prices were relatively low, dampening investment 
interest.  
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The conditions of economic collapse in the early 1990s and 
consequent investor uncertainty in both the Mongolian market 
and regulatory environment meant that the 1994 Law was not 
particularly influential in generating investor interest. This did 
not seem to be a great surprise, or a disappointment, even to the 
private sector. As N. Algaa, President of the Mongolian National 
Mining Association (MNMA) reflected, it was ‘very difficult for 
Mongolia to make a good law… we cannot blame [Mongolia], that 
was the situation’ (ibid). The 1994 law, however, at least 
provided a legal framework for the Gold Programme, intended to 
generate income for the state in a period of crisis. Thus, the 1994 
Minerals Law did not make great strides in opening up the 
minerals sector to investment at the time, but its partially 
liberalised approach reflected the ambivalence among legislators 
and policy-makers at the time about the extent of marketization, a 
conflict that generally characterised political debate in the 
beginning of the 1990s.  
In 1996, the former communist party – the MPRP – lost the 
parliamentary election, allowing the democratic reformers their 
first opportunity to govern the new democracy. As the previous 
chapter explained, the Democratic Party was partly energised by 
the presence of young economists eager to integrate Mongolia 
into the global economy and to further free its market from the 
lingering constraints of the old command-style economy. 1997 
marked a legal and political sea-change in the Mongolian state’s 
approach to both mining and foreign investment with major 
amendments to the Minerals, Investment and Tax Laws, and 
significant increase in land made available by the state for mining 
exploration (from 12.7% to 40%) (Wu, 1997; Lander, 2013). 
Mongolia also joined the World Trade Organisation in 1997, 
signalling its commitment to global free trade. The upshot of this 
dramatic shift was to create the legal infrastructure to enable 
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large-scale foreign direct investment in the mining sector and to 
effectively make the potential of Mongolia’s extractive industry 
globally competitive. The 1997 reforms marked a milestone in 
terms of Mongolia’s openness to private, transnational capital, as 
well as proof to its transition sponsors – specifically the World 
Bank, the IMF and the ADB – that the state was serious about 
finding its comparative advantage both within and on the terms 
of the global market.  
In 1997, a new minerals law was drafted and passed by 
Parliament. The 1997 Minerals Law was a new piece of 
legislation, not an amended version of the 1994 law. The World 
Bank funded the development of the law, with the support of the 
new government, and organised a foreign investors conference in 
the same year to advertise the new framework and stimulate 
investment into the minerals economy. The 1997 law provided a 
comprehensive liberal framework for the mining sector, easing 
conditions for investment and restricting the role of the state. A 
World Bank discussion paper – Review of Environmental and 
Social Impacts in the Mining Sector (2006: 2) – put it this way:  
In the past decade, the Government of Mongolia has 
evolved from being predominantly the owner and 
operator of mines to being a manager and regulator. 
The Review heralds the shift towards a ‘management and 
regulation’ approach as a progressive move away from the 
‘command and control’ regulatory approach that characterised 
the socialist era (ibid). The role of the state within the new legal 
framework was to facilitate investment by establishing 
‘procedures for obtaining mineral licenses [which] are clear, 
simple, and quick’ (Mineral Resources Authority of Mongolia, 
2002). A World Bank working paper – Mongolia Mining Sector: 
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Managing the Future (Husband & Songwe, 2004: 52) – praised the 
1997 Minerals Law: 
The Minerals Law of Mongolia is acknowledged by the 
international mining community as one of the 
strongest legal presentations of mineral licensee rights 
and obligations in the world, and clearly the most 
investor-friendly and enabling law in Asia. This is due 
to the clarity of its provisions that establish one-stop 
“first-come/first served” license application and 
granting procedures, security of tenure for licensees, 
regulatory guidance for environmental protection and 
obligations of licensees, and assignment and transfer of 
mineral licenses. Nothing should be altered in this law 
to weaken these important principles. 
The following table highlights various ways in which the 1997 
Law would ease conditions for investors whilst restricting the 
role of the state in the mining sector.  
Table One: Investor-State Rights in the 1997 Minerals Law 
 
Easing Conditions for 
Investment 
Restricting Role of the State 
Eliminated restrictions on number 
of licenses that can be held by one 
legal person (formerly five under 
1994 Law) (Article 13.7) 
Simplified application procedure 
for exploration and mining 
licenses (Article 13 and 14) 
No longer required feasibility 
Removed classification of minerals 
based on national strategic value 
(formerly Article 4 of 1994 
Minerals Law) 
Parliament restricted from 
limiting mining activity in general 
(only on State specially protected 
land – Article 6.1.4) and 
determining permissions for 
foreign investors to mine (Article 
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studies 
Environmental protection plans 
and impact assessments made 
into a secondary procedure, 
following granting of license 
(Article 29) 
Licenses granted on first-come-
first-served basis (no 
discrimination between 
companies) (Article 14.1) 
Exclusive rights to explore and 
mine (Article 12) 
No distinction made between 
domestic and international 
investors (Article 10.1) 
Right to sell mineral products at 
market prices on domestic or 
international markets (Article 
16.3)  
License extensions for forty years 
(Article 16.6) (formerly twenty 
under 1994 Law – Article 15.5)  
Right to use water (Article 16.10)  
Stability agreement provisions for 
10-15 years for investments > two 
million USD (Article 20) These 
agreements determine:  
6) 
Government restricted from direct 
participation in exploration and 
mining – only through a business 
entity (Article 6.6) 
Significant decentralisation of 
social and environmental aspects 
of regulation to local 
administrations (aimag, soum, 
bagh): 
➢ “ensure and monitor 
compliance by license 
holders of their obligations 
with respect to 
environmental protection, 
health and safety 
regulations for workers 
and local residents, and 
payment of their 
obligations to the 
treasuries of local 
administrative bodies” 
(Article 6.4.3) 
Eliminated state priority of 
purchase of minerals (formerly 
Article 6 of 1994 Minerals Law) 
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➢ Tax rates 
➢ Export and sale of 
products at international 
prices 
Established universal royalty rate 
at 2.5% (Article 38.3) 
Licensees had the right to transfer 
or pledge licenses to and/or with 
other parties (Articles 12 and 40; 
see also Husband and Songwe, 
2004: 52) 
The many proponents and few critics of the 1997 Minerals Law 
agreed at the time that it inaugurated a major shift in favour of 
protecting investor rights and shaking off lingering shadows of 
state control of the sector. The President of the Mongolian 
Investors’ Association would later note that the resurgence of 
commodity prices in the late 1990s – following the Asian 
Financial Crisis – complemented the government’s efforts to 
encourage private investment into the mining sector:  
By the 2000s, when commodity prices were rising, our 
government was also encouraging companies to get 
involved in mining activities… Whoever had some 
capital, they started investing into mining activities… 
Mongolia’s market is very small, only three million 
people, so mining business is the number one chance 
we can do some big business, you know. So that’s why a 
lot of businesses got involved with mining (President of 
the Mongolian Investors’ Association, author 
interview). 
Both domestic and foreign investors – treated equally under the 
1997 Minerals Law – leapt at the new opportunity to access this 
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largely untapped frontier minerals market. Many Mongolian 
entrepreneurs invested newly acquired capital in the mining 
sector in the late 1990s, particularly those that had benefited 
from the privatisation of SOEs. The privatisation of former 
socialist geological institutions and laboratories in the early 
1990s and the lack of new institutions to control geological 
information gave companies in the late 1990s a head start on 
exploring in the most viable locations. In this “frontier rush” 
atmosphere, some of the world’s largest and most established 
companies competed for access to mineral-rich territories 
alongside small and medium-scale enterprises. This initial rush 
for access to the new market was characterised by diversity in the 
origins of companies, from BHP Billiton (Australia), Centerra Gold 
(Canada), to new Mongolian companies ready to invest newly 
acquired capital assets.  
The 1997 Minerals Law created a relatively efficient structure for 
decision-making about mining licenses. An implementation 
agency was established within the Ministry of Industry and Trade 
(now the Ministry of Mining) to ‘facilitate the implementation of 
the new minerals law’ (World Bank, 2006: 3): the Mineral 
Resources Authority of Mongolia (MRAM). Whilst officially 
embedded within the Ministry, the agency enjoyed significant 
decision-making authority, where licenses were issued on a first-
come-first-served basis (Officer, MRAM, author interview). The 
concentration of implementation power and discretionary 
oversight of the minerals sector within MRAM was remarkable, 
particularly in light of MRAM’s authority to assign ‘extensive 
exploration rights’ (World Bank, 2006: 29) through its Cadastre 
Division. Stability agreements did not have a review process 
outside of the Ministry and MRAM; the signature of one financial 
minister was sufficient authorisation (Sukhbaatar, 2012: 225).  
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The legal environment created by the 1997 Mineral Law not only 
eased conditions in which to invest, but branded Mongolia as a 
liberal regulatory environment. According to the former 
Executive Vice President of Ivanhoe Mines (Kirwin, 2006), the 
1997 Minerals Law was a key catalyst for the development of the 
Oyu Tolgoi copper and gold mine in the South Gobi, and 
highlighted Mongolia’s status as an emerging free market 
economy. The newly liberalised framework created by the 1997 
Minerals Law enabled Ivanhoe to rapidly extend the process of 
exploration beyond the relatively shallow and ad-hoc drilling of 
its predecessors.34 In 2001, an exploration team lead by Robert 
Friedland of Ivanhoe Mines, discovered unprecedented gold and 
copper resources 80 kilometres from the Mongolian-Chinese 
border.35 By mid-2003, Oyu Tolgoi was the biggest mining 
exploration in the world, with eighteen drill rigs operating 
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week (Turquoise Hill 
Resources, 2013).36 In addition to the 2001 Southern Oyu 
discovery, three additional deposits were discovered (2002-
2008) which comprise the current Oyu Tolgoi mining complex 
(Turquoise Hill Resources, 2013; Kohn and Humber, 2013). Oyu 
Tolgoi is now estimated to contain almost 43 million tonnes of 
copper and 1,850 tonnes of gold, the largest high-grade deposit of 
their mineral classification37 in the world (Porter, 2016: 375-
376). The impact of the investment from the Oyu Tolgoi 
exploration was swift: the mineral sector’s share of GDP grew 
from 10% in 2002 to 33% in 2007 (Combellick-Bidney, 2012: 
 
34 While anomalous geological indicators were registered in the 1983 
Mongolian Geological Survey, it was not until 1996 when Magma Copper, a 
large American company, secured exploration rights to the deposit that Oyu 
Tolgoi generated any serious attention. By the end of that year, Magma Copper 
had been purchased by BHP Billiton, an Australian company, which took over 
their exploration rights. BHP Billiton quickly sold their exploration rights to 
Ivanhoe Mines following the copper bust in 1997. 
35 Ivanhoe’s 2002 independent research audit states that the initial exploration 
area contained 10 million ounces of gold and 5.6 billion pounds of copper 
(Turquoise Hill Resources, 2013). 
 
37 Palaeozoic porphyry deposits (see Porter, 2016).  
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273), and also constituted over 70% of total industrial output in 
2007 (Tse, 2009), officially putting Mongolia into the category of 
mineral dependence.38 
2002-2006: Re-Evaluating the State-Market Balance 
The 1997 Minerals Law fundamentally redefined the state-market 
relationship in the minerals sector, from a model of relatively 
strong state control to that of state-market complementarity. 
Formerly, the command economy and authoritarian political 
regime of the socialist period had designated the state as not only 
the owner of the minerals but the main organ of their 
exploitation. As explained in the previous section, the 1994 
Minerals Law was still characterised by the presumption of a 
strong state. However, the 1997 Minerals Law established a 
complementary division of regulatory labour, with the central 
state limiting itself to the technical administration of licenses, the 
collation of geological data and the collection of rents, established 
at economically rather than politically competitive rates. For 
example, the tax regime did not reflect the state’s ownership of 
natural resources by establishing substantial, non-negotiable 
rates. Instead, tax rates were used as leverage to attract investors, 
established at competitive rates that could be changed, delayed or 
eliminated in the context of stability agreements. Additionally, the 
central government delegated significant social and 
environmental responsibilities to local administrations, thereby 
dispersing its authority as the central institution of regulation. 
The growth of investment interest in the Mongolian minerals 
sector and the ease with which exploration and exploitation 
 
38 There is a growing literature on the calculation of natural resource 
dependence. Resource dependence is typically calculated based on the share of 
natural resources in GDP, national exports and/or government revenue (see 
Sachs and Warner, 1995; Baunsgaard, 2012). Over 20% in any category 
indicates significant mineral dependent (see Hailu and Kipgen, 2017, for an 
overview of different indices and introduction to the Extractives Dependence 
Index).  
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licenses could be obtained tested this new division of labour in 
three distinct ways.  
Firstly, the increase in mining activity from 1994 onwards 
produced extraordinary socio-environmental dislocation within a 
short space of time. The impact of opening Mongolian territory to 
mining investment had the unanticipated consequence of creating 
an informal mining economy, characterised by rudimentary 
extraction techniques and precarious living conditions. By 2001, 
up to 100,000 illegal gold miners were employed in the informal 
mining economy that had developed alongside the gold rush in 
the mid-1990s (World Bank, 2006: 8; Byambajav, 2012). The lack 
of strong environmental oversight meant that many small and 
medium-scale gold-mining operations had failed to rehabilitate 
the land, leaving it open to artisanal mining. Propelled both by 
rising poverty levels in the post-transition period as well as the 
lure of competing, albeit illicitly, in the booming gold market, the 
phenomenon of illegal “ninja” miners became a sign to many 
Mongolians of the abdication of effective state regulation of the 
mining economy.39  
The sudden appearance of mobile and unregulated illegal miners 
in rural Mongolia challenged the socio-environmental 
expectations of a predominantly pastoral population. The 
administration of pastureland was already under pressure with a 
rapid increase in the number of herders following the economic 
collapse of the early 1990s.40 While these new herders had 
squeezed available land and water, the presence of illegal miners 
 
39 The demographic of illegal miners is complex, despite their caricature as 
polluting criminals (High, 2008). Herders seeking to either supplement or find 
an alternative livelihood, ex-convicts and unemployed professionals from 
Ulaanbaatar found their way to the gold fields. 
40 The herding population grew from 18% to 50% of the working population in 
the 1990s (Mearns, 2004: 108; Rossabi, 2005: 121). 
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created a new kind of tension over access to resources because of 
the conflicting approach to resources by pastoralists and miners. 
Illegal miners were often perceived as having no respect for the 
sustainability of the land, the health of the rivers or respect for 
the locality, despite many “ninja” miners being former herders. In 
particular, the use of mercury by gold miners in general and the 
pollution of rivers was a catalyst for growing dissatisfaction with 
the regulation of mining, as well as the social disruptions 
associated with temporary mining camps (i.e., child labour, sexual 
abuse and various forms of violence).  
Secondly, the introduction of extractive land use created a 
hierarchy between the mining and herding economies. The 1997 
Minerals Law introduced a new hierarchy of property rights in 
the rural economy as pastoral land-use regimes had to compete 
for the first time against centrally issued mining licenses. 
Pastoralist property rights were, and still are, uncodified in 
Mongolia (Tumenbayar, 2002). The presumption of state 
ownership of property during the socialist period meant that 
herders only had access to use-rights, administered initially 
through pre-socialist customary systems and gradually 
institutionalised through collectivisation. With the disintegration 
of the negdels in the late 1980s, customary norms again became 
the basis for regulating pastureland. This was a somewhat fraught 
process, given that “customary norms” had been maintained to 
some degree through the socialist period but nonetheless 
morphed and shifted significantly. The arrival of “new herders” 
migrating from the city to the steppe looking for subsistence 
during the economic collapse of the early 1990s added another 
dimension. However, use-rights were negotiated between old and 
new herders in an informal and ad-hoc way. The arrival of mining 
companies in the mid to late 1990s interrupted the informal 
negotiation of property use-rights between herders, as 
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companies’ codified rights to explore and exploit the minerals 
under the soil were formally guaranteed by the newly established 
Mineral Resources Authority and justiciable by national courts 
and/or international arbitration.  
The issuance of mining licenses from the central government 
created an imbalance of power between herders and mining 
companies, due to conflicts between centrally issued mining 
licenses and herders’ informal entitlements to land use 
(Tumenbayar, 2002; Endicott, 2012: 143). By 2004, 
approximately 26% of Mongolian land was covered in mining 
licenses for exploration and extraction (Husband and Songwe, 
2004: 7); 50% of these licenses were held by only seven 
companies, the four largest of which were foreign (ibid). By 2009, 
the number of licenses had almost doubled, to cover 45% of 
Mongolian territory (Suzuki, 2013: 277). The environmental 
inputs of mining in terms of land and water not only created an 
economic conflict of interest with herders, but threatened to 
undermine the ‘material, environmental and cultural bases of the 
livelihood of local communities’ (Byambajav, 2012: 13). Small 
groups of herders suffering from the pollution and drying up of 
rivers, displacement from precious cultural landmarks and 
customary grazing land began to organise themselves to resist 
these changes in the early 2000s. These movements expressed 
resistance in various ways initially, through short-term direct 
action protests, such as roadblocks, hunger strikes, and lobbying 
within the Citizens Councils of local government to block the 
approval of mining licenses (Byambajav, 2012, 2014; Upton, 
2012).  
Thirdly, the strong presence of foreign companies in the mining 
sector contributed to negative public sentiment about the use of 
national wealth for the gain of foreign “others.” This “insult” 
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added to the general “injury” expressed in the ‘growing public 
outrage over the country’s lack of socio-economic improvements, 
despite the mining boom’ (Hatcher, 2014: 136). Additionally, 
growing political unrest about environmental degradation, new 
social ills in rural localities and power imbalances in the 
distribution of land heightened public concern. It was further 
heightened in the case of Oyu Tolgoi, once the significance of the 
deposit was realised. In April 2006, protests erupted in 
Ulaanbaatar, fuelled by remarks of Robert Friedland, then CEO of 
Ivanhoe Mines, revelling in the huge profit margins that were to 
be made by the company out of the resources in the deposit. 
Friedland’s comparison of Oyu Tolgoi to t-shirts being made ‘for 
five bucks and selling them for a hundred dollars’ incensed a 
vocal part of the Mongolian public in 2005, leading to a three-
week protest campaign and the burning of an effigy of Robert 
Friedland and several government ministers (New 
Internationalist, 2006; Reuters, 2010).  
The global context of a commodity boom and the national context 
of an impending Oyu Tolgoi stability agreement were two 
important features of this period. The stakes were heightened for 
the Mongolian government because it had started negotiations 
with Ivanhoe Mines in 2004 for a stability agreement, the terms of 
which would likely affect the trajectory of national development 
for the 21st century. The global boom in commodity prices offered 
an opportunity to gain more control of the Oyu Tolgoi deposit, 
creating competition between national power-holders as to which 
party interests would be reflected in the investment agreement. 
The timely coincidence of a commodity boom with the Oyu Tolgoi 
stability agreement negotiations engendered political conflict 
between political parties at a time when the government was 
particularly fragile following the 2004 parliamentary election. 
While the MPRP had been expected to win the election 
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(Schafferer, 2005; Sukhbaatar, 2012), they only received 49% of 
the vote and half of the seats in Parliament (thirty-six). Without a 
majority, the MPRP entered into a ‘grand coalition government’ 
(Schafferer, 2005: 746) with the Mongolian Democratic Coalition 
and other major parties.  
Despite the rhetoric of unity, the cracks in this ‘grand coalition’ 
quickly became evident, with the MPRP dissolving the coalition 
government in January 2006. The political bickering of the parties 
reinforced citizen anxiety about the close relationship between 
the government and investors, particularly Ivanhoe Mines, which 
the opposition parties used to their advantage. For example, in 
May 2006, twenty-six opposition MPs staged a walk-out to 
protest government corruption and support ‘calls for better terms 
in negotiations with foreign miners’ (White, 2013; Reuters, 2006). 
This display of nationalism from mainly Democratic Party MPs is 
somewhat ironic, as that party was the main architect and 
political force behind liberalising the mining investment 
framework in the 1997 Minerals Law. The internal conflict 
between the parties coincided with protest movements urging the 
state to ‘protect the basic interests of the people’ and ‘provide a 
legal environment with Mongolia to have an advantage in the 
minerals sector’ (Sukhbaatar, 2012: 223).  
To conclude this section, the sudden emergence of illegal mining, 
the subordination of herders’ customary entitlements to miners’ 
property rights and the presence of foreigners in Mongol 
heartlands – and all the socio-environmental dislocation entailed 
by these phenomena – provoked major public concern about the 
influence of foreign investors on the state, as well as the state’s 
capacity to address the socio-environmental impacts of mining. 
The subsequent push for national law reform reflected a strong 
sense on the part of voters and their representatives that the 
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government could – and should – regain some regulatory power 
and political control of the mining sector. The visible disturbance 
to public life in Mongolia created a fertile political moment for the 
government to re-evaluate the regulatory balance that had been 
struck in the 1997 Minerals Law.  
2006-2009: State-Market Compromise and the Oyu 
Tolgoi Investment Agreement 
In May 2006, legislators proposed a new draft Minerals Law. In 
July, after less than three months of deliberation, a new minerals 
law was passed by Parliament. The 2006 Law can be understood 
as a mixture of the 1994 and 1997 Laws, giving the state wider 
regulatory powers within an enabling market-based framework 
that still guaranteed investor access to international markets and 
a stabilised tax environment. The government framed this 
decision to “bring the state back in” as a win-win for the public 
and private sectors, stating at an investor conference that, 
The involvement of government will stabilise the 
project by lowering any risks that may face a project, 
such as the issue of infrastructure, power and water 
supplying permission… it [will] not control projects 
only prevent exploitation and provide a stable business 
environment (Sukhbaatar, 2012: 224 quoting BBC 
Worldwide Monitoring, September 14, 2006).  
However, the 2006 Minerals Law effectively redrew the boundary 
around the state’s involvement in the sector to some extent, 
giving legal legitimacy to the expression of national interest in the 
mining economy. The Law reintroduced the concept of mineral 
classification based on the national strategic value of deposits 
(Article 6), expanded the competence of Parliament to ‘approve 
or initiate’ the strategic value of a mineral deposit (Article 8.1.4) 
and determine the state’s share in those deposits (Article 8.1.7). It 
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also gave Parliament wider discretion to ‘determine’ state policy 
in the mining sector (Article 8.1.1), and ‘restrict or prohibit 
exploration and mining activities’ in ‘certain territories’ at its own 
initiative or the suggestion of the Government (Article 8.1.5). In 
terms of the ownership of minerals, the 2006 Law gave rights to 
the state to hold direct shares in strategic minerals deposits: up to 
50% in cases where the State funded exploration and up to 34% 
where the State did not contribute finance to the exploration 
(Article 5). The State’s right to hold direct shares in the deposit 
was not unqualified, but dependent upon negotiation of an 
agreement with other share-holders upon exploitation of the 
resource.  
Reflecting upon the 2006 Law, Sukhbaatar (2012: 225-226) 
accurately points out the redistribution of decision-making 
authority in stability agreements in favour of Parliament. Where 
the 1997 Law gave the power to sign a stability agreement to a 
‘financial minister on behalf of the government,’ (ibid: 225) the 
2006 Law required ‘an investment agreement… to be made 
jointly by three ministers in charge of finance, mining and 
environment upon authorisation by the cabinet (Article 29.4)’ 
(ibid: 226) for investments up to US $100 million. The 
requirement of parliamentary approval for investment above the 
“cabinet cap” asserted a strengthened form of representative 
safeguarding of national “strategic” interests by placing large-
scale investment agreement negotiation within an explicitly 
political state institution, rather than the executive ministries of 
government. Furthermore, the 2006 Minerals Law concentrated 
the collection of tax and royalty revenues at the central level, a 
move that would later frustrate the relationship between local 
administrations and the central state. The centralisation of 
revenue collection reinforced the emphasis on generating 
national wealth through the exploitation of minerals.  
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Within the contractual framework of investment agreements, the 
law stipulated a range of additional clauses imposing new duties 
upon investors and raised the bar of necessary finance to qualify 
for an investment agreement, from US $2 million to US $50 
million (Sukhbaatar, 2012: 225). Introducing investment 
agreements under Article 29 of the 2006 Law gave the state the 
opportunity to put more obligations on investors while still 
incentivising their interest in investing by providing for 
‘improved recognition to investors making larger, longer term 
commitments’ (Ivanhoe Mines, 2006: 3). In addition to the former 
rights to a stable tax environment, to sell mineral products at 
international prices and to discretionary management of income, 
Article 29 of the Law required the investor to make commitments 
to ‘minimise damage to environment and public health’ (29.1.5), 
protect the environment (29.1.6), leave no negative impacts on 
other industries (29.1.7), and promote regional development and 
increase employment (29.1.8).  
Furthermore, the 2006 Law gave local governments legal 
standing in relation to mining companies by requiring them to 
negotiate agreements ‘on issues of environmental protection, 
mine exploitation, infrastructure development in relation to 
mine-site development and job creation’ (Article 42.1). Articles 
42.2 and 42.3 provided pathways for citizen participation in 
public forums and ‘monitoring of the license holder’s activities’ 
vis-à-vis an elected representative. All of these changes clearly 
responded to demands by new political movements, particularly 
in rural areas, for the state to make mining companies 
accountable for environmental damage and to increase the 
inclusion of citizens in decision-making processes (Byambajav, 
2012; 2014). By introducing investment agreements as a stronger 
form of contract in the international mining sector, the state now 
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had the right to negotiate a specific investment agreement for 
Oyu Tolgoi but on the basis of improved standing.  
Changes in the tax regime in early 2006 evidenced a balancing act 
by the state in terms of increasing its expected benefits from 
mining projects while still maintaining investment interest. A few 
bold new measures were balanced with general ongoing support 
for investors’ rights. For example, the government appeared to 
champion the national interest by introducing a controversial 
Windfall Profits Tax in May 2006 and doubling the royalty rate in 
the Minerals Law from 2.5% to 5%. Combined with the 
reintroduction of nationally “strategic” deposits and the push for 
the state to hold direct stakes in mining projects, Mongolia gained 
a reputation for “resource nationalism” in the international media 
and among investors (Sukhbaatar, 2012; Lander, 2013). Notably, 
a group of Russian investors filed a case with UNCITRAL (Paushok 
v Mongolia) in 2007 under the Russia-Mongolia BIT on the basis 
that the windfall profits tax jeopardised their right to fair and 
equitable treatment (see Knotterus and Olivet, 2016). 
However, the 2006 Minerals Law actually reduced corporate 
income tax (from 30% to 25%) and value-added tax (from 15% to 
10%) from 1997 levels and instituted a flattened rate of personal 
income tax (10%) (Ivanhoe Mines, 2006: 3). Furthermore, it 
provided for an Investment Tax Credit where 10% of the 
investment amount was deductible from tax duties. The 2006 
Law also doubled the time frame of stabilisation to thirty years in 
the case of investments over 300 million US dollars. This reflected 
the state’s priority on large-scale mining projects, hoping to 
discourage widespread mining through small and medium-scale 
enterprises, which were seen by the government as contributing 
less to national income and also lacking the “capacity” to follow 
more stringent socio-environmental regulation.  
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The imperative to at least appear to respond to citizens’ interests, 
maximise state revenue in a commodity boom and yet sustain 
investor interest in the Mongolian mining sector generated a 
complex state-investor dynamic in the post-2006 political-legal 
environment. The period leading up to the signing of the Oyu 
Tolgoi Investment Agreement (OTIA) in 2009 was marked 
initially by anxiety due in large part to the extent to which Oyu 
Tolgoi offered hope of an accelerated path to economic 
development. Initially the move to permit the state to hold direct 
shareholding stakes in mining projects was met by resistance 
from investors, particularly from Ivanhoe Mines, but soon became 
less controversial as investors realised some of the benefits of 
working closely with the government, particularly in terms of 
gaining permit approvals (Sukhbaatar, 2012: 224).  
In October 2009, after five years of negotiations, the OTIA was 
signed by the Mongolian government, Rio Tinto and Ivanhoe 
Mines (now Turquoise Hill Resources). The Mongolian 
government emerged with a 34% stake,41  with the right to 
appoint three members (out of nine) to the Board of Directors. 
The OTIA determined stabilised tax rates and a zero rate for 
Value-Added Tax (VAT) for specified goods and services related 
to Oyu Tolgoi, in addition to the freedom of the foreign investor to 
repatriate export earnings (OTIA, Article 2.1 and 2.18). It also 
gave the foreign investor the right to avail itself of lower tax rates 
if they existed in applicable international or double-taxation 
treaties (ibid, Article 2.27). In turn the foreign investor committed 
to a range of initiatives to ‘support socio-economic development 
policies...to ensure that sustainable benefits from the OT Project 
reach Mongolian people, including people in Umnogovi aimag’ 
(ibid, Article 4.5). The OTIA instituted a division of labour 
 
41 In the lead up to the 2008 elections, there was an attempt by some leading 
politicians to renegotiate this level to 50% but Ivanhoe refused.  
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between the parties, with Rio Tinto responsible for the 
management of the project as a preferred stakeholder and the 
Mongolian government responsible to fund its “common” stake in 
the project by investing in infrastructure. The context of the 
global financial crisis in 2008 hastened the signing of the Oyu 
Tolgoi Investment Agreement as it became clear that ‘requiring 
yet more analysis of the public finance or economic implications 
of the project’ or ‘any further delays in the Oyu Tolgoi Project’ 
would discourage the investment interest of Ivanhoe Mines and 
Rio Tinto (World Growth Mongolia, 2009: 4).  The Windfall Profits 
Tax, having sent ‘a negative message to foreign investors’ 
(Ivanhoe Mines, 2006: 4) was also repealed in 2009.  
Between 2006 and 2009, the opportunity for the state to regain 
some influence in the mining sector seemed to provide both an 
economic and political solution to the pressing issues of depleted 
state capital and a discontented public. It could be described as a 
period of recalibration in the state-market relationship, 
characterised by outbursts of high emotion and passionate 
lobbying by government bureaucrats, legislators, activists and 
investors as a balance was struck within the legal framework 
between claims for the interests of the voting public, political 
parties and the private sector. However, as noted, a large degree 
of continuity in neoliberal state support for the private sector was 
maintained underneath the more vocal aspects of “resistance” to 
foreign control of Mongolia’s mineral wealth (Hatcher, 2014: 
108). By 2009, the political volatility which had characterised 
earlier years seemed to have settled, with a balance struck 
between state and investor interests, with limited state 
involvement in strategic mining projects and a more centralised 
tax framework. Qualified state participation had been permitted 
in the minerals market without jeopardising the unprecedented 
Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreement.  
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2009-2013: Optimism and Entanglement  
This extended quote from one of the author’s interviews 
highlights the initial optimism which subsequently gave way to 
disenchantment, particularly among government officials, 
following the signing of the Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreement:  
My attitude or my thinking about mining companies 
has changed… Before 2009 or 2010… my imagination 
was perfectly positive about the mining companies, 
especially companies like Rio Tinto, you know, because 
I was part of the government working group for the 
[Oyu Tolgoi] Agreement… I was thinking, “This is a 
multinational company… They will never lie…” But 
then since 2012 when there was a dispute… Rio Tinto 
as a global company actually managed all the media… 
so all the information about investing in Mongolia 
internationally was very, very negative: “This is one of 
the worst countries in the world to invest your money!” 
This was a big attack for Mongolia. No one would risk 
money, maybe except China or Russia. Why are [Rio 
Tinto] doing this? It was actually very unbalanced and 
very unequal. 
– Former Deputy Director of Legal Policy Department, 
Ministry of Justice, and Member of the Oyu Tolgoi 
Working Group prior to the signing of the Investment 
Agreement (author interview) 
As explained in the previous section, the Mongolian government 
had achieved a stronger presence for itself within the minerals 
economy under the 2006 minerals framework, both in terms of 
raising expectations on investors, especially in terms of financial 
commitment and socio-environmental obligations, and in terms 
of generating more substantial revenue for the state. The 
presumption at the time was that the government could shape the 
function of the market without interrupting it and by doing so 
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could mitigate its most damaging aspects (i.e., environmental 
degradation, social dislocation, Dutch Disease, economic 
inequality).  
Institutionally, this optimism had been reflected in the creation of 
two new funds to 1.) redistribute mineral rents to the public and 
2.) prevent pro-cyclical spending by the government. In 
November 2009, the Human Development Fund (HDF) replaced 
the Mongolian Development Fund (est. 2007) ‘to counteract rising 
inequality and distribute the benefits of the mining boom more 
widely’ (Isakova et al., 2012: 10). The state was supposed to 
allocate a portion of revenue to the HDF each year based on 
expected earnings from mineral dividends, royalties and taxation 
(ibid: 11; Campi, 2012). It was primarily designed as an ongoing 
‘cash transfer mechanism,’ (Isakova et al., 2012: 11) in addition to 
funding education initiatives and social services (ibid; Yeung & 
Howes, 2015; Moran, 2013). According to Campi (2012), the HDF 
was a legal milestone for the Mongolian public, as it enshrined 
‘equal eligibility’ for each citizen to share in the country’s mineral 
wealth. To generate savings and prevent reliance on volatile 
mineral prices, the Parliament passed the Fiscal Stability Law in 
2010 and the Integrated Budget Law in 2011. These laws have the 
combined effect of capping the deficit and public debt at 2% and 
40% of GDP respectively, keeping expenditure in line with the 
growth rate of Mongolia’s non-mineral GDP, and constraining the 
power of Parliament to influence the state budget (Ognon, 2013). 
According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), the Fiscal Stability Law crucially included 
the introduction of a ‘transparent formula for copper price 
projections’ (Isakova et al., 2012: 15) to help the Mongolian 
government anticipate the boom and bust cycle of this commodity 
market. Finally, the Fiscal Stability Law established the Fiscal 
Stability Fund to accumulate ‘excess commodity-related 
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revenues’ (ibid) from boom phases in order to supplement 
financial losses experienced in bust phases of the cycle.  
In 2011, Mongolia recorded the world’s highest GDP growth at 
17.5% (World Bank, 2013: 3), and was acclaimed internationally 
as a “Global Growth Generator.” The ‘2010/2011 spike in 
commodity markets’ (World Bank, 2011: 1) created a fever of 
investor interest (President of the Mongolian Investors’ 
Assocation, author interview). Combined with the initial influx of 
investment – US $4.6 billion – to develop the surface operation of 
the Oyu Tolgoi project in 2010, there was a general sense of a 
“win-win” solution shared by the government and investors in the 
context of the ‘global supercycle’ of commodity prices. Given that 
Mongolia’s total GDP was only US $4.2 billion in 2009 (Isakova et 
al, 2012: 2), it is hard to overstate the significance of the Oyu 
Tolgoi investment for Mongolia’s prospects for economic 
development at the time. As the Director of the Strategic Policy 
and Planning Department at the Ministry of Mining put it (author 
interview),  
Prices were high, everyone could do business, everyone 
was satisfied, everyone was too confident.  
The influx of FDI into the mining economy had a significant effect 
across the national economy. As expected, support and 
infrastructure industries also boomed at this time, particularly to 
service the development of Oyu Tolgoi. The presence of new 
mining ventures in rural areas created new demand and higher 
prices for meat, as well as new housing developments in high-
income areas on Ulaanbaatar’s outskirts to house foreign 
business people and their families, as well as the rising middle 
class. Apart from these quite direct effects, the increase in capital 
flow within the domestic economy caused the tugrik to appreciate 
by 13% against the US dollar in 2010 (M.A.D. Investment 
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Solutions, 2013), with ‘record high reserves’ held by Mongol Bank 
that year. As citizens’ purchasing power increased, so did demand 
for secondary goods and services, leading to a boom in expensive 
coffee shops, high-line retail and luxury apartments. However, 
this new wave of growth had shallow roots, as it was 
fundamentally linked to the welfare of the mining sector. In 
hindsight, the President of the Association of Investors in 
Mongolian Mining (author interview) reflected on the real risk 
associated with the boom in mining investment:  
Now everybody’s stuck into this. But it’s also [a] very 
big problem because all our capital assets [are] locked 
in mining business. 
The 2006-2009 period had seen the state making strong 
commitments in two directions: to finance its direct stakes in 
mining projects and to redistribute tangible benefits from the 
mining sector to citizens. In 2011, the Mongolian government 
established the Development Bank of Mongolia through law ‘with 
a mandate to finance development projects’ (Isakova et al., 2012: 
9) specifically related to mining infrastructure (i.e., 
transportation) (IMF, 2012: 3). This need for finance was mainly 
catalysed by the Oyu Tolgoi and Tavan Tolgoi projects in the 
South Gobi region. The government required finance to fund its 
34% stake in the Oyu Tolgoi project through infrastructure 
development. As the government’s stake in Oyu Tolgoi was 
initially obtained by receiving a loan from Rio Tinto which had to 
be repaid in order to receive dividends, the government sought to 
expedite the mine development process by taking on significant 
debt in the short-term. An operating contract with foreign 
investors for the eastern bloc of Tavan Tolgoi (100% state-
owned) was also concluded in October 2011, requiring a renewed 
level of state investment through its subsidiary company, Erdenes 
Tavan Tolgoi. To expedite the export of coking coal from Tavan 
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Tolgoi to China and other East Asian markets, infrastructure was 
required ‘immediately’ to reduce high product costs associated 
with freight expenses (InfoMongolia, 2013).  
Funding infrastructure development for both of these mining 
projects required significant capital expenditure from the state. 
Thus, despite the intention of the fiscal stability framework to 
prevent “expansionary” spending during boom periods, the 
creation of the Development Bank enabled the government to 
technically circumvent the framework and acquire new debt 
because the Fiscal Stability Law only regulated spending by the 
central bank. Between 2012 and 2013, the government and the 
Development Bank ‘borrowed over US $2 billion in international 
debt markets,’ (Dettoni, 2013), with both public and external debt 
more than doubling between 2011 and 2012 (World Bank, 2013: 
24). In November 2012, the Mongolian government sold its first 
bond – the “Chinggis Bond” – worth USD 1.5 billion on the 
international bond market to fund energy and transport 
infrastructure, such as the Millennium Road project (Frangos & 
Natarajan, 2012). The Development Bank of Mongolia also sold a 
bond worth USD 580 million, directly guaranteed by the 
government (World Bank, 2013: 24). Consequently, the 
commercial proportion of Mongolia’s external debt overtook 
concessional development loans from IFIs for the first time. The 
Mongolian government was desperate for loan financing at the 
time, to fund its infrastructure projects. Consequently, in 2011, 
Mongolia and China entered into three-year currency swap 
agreement to maintain Mongolia’s financial liquidity – worth USD 
770 million. 
In addition to the financial pressure generated by the sudden 
development of its two mega-mines, the government was also 
under pressure from its voting constituency to make good on its 
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promises of redistribution (Yeung and Howes, 2015; The 
Economist, 2012). Between February 2010 and June 2012, the 
government created a universal cash transfer programme 
through the Human Development Fund based on new mineral 
revenues (Yeung and Howes, 2015). Tangibly this amounted to a 
monthly transfer of 10,000 MNT (USD 7.42) to each Mongolian 
citizen between August and December 2010, and 20,000 MNT 
(USD 16.57) between January 2011 and June 2012 (ibid: 14). As 
the subject of universal cash transfers had been a campaign 
platform for both the major parties in 2008 – the Mongolian 
People’s Party (MPP)42 and the Democratic Party – the desire to 
maintain popular support in preparation for the June 2012 
election meant that the programme was continued despite 
becoming ‘increasingly unsustainable’ (ibid). As Yeung and 
Howes (ibid) observe, the programme left the state-holding 
company – Erdenes Tavan Tolgoi – ‘technically insolvent’ in 2012 
when USD 310 million was transferred from the company to the 
Human Development Fund to enable ongoing payments to the 
public.  
The growing financial pressure on the government due to rising 
debt pushed it towards Mongolia’s southern neighbour, China, 
which consumes the majority of Mongolian coal, effectively 
controlling the sector. Diminishing reserves in the Human 
Development Fund led to increased dependence on “support” 
from the state-owned Chinese investor in Tavan Tolgoi – the 
Aluminium Corporation of China (Chalco). Chalco enabled 
Erdenes Tavan Tolgoi to remain solvent through an advanced 
payment of USD 350 million, on the condition that Erdenes would 
sell coal to Chalco at reduced prices, from an original set price of 
USD 70 per ton to a quarterly fluctuating rate of USD 53-56 per 
 
42 In 2010, the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) changed its 
name to the Mongolian People’s Party. 
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ton (InfoMongolia, 2013). As Chalco was the only buyer at the 
time from Tavan Tolgoi, a growing sense of Mongolia’s seeming 
inability to dictate favourable export prices created a strong 
sense of urgency amongst citizens and some politicians.43This 
anxiety was exacerbated by Chalco’s almost simultaneous attempt 
to purchase a majority share in the Ovoot Tolgoi coal deposit, for 
which Turquoise Hill held a mining license. This attempt was 
blocked by the government, as ‘this merger would have made a 
single Chinese state-owned company both the owner and the 
buyer of the mine’s resource’ (Oxford Business Group, 2013: 
115).  
The fact that by 2012, China had commandeered 90% of 
Mongolia’s total minerals export market provides a geopolitical 
explanation for resistance to China’s ‘growing economic 
hegemony’ (Edwards, 2013) in the Mongolian market. The 
Strategic Entities Foreign Investment Law (SEFIL) was passed in 
May 2012, asserting a strong political role for the state in relation 
to FDI, particularly that coming from foreign, particularly Chinese, 
SOEs. The Law introduced the concept of “strategic sectors”, 
which included banking, telecommunications and finance in 
addition to mining (ibid). The more controversial provisions of 
SEFIL included:  
1. the requirement of Cabinet approval to 
purchase shares above 33% in a company in 
a strategic sector,  
2.  the requirement of Parliamentary approval 
for a.) state-owned investors to purchase a 
majority share in a strategic entity and b.) 
state-owned investors planning to invest 
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more than 100 billion tugriks (approximately 
USD 71 million) (Edwards, 2013)  
3. Cabinet approval for any transaction that had 
the possibility of controlling or diminishing 
the market price of mineral exports (Viverito 
and Hankin, 2014)  
4. Disclosure of ‘ultimate beneficial 
shareholders’ (Hogan Lovells, 2013)  
5. Mandatory notification of equity holdings of 
more than 5% in “Business Entities of 
Strategic Importance” within 180 days of the 
law’s entry into force (13th November, 2012). 
(ibid)  
In addition to these provisions, the government was given a 
variety of new prerogatives regarding the appointment of boards 
of directors of strategic business entities (Viverito and Hankin, 
2014). Most commentators on SEFIL at the time portrayed it as a 
blatant overstepping of the public-private boundary and an 
illegitimate exhibition of resource nationalism. 
In October 2012, following the parliamentary election, the new 
coalition government led by the Democratic Party attempted to 
renegotiate the Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreement under the 
provisions of SEFIL. Importantly for this analysis, a major part of 
the government’s intention at the time was to ‘unfreeze’ the tax 
and royalty rates that had been stabilised in 2009 (Kosich, 2012) 
in order to cover a growing fiscal deficit in the 2013 Budget. The 
proposed changes included a sliding royalty rate on copper, up to 
20% depending on the market price, as opposed to the fixed rate 
of 5%, and removing exemptions from corporate income tax 
(Macnamara, 2012). This attempt to increase state revenue from 
the project was rejected by Rio Tinto and Turquoise Hill, and 
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majorly impacted Mongolia’s reputation as a stable destination 
for investment. As Oyu Tolgoi functioned as ‘litmus test’ 
(Falconer, 2013) of Mongolia’s investment potential, the 
perception among investors of Mongolia’s stability became a 
critical factor for capital flows. At the time, a senior U.S. diplomat 
predicted that, 
If there appears to be an attempt at renegotiating or 
somehow reneging on the investment agreement, that 
could have a potentially catastrophic effect on the 
country. It could stop the flow of foreign capital into 
Mongolia. (David Wyche, Economic Section Chief, U.S. 
Embassy quoted in Macnamara, 2012)  
In the year that followed, the Mongolian government resolutely 
continued to challenge Rio Tinto about “missing revenues,” with 
allegations of tax evasion. The government blocked the mine’s 
first shipment of copper in June 2013 on the basis of ’77 points of 
dispute,’ including tax evasion, Rio’s management fees and cost 
overruns upwards of USD 2 billion. The government cancelled its 
double-taxation treaty with the Netherlands, among others, 
claiming that the foreign stakeholders in Oyu Tolgoi were using 
Turquoise Hill’s office in Amsterdam as a tax haven (Deutsch and 
Edwards, 2013).  
Critically, the dispute with Oyu Tolgoi came down to an issue of 
control over the timing of the project. The USD 2 billion accrued 
to the project through cost overruns not only increased the 
government’s debt, but increased the “management service fee” – 
3-6% - associated with these “investment costs.” While Rio Tinto 
was frustrated by the delays, the cost to the government was 
immediate with a virtual walk-out of investors, particularly Euro-
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American companies.44 As the U.S. Embassy’s 2013 Investment 
Climate Statement (U.S. Embassy, 2013: 3) stated,  
Doubts persist over the [Government of Mongolia’s] 
commitment to honouring the Oyu Tolgoi Investment 
Agreement and its ability to manage public 
expectations over mining revenues and related 
development. 
A senior Mongolian policy-maker who was generally supportive 
of foreign investment later reflected that these ‘shareholder 
issues’ were unfairly inflamed into major reputational damage for 
the government:  
We don’t have capacity to do some communication 
strategy, we don’t have a system to [communicate] to 
international financial markets. And afterward, they 
(investors) see the trouble through the lens of Rio Tinto 
because investors think the government of Mongolia is 
stupid… delaying things. But it was [the] opposite.  
In addition to SEFIL and attempted renegotiation of the OTIA, the 
cancellation of mining licenses due to environmental legislation 
and corruption allegations further damaged the state’s 
relationship with foreign investors.  
In 2009, the Law on the Prohibition of Mineral Exploration and 
Mining Operations at Headwaters of Rivers, Protected Zones of 
Water Reservoirs and Forested Areas was passed in Parliament, 
 
44 Somewhat ironically, SEFIL and other measures intended to give the state 
greater control of the mining sector (particularly from Chinese state 
investment) pushed Mongolia into greater dependence on Chinese investment 
and finance. China provided critical financial support during the investment 
crisis and commodity price slump (2012-2013) when FDI contracted. While 
Chinese demand for Mongolian coal had slowed, it did not suddenly withdraw 
capital following the “resource nationalist” decisions of the Mongolian 
government. Instead, Chinese SOEs exploited Mongolia’s dependence by 
offering long-term purchase agreements for commodities at ‘deeply-
discounted’ rates, sometimes as low as 11% of ‘global benchmark prices’ 
(Wernau, 2017).  
148 
 
following years of environmental activism to place firm limits on 
mining activity in these areas. Led by small rural associations of 
activists known as the River Movements, the appeal to strengthen 
environmental legislation generated widespread public concern, 
culminating in letter-writing campaigns across the country and 
large symbolic demonstrations in Chinggis Square. The 
government initially did not implement the legislation because it 
was perceived as too expensive; not only would the state be 
responsible to compensate license-holders, it would significantly 
impact Mongolia’s gold industry by restricting alluvial gold 
mining. However, in 2011, following public pressure and at the 
Supreme Court’s order, the government cancelled licenses for 
over two hundred mining projects that contravened the 
boundaries set out in the new legislation (U.S. Embassy, 2011: 
24). Gold production, which had been contributing up to 20 
tonnes of gold per year to the Bank of Mongolia’s gold reserve, 
declined to 4-5 tonnes after the enforcement of the legislation 
(Fehrbach, 2013).  
According to the President of the Mongolian National Mining 
Association, the environmental law ‘affected almost 1800 
licenses… which should be revoked and compensated’ (author 
interview). The enforcement of the law was generally met with 
enthusiasm from the public at the time, particularly among the 
growing number of environmental activists and citizens 
concerned about the impact of mining on Mongolian territory. As 
public debates have shown, the main sources of ‘public 
discontent’ (Mendee, 2013) about the regulation of the mining 
sector were based on environmental damage and corruption in 
the mining sector. In contrast, the enforcement of this law ‘caused 
intense opposition from miners’ (ibid). The legislation amplified 
the growing pressure on the state between its voting constituency 
and the investment sector, as public expectations for stronger 
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regulation of the mining sector conflicted with those of investors, 
who demanded reassurance that the state was committed to 
protecting their rights and interests.  
In the same period, the government also introduced a new 
nuclear energy law, which led to the deregistration and non-
renewal of a uranium mining licence held by Canadian mining 
company Khan Resources in 2010. Khan Resources filed for 
arbitration proceedings in the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) against the Government of 
Mongolia under the Energy Charter less than a week after the 
revocation of their license. Khan filed for arbitration on the basis 
of indirect expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, arbitrary 
measures and the umbrella clause of the Charter.45  
Investor concerns were further exacerbated when corruption 
charges brought against senior officials of the Minerals Resources 
Agency led to the official cancellation of 106 mining licenses in 
November 2013 and a moratorium on granting further licenses 
following the investigation. The illegality of the issuance of the 
licenses did not assuage investors, many of whom openly 
challenged the cancellation of the licenses as a blatant 
expropriation by the state of their property rights and a failure to 
honour contracts. The President of Kincora, a foreign-invested 
copper and gold mining company, stated that ‘security of tenure 
and a transparent legal system are key cornerstones for both 
domestic and foreign investment’ (Reuters, 2013). 
2013- 2015: A “Learning Curve”? 
“Well, previously there was a supercycle in the minerals 
sector everywhere – prices were very high, everyone 
could do business, everyone was satisfied, everyone was 
 
45 See Khan Resources v Mongolia (PCA Case No. 2011-09).  
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too confident. Too confident, companies [and] 
government… And there was a strong sentiment of 
nationalism – “Mongolia should have a bigger stake in 
everything” – everyone was too confident. The legal 
changes at that time were too harsh. But recently the 
boom ended and now we are having difficult times. 
These hard times they are lessons. The biggest lesson 
was that we need investment, we need to support 
business activities, and in order to create a favourable 
environment to support business, we need to have very 
close discussions with our industry representatives, 
investors and other stakeholders including 
academicians, civil society, international organisations 
who are big advisors to us… The legal reforms were 
done not only in [the] minerals sector, but in the 
general economy as well. We have revised our 
investment law. Previously we had a law on…foreign 
investment in strategic sectors [SEFIL] which was a 
very harsh law that restricted, controlled everything. 
We changed the investment law, we created a new 
investment fund law, we created capital markets law, 
also we have [a] great law on fiscal stabilisation funds 
and many others. So this is one direction [the] 
government took to help the industry: legal reform.” – 
Director, Strategic Policy and Planning Department, 
Ministry of Mining (author interview) 
There was an immediate response from foreign investors to the 
perception of instability in the investment environment, with a 
sudden decline in FDI between 2012 and 2014. The sudden 
withdrawal of foreign capital from the economy put Mongolia on 
the brink of an economic collapse. While Mongolia was hailed as a 
“growth generator” only the year before, total revenue 
accumulated in 2012 was 12.1% below the budget projection, 
with mineral revenue 35.6% below the previous year. Total 
exports fell by 9% and FDI dropped by 17% (World Bank Group 
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Mongolia, 2013: 4). In 2013, FDI almost halved – dropping 49% - 
and continued to spiral in the first half of 2014. In May 2014, 
Mongol Bank reported a 64% year-on-year drop in FDI (U.S. 
Department of State, 2014: 1). Desperate to maintain capital 
liquidity, the Mongolian government negotiated another three-
year currency swap agreement with China, this time for USD 2.18 
billion (Yamada, 2017).46 
In response to this apparent crisis of FDI, Mongolia legislators 
passed a new investment law by the end of 2013 with the 
assistance of the International Finance Corporation of the World 
Bank Group. The development of this piece of legislation was 
widely understood as a direct attempt by the government to 
repair Mongolia’s damaged reputation and ‘attract fresh capital in 
the mining sector’ (Els, 2013). The stated purpose of the new 
investment law in Article 1 was to explicitly  
protect the legal rights and interests of investors in the 
territory of Mongolia, to establish a common legislative 
guarantee for investment, to encourage investment, to 
stabilise the tax environment, to determine the rights 
and obligations of investors and the competences of a 
government body related to investment. 
Foreign and domestic investors were given the same treatment 
under the new law, taxation rates returned to previously low 
rates, a wider range of tax and non-tax incentives made available 
 
46 As China is Mongolia’s largest trading partner, the yuan can be used in 
relation to Mongolia-China trade settlements, thus protecting other foreign 
currency reserves (Yamada, 2017). Mongolia’s swap agreements with China 
essentially function as a credit line to finance Mongolia’s trade deficit. The 
Bank of China also set up an office in Mongolia in 2013, which invests in 
infrastructure, energy and mining companies. By 2014, approximately forty 
companies had applied for USD$ 3 billion worth of loans from the Bank, 
according to a Bank report cited in a national newspaper (Bayarsaikhan, 
2016). While the Bank of China has not opened an official branch, there are 
concerns about the devastating impact such a move could have on Mongolia’s 
financial sector, which would easily be undercut by the lower interest rates of 
the Bank of China (ibid).  
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to investors, and investors gained new rights to avail themselves 
of international arbitration. The reduction of taxes and re-
introduction of stability agreements resembled the liberal 
provisions of the 1997 Minerals Law. Notably, the new 
Investment Law significantly restricted the remit of government’s 
involvement in mining projects. Government competence was 
strictly placed within the remit of a ‘central administrative body’ 
(initially the Ministry of Economic Development) with 
implementation functions centralised in an agency, significantly 
limiting the previously primary role of Parliament with regard to 
investors. The new law removed screening and no longer 
required government approval on private foreign investment, in 
what were previously considered nationally strategic areas under 
SEFIL (Hogan Lovells, 2013c). Only foreign companies over 50% 
state-owned and investing at least 33% into minerals, 
communication or financial sectors – the former ‘strategic’ 
sectors – were obligated to go through a government approval 
process (Hogan Lovells, 2013). The Invest Mongolia Agency, as 
the implementation arm of the government, was placed in charge 
of the approval process (Invest Mongolia Agency, 2014: 60), thus 
effectively streamlining decision-making into a one-step process 
at most. Article 6.10 protects the Investment Law from hasty 
amendment by requiring a two thirds majority of votes in 
Parliament, in contrast to the prevalence of low quorum rules 
(Munkhsaikhan, 2016; Enkhbaatar et al, 2015).  
The explicit mandate of the Invest Mongolia Agency under the 
2013 Investment Law is to resurrect investor confidence in the 
Mongolian market by providing an in-house government service 
to ‘streamline’ decision-making and assist access to preferential 
financial arrangements for investors: helping ‘both foreign and 
domestic [investors] – in planning their investments and to 
protect their interests and rights’ (IMA, 2014: 62). Its main 
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functions include the international promotion of the investment 
climate and opportunities in Mongolia, the provision of 
consultation and ‘one-stop online services to foreign investors,’ 
supporting FDI and registering new foreign investments. A 
significant part of the IMA’s promotional activity since 2013 has 
been raising awareness about new changes to Mongolia’s tax 
framework that make it ‘competitive.’ For example, in the IMA’s 
2014 Investment Guide, it boasts that ‘Mongolia is one of the 
countries with the lowest tax rate in the Asia Pacific region with 
10% and 25% for corporate income tax, 10% for individual 
income tax and VAT rate of 10%’ (IMA, 2014: 28). Further to 
these standard low rates, the IMA aims to assist investors to 
access the numerous options available to relieve both tax and 
bureaucracy burdens (i.e., ‘an alleviated regime of registration 
and checkpoint’ (Investment Law, Article 12.1.2)). It guarantees 
the option of an investment agreement to any entity investing 
above 500 billion tugriks (approximately USD 250 million), 
within which taxes may be stabilised for periods exceeding those 
laid out in the Investment Law (Article 16.2.1, see Table Two).  
Table Two: Tax Stabilisation Periods Based on Region and 
Investment Amount (Source: IMA, 2015: 31) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, entities operating within economic free zones do 
not have to pay any tax for the first five years under the terms of 
the 2013 Investment Law (IMA, 2015b: 4). Notably, Mongolia’s 
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main Economic Free Zone – Zamyyn Uud – is a port on the border 
with China, a major export route for the mining-intensive South 
Gobi region. Non-tax benefits include ‘longer land lease rights, 
residential permits for international investors and their families, 
expedited registration process if the investment involves a free 
economic zone or industrial complex, and financial guarantees for 
investment projects involving innovative technology’ (IMA, 2014: 
67).  
In addition to the Investment Law and new agency, Mongolia’s 
urgent need for capital led to the swift passing of several 
significant pieces of legislation to develop its capital markets 
(Surenjav and Buxbaum, 2015: 323). This included ‘managerial 
and technical reform’ to the Mongolian Stock Exchange to comply 
with ‘international standards’ through amendments to the Market 
Security Laws (ibid). These amendments introduced ‘a greater 
variety of financial instruments, including options, futures, 
derivatives, and convertible securities’ (ibid 324), contributing to 
the development of Mongolia’s market ‘infrastructure’ (ibid). 
Additionally, an Investment Fund Law was passed to enable 
private investment funds, where domestic investors can raise 
capital on global markets and take advantage of reform to the 
Mongolian Stock Exchange (ibid). Private investment funds were 
perceived as ‘a positive development in increasing the liquidity of 
Mongolian capital markets,’ (Hogan Lovells, 2014), generating a.) 
new investment opportunities for shareholders, and b.) the hope 
of making companies more profitable and less vulnerable to 
bankruptcy.47  
These efforts to deepen access to capital markets and provide 
domestic frameworks for more complex financial mechanisms 
 
47 This was arguably most important for Mongolian companies, which have 
tended to lack ‘sufficient financial capability’ (N. Enkhbayar, author interview) 
in terms of the reliability of their own capital assets. 
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made progress towards bringing Mongolia’s domestic market 
environment up to “international standards,” the desired basis of 
global trade being the free movement of capital and predictable 
rules. In light of these changes, ‘some foreign investors are 
beginning to argue that the difficult times have actually been good 
for the market’ (Oxford Business Group, 2014). Presumably the 
benefit of the ‘difficult times’ lies in their persuasive effect on the 
state to reconsider the cost of its interventions in the market.  
In 2014, the minerals law and policy framework underwent 
comprehensive reform. A new State Policy on Minerals (2014-
2025) was approved by Parliament in January, with the main 
stated objective being ‘to establish a stable investment 
environment, to improve the quality of minerals exploration, 
mining and processing by encouraging advanced equipment, 
technologies and innovations with low negative impacts on the 
environment, to produce value-added products and to strengthen 
competitiveness in the global market’ (Article 1.2, emphasis 
added). In addition to new institutional mechanisms to protect 
the investment environment from the destabilising influences of 
Parliament and local authorities (the subject of the next chapter), 
the State Minerals Policy prioritised ‘private sector-led 
development.’ This entailed not only positive support for 
investors, but an active reduction for the state’s role in relation to 
the market. As the Director of the Department for Strategic Policy 
and Planning (author interview) put it,  
Government should participate only as a tax collector 
and, of course, rules and standards enforcing agency… 
there is a strong sentiment among people – ordinary 
people – that government officials should not be 
involved in management of business operations of a 
company. Everything must be done by private sector. 
Private people will be much more rational… 
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This point of view was affirmed by a senior legal specialist at 
Erdenes Mongol LLC (author interview), the state-owned mining 
company representing the government of Mongolia’s interests in 
its fifteen nationally strategic mineral assets: 
All the stakeholders together worked on this document 
[State Policy on Minerals Sector 2014-2025]. So it is [a] 
very important document to make sure that investment 
is attracted, and that state-owned companies can work 
effectively, efficiently… The point is that the 
government is trying to move the industry forward 
because it is a very important industry for the country’s 
economy… since Mongolia is a market economy, so also 
the private sector [has a] very important role in the 
economy and industries, in development. So it is quite a 
liberal policy document, which means that it is open to 
all the partners, all the parties, investors, including all 
of the investment community. So not only the local 
community but the international community.  
The significance of Erdenes Mongol as the SOE representing 
government interests in the economy has put the company under 
the limelight of reform since 2014. Previously, Erdenes Mongol 
had been designed to function as a type of sovereign wealth fund, 
financing the Human Development Fund through dividends. Since 
2014, Erdenes Mongol has been in a restructuring process, so that 
it can operate with a ‘commercial mandate’ (ibid), to put its daily 
operation beyond the immediate influence and control of its 
government shareholders (i.e., the Prime Minister, Ministry of 
Finance, Mongol Bank, Ministry of Mining). The CEO of Erdenes 
Mongol, B. Byambasaikhan, has placed priority on disentangling 
the enterprise from the direct influence of the government 
provided the leadership for this transition, tantamount to a semi-
privatisation of Mongolia’s most significant SOE. Byambasaikhan 
stated in a media interview (News.mn, 17th March 2015) that 
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‘government involvement in business and the negative 
international perception of this’ was the primary issue to be 
overcome in terms of reforms.  
While the language of privatisation was resisted in the author’s 
interviews with three senior representatives at Erdenes Mongol, 
the model upon which the restructuring was guided is that of 
Temasek, the Singaporean Holdings company. The Temasek 
model effectively delinks the operation of SOEs from the 
government through a Shareholder Representative, who appoints 
the board of directors, instead of Cabinet and Ministries. This 
should be understood as a partial privatisation of state property 
and governance, because it aims to remove the state’s direct, 
political involvement from the operation of the company, 
rendering a “public” company virtually indistinguishable from 
private companies in order than it can compete more effectively 
in the market. According to senior experts at Erdenes Mongol, the 
bureaucratic checks and balances, and inability to adapt quickly 
enough to market signals, were the reasons for the shift to a 
commercial mandate. The emphasis on private-sector led 
development and the new push to privatise, at least partially, 
many SOEs more generally reflects an overall trend since 2014 
that ‘the government should not participate as a shareholder’ 
(Director, Strategic Policy and Planning Department, Ministry of 
Mining, author interview).48  
The 2006 Minerals Law was amended in July 2014 to reflect 
reformed priorities in the minerals economy, favouring the 
private sector. A summary of changes as they relate the role of the 
state and investor interests are detailed in the following table: 
 
48 Notably, in 2014, Parliament decided against participation in a ‘strategically 
important deposit’ – Tsagaan Suvraga – reflecting a shifting sense of political 
will along with policy reform. 
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Table Three: Investor-State Balance in the 2014 Amendments to 
the 2006 Minerals Law (see Minter Ellison, 2014; Hogan Lovells, 
2014b) 
 
Investor Benefits Role of the State 
Scope of mining activity reduced 
from 8% to 20% of the total 
territory 
Reduced restrictions on license 
trading 
Newly issued licenses may be 
immediately transferred 
Stream-lining procedures for 
obtaining licenses 
Replaces former grounds for 
license cancellation with fines 
Introduced a 30-60 day time-limit 
on government decision-making 
to reduce bureaucracy 
Reduction of taxes:  
➢ Royalty on gold reduced 
from 10% to 2.5% 
➢ Elimination of taxes on 
imports, equipment, 
machinery until 2018  
Direct stakes in mining 
projects exchangeable for 
special royalties, 
depending on negotiations 
with the license-holder 
Formalisation of local 
development agreements 
(made mandatory) 
Financial burden of 
limiting mining shifted to 
local authorities: 
confiscation of licensed 
areas under the terms of 
‘specially protected areas’ 
have to be compensated 
by the local authority 
within a year, otherwise 
mining operations may 
continue 
MRAM and Ministry of 
Mining to pre-determine 
areas for exploration 
Prerogatives of the 
Ministry of Mining 
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 significantly expanded, 
particularly regarding the 
approval of regulation 
related to mine 
processing, environmental 
rehabilitation, the 
collection of geological 
data, the qualification of 
official experts and 
analysts, the classification 
of resources and public 
reporting (Article 10.1 and 
sub-provisions) 
The 2014 changes to the legal framework in the minerals sector 
also addressed the moratorium on license issuance, which was 
‘simultaneously repealed’ (Hogan Lovells, 2014b: 1) with the 
amendment of the minerals law. Mineral licenses for exploration 
and exploitation were available again on a first-come-first-served 
basis, reverting back to the “competitive” standard of the 1997 
Minerals Law. Furthermore, the Law on the Prohibition of Mineral 
Exploration and Mining Operations at Headwaters of Rivers, 
Protected Zones of Water Reservoirs and Forested Areas was 
significantly revised. Operations in headwaters or river basins 
remained restricted, but limited mining was permitted again 
along rivers and in forested areas. The amendments to this 
environmental law have a clear economic explanation: ‘there is no 
money to compensate’ the revoked exploration and exploitation 
licenses (President of the National Mongolian Mining Association, 
author interview).  
Apart from legal and policy changes, the Mongolian government 
made significant efforts to heal its reputation within the 
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international investment community. This effort has been 
particularly prominent since the start of 2015 when Prime 
Minister Chimed Saikhanbileg assumed the office after his 
predecessor was ousted for his alleged lack of effort to resurrect 
investor confidence in the minerals sector (Reuters, 2014). PM C. 
Saikhanbileg and other senior politicians, including B. 
Byambasaikhan, CEO of Erdenes Mongol, actively courted the 
international investment community through demonstrations of 
contrition for past “mistakes.” For example, the Mongolian 
government agreed to pay Khan Resources more than USD 80 
million in damages for revoking the company’s uranium mining 
license, following UNCITRAL’s decision in the Khan Resources v 
Mongolia case in March 2015. Shortly thereafter, in April 2015, in 
the run-up to the Dubai negotiation of the ongoing Oyu Tolgoi 
dispute, the Prime Minister faulted the Mongolian government for 
‘lost credibility’ in the international market (Reuters, 2015).  
The resolution of the dispute between the government and Rio 
Tinto over Oyu Tolgoi in 2015 – known as the Dubai Agreement – 
was a crucial part of the government’s effort to restore investor 
confidence in Mongolia’s mining sector. The Dubai Agreement 
was widely seen by the government and investors as a success, 
providing a basis of unity among private and public stakeholders 
about the second phase of mine development for Oyu Tolgoi. It 
was also interpreted as a positive signal for other investors, as 
Oyu Tolgoi continues to exercise broader influence as a 
barometer of political for investment in the mining sector in 
general (Falconer, 2013; Macnamara, 2012). The “success” of the 
Mongolian negotiators in Dubai in terms of resolving the dispute 
between Rio Tinto and the Mongolian government was their 
ability to demonstrate the “economic facts” that showed the 
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impacts of nationalistic decision-making on investment levels.49 A 
business approach – rather than a political approach – was seen 
as necessary to prevent further reputation damage for the 
country. USD 30 million was paid to the Mongolian government 
by Rio Tinto to settle the tax dispute, 10% of the original claim, 
and a two percent tax that the stakeholders inherited from BHP – 
a source of dissatisfaction on the Mongolian side – was 
eliminated. A methodology for the calculation of royalties and 
income tax was agreed upon, that it should be calculated on the 
basis of gross rather than net profits.  
While many perceived these outcomes as a win for the 
government against Rio Tinto, others were less convinced. A 
former advisor to the government in the original Oyu Tolgoi 
dispute explained that these concessions should not be seen as 
‘big victory’ because they are not comparable to other 
concessions that remain sealed in the investment agreement, 
such as the Investment Tax Credit and Management Service Fee 
provisions (author interview). However, as low tax barriers and 
liberal investment conditions are key to Mongolia’s 
competitiveness in the global minerals market, the Dubai 
Agreement was widely perceived as a necessary step towards 
regaining credibility among investors. As PM Saikhanbileg 
announced, 
 
49 B. Byambasaikhan, CEO of Erdenes Mongol LLC, was particularly influential 
as the ‘internationally experienced’ Mongolian negotiator representing the 
government’s interests in Dubai (INS, 2015). He has a strong reputation as an 
internationally oriented businessman, with previous experience in banking 
(Asian Development Bank), investment and advisory services as Director of 
NovaTerra LLC, and as President of the Business Council of Mongolia.  In 
contrast to previous negotiators for the government in relation to Oyu Tolgoi, 
Byambasaikhan is known for his positive approach to foreign investment and 
support for the restructuring and privatisation of SOEs. In August 2015, 
following the Dubai Agreement, Byambasaikhan was appointed to the Board of 
Directors for Oyu Tolgoi. See Oyu Tolgoi, Board of Directors, 2017.  
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Mongolia is back to business. Oyu Tolgoi is a world-
class copper-gold asset and its further development is 
of great economic significance for Mongolia. We have 
finalised a way forward with our partners which re-
establishes the foundations of a new and constructive 
relationship based on mutual trust and our joint long-
term commitment to Mongolia’s growth (Rio Tinto 
2015, Press Release). 
Conclusion 
Through a chronological schema, this chapter has focused on key 
shifts and dynamics that have reordered the state-market 
relationship in the minerals sector. Eschewing the paternalistic 
narrative of ‘learning from mistakes’ that has dominated the 
media discourse of the government’s action in the minerals 
economy, this chapter has set out to highlight the growing power 
imbalance between the government and investors since 1997. 
The initial optimism about free markets quickly led to 
disillusionment among the Mongolian public, as the state’s 
minimal regulatory approach generated a host of new 
environmental and social issues. The public’s concern over the 
benefits that would accrue to citizens through the exploitation of 
natural resource put pressure on the government to take a 
stronger hand in the economy. There were surely elements of 
state-interest at work in the 2006 changes to the legislative and 
policy framework around minerals, as political parties vied for 
control of exploiting Oyu Tolgoi. However, a purely “resource 
nationalist” frame discredits the responsiveness to the state’s 
voting constituency that gave these decisions a basic democratic 
legitimacy.  
The assertion of a larger role for the state in the minerals sector 
in 2006 indicates that re-regulation of the sector was perceived as 
a viable option at that point. However, the government 
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demonstrated a lack of awareness about the way market 
liberalisation had created new pressure points on the state 
through the mechanism of foreign direct investment, giving 
investors economic leverage against the state. This leverage did 
not operate forcefully until the signing of the Oyu Tolgoi 
Investment Agreement, when the mineral sector’s share of GDP 
and exports pushed Mongolia officially into the category of 
mineral dependence. After an initial period of optimism following 
the OTIA in the context of the commodity boom, we can see the 
ways in which the government has since been forced to withdraw 
or ameliorate its efforts to influence the sector based on 
geopolitical, environmental, or corruption-related concerns. 
Mongolia’s initial entry into the global minerals economy through 
the 1997 Minerals Law was associated with a liberal investment 
environment, a key element of the country’s comparative 
advantage. While more powerful countries like China, Australia 
and Indonesia have been able to raise taxes during the decline in 
commodity prices since 2011 without reprisal, Mongolia has had 
to re-liberalise its taxation framework, particularly given the 
financial vulnerability of domestic companies: ‘we don’t have the 
option to increase taxes during hard times’ (Director, Strategic 
Policy and Planning Department, Ministry of Mining, author 
interview). Part of Mongolia’s competitive strategy to undermine 
its rivals in the minerals market is to lower taxation and create 
favourable conditions for the mining industry. 
The push-back from foreign investors over the state’s 
management of its two landmark mining projects – Oyu Tolgoi 
and Tavan Tolgoi – emphasised the nationalistic approach of 
governmental action. However, even influential pro-market 
government officials expressed ‘mixed feelings’ about this 
narrative because of the way it vilified the Mongolian state. As 
one senior policy-maker put it, 
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In the UK, say you have a project as big as your 
economy and 34% is funded by tax-payers’ money. The 
other foreign contracting party [to the project] 
increases the cost, and your debt increases. I assume 
tomorrow that there will be riots… In Mongolia there 
was the same reaction, but it was seen as resource 
nationalism (author interview). 
Similarly, a former economic advisor to N. Altankhuyag during his 
term as Deputy Prime Minister (2008-2012) reflected on 
Altankhuyag’s leadership when he assumed the office of Prime 
Minister from 2012-2014, during the FDI crisis.50 The advisor 
explained that the ‘hard line’ that was taken in the Oyu Tolgoi 
dispute was out of genuine concern for the public interest and did 
not reflect a lack of support for foreign investment in general 
(ibid). Commenting that Mongolia’s tax regime was very ‘pro-
mining,’ he acknowledged having a mixed response to the 
stabilisation of tax, perceiving it as a major concession to 
investors: 
Okay, I see the rationale – economic rationale. Because 
Mongolia is a small country, it could be unstable. In 
order to attract money, maybe we have to promise 
stable tax rate… But on the other hand it is kind of 
unfair, because, say we [Mongolian citizens] have an 
emergency. Sometimes the government has to raise the 
tax. Then other regular non-mining sector could be 
levied higher tax, but those guys with the stability 
agreement wouldn’t pay extra, right? (ibid) 
While many government representatives involved in mining 
policy-making interviewed by the author were generally critical 
of the reactive decision-making that characterised 2012-2013, 
 
50 Not surprisingly, Altankhuyag’s term as Prime Minister has been associated 
with the state’s turn towards resource nationalism. After FDI continued to 
spiral downwards in 2014, Prime Minister N. Altankhuyag was removed from 
office by a parliamentary vote of no-confidence on the 5th of November. 
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they painted a nuanced picture of a state caught betwixt an 
increasingly anxious voting constituency and pressure from 
investors.  
The reforms since 2014 under the new State Minerals Policy 
establish a “complementary” division of labour for the state, 
whose domain is the production and enforcement of rules to 
enable ‘private-sector led development.’ Investor expectations for 
the type of legal and political pre-requisites for investment in the 
Mongolian mining sector may be backed by coercive financial 
power through the mechanism of FDI, but their power has proved 
even more transformative than limiting the legal remit of the 
state’s role in the minerals economy in the short term. The 
episode of bold – “bad” – decision-making in 2012 and early 2013 
shifted the state’s own discourse about itself, at least in the public 
domain. A striking example of this mea culpa discourse was 
evidenced in 2015, when Prime Minister Saikhanbileg appeared 
on national television to explain an SMS referendum in which 
Mongolian citizens were invited to vote on whether they wanted 
‘to step up austerity measures or do whatever it takes to get the 
country’s mining sector growing again’ (Edwards, 2015). This 
dichotomy between austerity and prosperity was sustained by a 
presumption of the objective status of the market and the limited 
options available to the state operating in relation to it.  
The following chapter will engage with the specific ways in which 
three key sources of “political risk” to the mining sector have 
been “stabilised.” Parliament, local governments and rural 
environmental NGOs resisted mining investment in different 
ways between 1997 and 2014, as institutional agents of 
disruption to Mongolia’s global economic transition. These 
institutions sit along critical axes of reordering, determining 
intra-state (central, and central-local) and state-society relations. 
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The “stabilisation” of these institutions following the FDI crisis is 
significant; the next two chapters empirically demonstrate the 
way that power was redistributed within the central state, the 
principle of self-government (central-local state relations) was 
reinterpreted, and the boundaries of political contestation were 
reformulated, in order to designate Mongolia as a stable 
destination for FDI. Notably, these processes of minimising and 
excluding certain political institutions and actors were juridical 
and technical-administrative rather than overtly political.  
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Chapter Four 
Stabilising Instability for Investors: New Axes 
of Reordering for Mongolia’s Extractive 
Political Economy in the Post-2014 Consensus 
Introduction 
[Mongolia has been adjusting to] democracy and 
capitalism in the past twenty years...They're learning a 
lot so it's a steep learning curve, but they're adjusting 
and they do things right in many ways, it's just the 
politics gets in the way. The last twenty years have 
been an experiment. 
Foreign CEO, Mining Company (author interview, 
January 2015)  
The previous chapter gave a chronological overview of a 
transformative period in the governance of Mongolia’s mining 
sector, from the genesis of an open investment regime in the late 
1990s to an attempt to reassert stronger state interests within it 
(2006-2012), and the dramatic re-liberalisation process that 
followed after FDI dramatically fell (2012-2013). The stability of 
the political and legal environment became the object of reform in 
2014 following the collapse in foreign direct investment and the 
global downturn in commodity prices, in the hopes of regaining 
investor interest and confidence. The collapse of investment flows 
and investor confidence in the Mongolian case was not the typical 
risk-aversion that can characterise investor behaviour during 
commodity busts, although that was surely present. It was 
characterised by a sense of lost confidence among investors that 
the government would respect the boundary between the state 
and the market.  
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Having established the broad trajectory of Mongolian mining 
governance since the post-socialist transition, this chapter takes a 
closer look at how particular institutional sources of political-
legal instability were targeted for reform after the radical decline 
of investment interest in the Mongolian mining sector in 2012-
2013. I argue that these “reforms” constitute a reordering of the 
state itself and its relationship with Mongolian citizens. While 
there may be more, three critical axes of reordering have been 
identified: 1.) the redistribution of decision-making power away 
from representative institutions of government towards the 
executive within the central state, 2.) the redefinition of the 
boundaries of self-government for provincial authorities, and 3.) 
the marginalisation of conflictual social movements from formal 
governance processes.  
These axes are symptomatic of a process of deep change within 
the state because they relate to fundamental aspects of the 
national system of government such as the function of the 
separation of powers, the practice of self-government within the 
state and the scope of democratic politics (state-society 
relations). I argue that these transformations of the national state 
were an attempt to insulate the mining economy from political 
antagonism (i.e., expropriation by the state, protest etc.) and 
should be seen as a form of de facto constitutionalism, where – in 
relation to the mining sector – the principles of the national 
constitution have evidently been reinterpreted, revised or 
ignored in practice. Notably, this insulation has been effected 
through legal means and financial incentives, reinforcing the 
structural nature of this shift within the state itself. Viewing these 
apparently disparate processes through the lens of stabilisation - 
to create ideal conditions for FDI – illuminates the way in which 
distinctly global processes affect state institutions despite the 
formal continuity of its nationally constituted structure. In this 
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chapter, I will address the first two “axes of reordering” described 
above within the central state itself and between central and sub-
national administrations. Specifically, I will discuss the way 
Parliament and local governments were targeted in the 2014 
reforms in the mining regime. The following chapter will address 
the third state-society axis, regarding the marginalisation of social 
movements and the institutionalisation of environmental NGOs to 
prevent overtly “political” activism.  
Unstable Institutions at the Centre and the 
Periphery: Curtailing Political Risk for Investors 
within the State  
In this section I will address two different sources of “instability” 
within the state that have been targets for reform since the 2012-
2013 crisis of investment capital and confidence. Both Parliament 
and sub-national (provincial and district) governments were 
problematized by pro-extractive interests for their “nationalist” 
and “corrupt” behaviour which had contributed an unacceptable 
level of political risk to the investment environment. The return 
to an open and competitive investment regime in 2014 under the 
State Minerals Policy (2014-2025) was accompanied by the 
transfer of authority from representative to executive spaces of 
the state or to new institutions to insulate the investment regime 
from unpredictable political influences. This trajectory was 
accompanied by the integration of private mining interests into 
the machinery of national governance, reflecting a shift within the 
state itself as well as a “cracking open” of its institutions to global 
market influence.  
Conflict at the Core: Parliament, Politicians and 
“Resource Nationalism”  
The Mongolian government finally realised that they 
really need foreign investors. Before it was more about 
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nationalistic sentiment, overwhelmingly, but I think 
they realised they need foreign investors to get this 
economy rolling…  Hopefully politicians with a 
different view on things will start to get elected… 
[before it was] pretty nationalistic and let’s kick out 
foreigners and what have you, and that starts to be 
negative politics. I hope it won’t happen again. But in 
the meantime, the tugrik is suffering, their foreign 
currency reserve is dwindling, all the prices are going 
up right now, people are complaining… so there’s a lot 
of pressure on the government to do things right 
(Interview, Foreign Mining Company CEO, January 
2015).  
The question of how to govern the minerals sector has been at the 
heart of democratic politics in Mongolia since the post-socialist 
transition. As the previous chapter indicated, the new democratic 
government was immediately confronted with a crisis of quickly 
depleting public capital, ballooning debt and the devaluation of 
the tugrik following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Gold 
Programme and the speedy adoption of the 1994 Minerals Law 
both reflect the severity of the imperative to attract private 
investment in order to stimulate the failing economy. By the late 
1990s, a consensus that minerals would be the national economic 
base had emerged, although this general consensus was 
characterised by an ongoing conflict about the precise limits of 
the regulatory role of the state. Following the post-socialist 
transition, the issue of the role of the state in economic regulation 
in general had been a major source of contention between the 
former socialist vanguard and the pro-market reformers 
(Rossabi, 2005). This conflict was intensified through the 1990s 
as the stakes of the mining industry, relative to the national 
economy, became much higher. Consequently, competing claims 
about which party would maximise national benefit from the 
mining industry became central to national parliamentary 
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election platforms, especially following the discovery of Oyu 
Tolgoi.  
The authoritarian nature of the state during the socialist period 
had given the Great Khural more symbolic than actual power, as 
its representative role was fundamentally compromised by the 
absence of free elections or institutional accountability. The 
socialist era of rule can be characterised as a marriage of 
executive and judicial power (Butler & Nathanson, 1982), a fairly 
straightforward expression of ‘socialist legality’ dominated by the 
institution of the Soviet procuracy (Ginsburg, 1994: 81). 
Following the Soviet example (Butler and Nathanson, 1982: 83), 
the MPR established a State Procuracy in 1930 to supervise ‘the 
observance of legality’ (ibid) ‘over all ministries, organisations 
and citizens’ (Ginsburg, 1994: 81). As well as ‘general supervision’ 
(ibid), the Procuracy also exercised the power to prosecute, 
‘maintaining a close link with Party policies’ (Butler and 
Nathanson, 1982: 83).  
Democratisation and the constitutional separation of powers in 
1992 consequently transformed the Great Khural into an active 
political institution in its own right (rather than being simply a 
handmaid of the MPRP), with representative legitimacy and law-
making authority. In the democratic constitution, legislation can 
be proposed by both the executive and legislative arms of 
government, but representative power, vis-à-vis Parliament, 
controls the drafting and legislating procedure. Consequently, the 
Great Khural has become ‘the highest organ of state power’ (1992 
Constitution, Article 20) in the democratic era. The right of single 
members of Parliament (MPs) to initiate legislation combined 
with low quorum rules, where as few as twenty MPs out of the 
seventy-six can pass legislation (UNDP, 2015: 23), has meant that 
law reform has historically played a key role in national politics.  
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As we will see in this chapter, one of the key reordering effects of 
Mongolia’s foreign investment dependence since the FDI crisis 
has been the systematic attempt to insulate the mining regime 
from political forces of law reform. The speed with which 
legislation can be passed, amended and influenced by individual 
politicians has been widely portrayed as a major barrier to 
investment in the mining sector. Parliament has been the main 
source of risk for investors at the national level; as the legislative 
organ of the state, it has the most power to directly affect the 
national political and legal environment. With the hasty 
introduction of an entirely new piece of minerals legislation in 
2006, the politicised negotiation of the Oyu Tolgoi Investment 
Agreement and, most significantly, the nationalist barriers to 
investment under the Strategic Entities Foreign Investment Law 
(SEFIL) of 2012, Parliament quickly gained the status of an 
unpredictable ‘pariah’ (Manthorpe, 2013) in the international 
media.  
The close attention paid by investors to the 2012 Parliamentary 
elections indicated the anxiety felt by the state’s new economic 
constituency about the membership of Parliament. According to 
an article in Resource Investing News, for example, ‘uncertainty 
concerning just how far politicians are willing to move toward 
resource nationalism in an effort to win votes is understandably 
raising Mongolia’s political risk factor in the eyes of resource 
investors’ (Pistilli, 2012). Political parties have since been 
regularly criticised by international investment experts on 
emerging markets for their ‘anti-FDI platforms’ (Kohli, 2016), 
emphasising ‘domestic politics’ as the major ‘obstruction’ for 
investors rather than ‘commodity or China risk’ (Weafer, 2016). 
Resource nationalism has been consistently identified as one of 
the top five risks facing the major mining investors globally since 
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2011 in the Ernst and Young “Business Risks Facing Mining and 
Metals” reports (Ernst and Young, 2011-2016).  
As Dierkes (2013) commented, ‘many non-Mongolians have 
focused on “resource nationalism” to explain the new laws... 
generally equated with some evil movement aimed at the 
nationalisation of resource assets.’ The actions of the Mongolian 
Parliament thus fed into a wider narrative of resource 
nationalism, shifting the country from its pre-2006 image as the 
‘darling of international risk-takers’ (Manthorpe, 2013) to that of 
either ineptitude or deviancy from the expectations on states to 
“play fair” in the market.  
Author interviews with foreign and Mongolian investors, pro-
mining lobbyists and Ministry of Mining officials in 
October/November 2015 reinforced the negative image of 
Parliament. The President of the National Mining Association 
reflected on the controversy surrounding the Law Protecting 
Headlands, Water Basins and Forests, that it was members of 
Parliament and armed activist groups that had been ‘pushing’ the 
government to implement the law even though ‘it cannot be 
implemented’ because the state lacks the means to adequately 
compensate companies for the revoked licenses (author 
interview). Similarly, the President of the Mongolian Investors’ 
Association ultimately blamed Parliament Members for ‘wanting 
to get some name for themselves’ and secure electoral votes as 
the real force behind the environmental legislation:  
Instead of listening to the businesses who were the 
taxpayers, they started listening to the activists more. 
(author interview) 
In relation to the State Minerals Policy 2014-2025, a senior 
official in the Ministry of Mining (Senior Policy-Maker, Ministry of 
174 
 
Mining, author interview) expressed concern that the strength of 
Parliament did not bode well for the stability of the policy, given 
that ‘they have a right’ not only to propose legislation but also 
draft it, the implication being that the final product might be quite 
different from the original proposal. A senior representative from 
Oyu Tolgoi similarly reflected that, 
We hope it will be stable, but nobody knows… Mongolia 
has a permanently working Parliament which means 
they could change any law within four years. The last 
couple of years made clear that if we will not really 
support business to be run in a proper market 
situation, it will badly influence the whole economy 
(author interview). 
Mr. Munkhbat concluded that ‘for things to move properly and 
run in commercial ways,’ it would necessitate ‘less political 
involvement’ (ibid). 
Conflict at the Periphery: Local Governments, 
Mining Companies, and Corruption 
Since democratisation in the early 1990s, local governments have 
become important institutional loci for democratic politics in 
Mongolia.51 Previously, under the Soviet-inspired socialist regime, 
all local authorities were appointed directly from the central 
government at the provincial (aimag), district (soum) and sub-
district (bagh) level. As discussed in the first chapter, the 
governance of the pastoral economy was central to socialist 
economic development requiring a relatively high level of 
coordination and oversight. The 1992 Constitution ameliorated 
the system of direct appointment, by establishing a direct election 
 
51 Mongolia is a unitary state, with 21 provinces (aimags) and 329 districts 
(soums), with a large and indeterminate number of sub-districts (baghs). Their 
precise number is unknown because they often lack a permanent site of 
government. The sub-districts bear the closest resemblance to pre-socialist 
customary institutions before nationalist territorialisation occurred in the 
1920s. 
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process for local parliaments, which in turn nominate a governor. 
Each level of government is comprised of a governor’s office and a 
local parliament (khural). While representatives in the local 
khural are directly elected, governors gain their positions through 
nomination by the khurals and then approval by the governor at 
the higher level of government. Thus, the Prime Minister 
approves provincial (aimag) governors, provincial governors 
approve district (soum) governors, and district governors 
approve sub-district (bagh) governors. This has been generally 
considered to be a formalistic process of approval and typically 
functions as a form of indirect appointment, as the nominee put 
forward by the elected representatives is usually approved. There 
have been cases where the governor of a higher order has 
rejected the nominee and the parliament refuses to nominate a 
new candidate, although this is rare. In the context of the 
democratic state, the relationship between local governments and 
the central state has consequently been quite ambiguous, because 
the 1992 Constitution balances both principles of ‘self-
governance and state management’ (Lkhagvadorj, 2010: 79) in 
sub-national administration. This ambiguity often creates conflict 
between different levels of government about where the line gets 
drawn between their authority.  
If self-interested nationalism has been the overarching 
characterisation of central Mongolian politicians and political 
institutions, the narrative of local governments in relation to 
mining has been one of corruption. As the previous chapter 
outlined, the role of local governments within the mining 
governance regime shifted considerably over its twenty-year 
development (1994-2014). Originally in the 1997 Minerals Law, 
there was a general legal obligation on companies to ‘cooperate’ 
with local authorities in relation to existing local development 
priorities. However, the 1997 ‘consult and coordinate’ framework 
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gave local governments considerable room to negotiate the 
contributions of mining companies to local development without 
oversight from the central government. The ambiguity of the law 
and the informality of the arrangements gave governors 
significant political leverage. This leverage became a major 
“governance gap” to be addressed in the 2014 reforms to the 
minerals governance regime. It created space for local 
governments to express their dissatisfaction with, or make 
demands upon, mining companies in ways that conflicted with 
the central state’s interests in opening up provincial territories 
for extraction. The tension between central and local 
governments in relation to the mining sector was fuelled by two 
intertwined issues, relating to a lack of sub-national input in the 
licensing process and a lack of direct local benefits from mining 
revenue.  
Since 1997, in relation to the sense of exclusion from decision-
making, there was a mismatch between the centralised licensing 
process and the ‘decentralised’ approach to addressing the 
environmental and social impacts of mining. While local 
governments had significant freedom to negotiate with mining 
companies without central oversight, the licensing process was 
deeply centralised. The 1997 Minerals Law established a 
centralised regulatory regime for the mining sector that 
concentrated decision-making power in the executive spaces of 
the central state, particularly the Mineral Resources Authority of 
Mongolia (MRAM). The 1997 Minerals Law, designed to ‘regulate 
relations’ in the mining sector, only recognised one primary right 
local administrative bodies: ‘to permit the use of licensed areas 
for the purposes specified in the licenses, except where 
exploration or mining is prohibited or restricted by applicable 
legislation’ (Article 6.4.2). Under this law, MRAM was – and still is 
– expected to receive local government approval in order to issue 
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mining licenses. However, an officer at MRAM explained that, 
formerly, most local governments would ‘disagree’ with the 
proposed licenses (Officer, MRAM, author interview), although 
this allegedly did not always prevent their issuance in practice. A 
senior policy-maker at the Ministry of Mining (author interview) 
put it this way: 
The main problem is the local governor. According to 
the Mineral Law, the first application – mineral 
exploration applications – we send to the local 
government to ask permission. In most cases they said 
no, no, no. So then how can mineral exploration 
licenses be issued? If we don’t consider their [input], 
then they complain. So we make an assumption and say 
‘okay, we will issue the license.’ The next day, the 
mining companies or exploration companies arrive on 
the land and they start drilling. So again, conflict. Local 
governors would say, ‘We didn’t give any permission. 
We don’t want drilling.’ This is the main problem… the 
process starts from the very top. The government has 
announced that these areas (are available for drilling) 
but at the bottom level [local government] there is 
conflict against this (author interview). 
Secondly, the fiscal structure governing mining revenues was 
highly centralised in the first decade of the mining boom. Taxes, 
mining license fees and royalties were collected centrally and 
redistributed through the national budget on the basis of 
Parliamentary decision, advised by the Ministry of Finance 
(Lhakgvadorj, 2012: 6). This centralised system excluded local 
governments from both the ‘budget planning and approving 
process’ (ibid).  
By the early 2000s, over 40% of Mongolian territory was covered 
by mining licenses (Suzuki, 2013). As noted in the previous 
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chapter, widespread environmental degradation and social 
dislocation catalysed the formation of the first rural social 
movements in the early 2000s which contested the preferential 
access to land and water given to mining companies through 
MRAM’s lax licensing regime, which had led to the drying and 
pollution of rivers, a boom in artisanal mining and the 
subordination of herders’ customary use rights to centrally 
administered mining licenses. These social movements were 
particularly associated with soum and bagh governors and chairs 
of local parliaments; their early success and political momentum 
has been linked to this capacity to forge strong networks with 
local authorities at all levels of sub-national administration. Many 
local governments were sympathetic to the groundswell of anti-
mining sentiment among rural citizens, because they were also 
largely excluded from central processes of decision-making and 
accumulation, with mining revenues being redistributed through 
the central budget.  
Without wishing to glorify local governments or deny the 
presence of personal interests, local authorities at both the 
provincial and district levels did respond to public concerns in a 
variety of formal and informal ways. In Mongolian land law, local 
authorities have the right to set aside land for ‘special use’ and to 
grant ‘certificates of possession’ to customary land users (i.e., 
herders) (Endicott, 2012: 97). These provisions were used 
strategically by authorities across the country as a form of 
indirect intervention to reserve land from mining and to protect 
herders’ land entitlements in the absence of justiciable rights. 
More informally, governors were widely known to lobby mining 
companies to contribute to rural projects (i.e., building 
infrastructure, schools, financing social events) in return for 
approving various water and land permits for which local 
authorities’ approval is necessary. There have also been 
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instances, particularly in the South Gobi, where local parliaments 
have banned access to groundwater for mining companies even 
when they formally have no legal prerogative to do so. While 
these decisions were overturned by the central government, they 
delayed projects in the short term and were a major source of 
anxiety and frustration for mining companies.  
The resistant activities of local governments were typically 
framed by central policy-makers and mining companies alike as 
“corruption,” based on the personal interests of local authorities 
trying to squeeze benefits out of mining projects in their regions 
and manipulate the legal provisions for local agreements. One 
foreign CEO of a medium-scale mining company stated that 
‘obviously community relations are about risk management’ 
(CEO, Foreign-Invested Company, author interview):  
If they see a big mine with hundreds of trucks, 
obviously generating big revenue, they will say ‘where’s 
my piece, where’s my cut?’ They’re not going to be 
satisfied with government royalty and tax.  
The President of the Association of Investors in Mongolian 
Mining, also the CEO of a Mongolian mining company, similarly 
framed local governments as putting onerous and superficial 
demands upon them (author interview). He stated that, ‘local 
government or local people want many different things,’ 
characterising local governments’ demands as purely self-
seeking: ‘They want to travel to London… [They say] I'm governor 
of this village, right, so my wife needs the mink coat, so you bring 
me the mink coat’ (ibid). The lack of clarity about which level of 
government companies should liaise with (i.e., provincial or 
district) was described as confusing and exhausting for the 
companies, and as a loophole in the governance regime that 
facilitated rent-seeking. Similarly, environmental legislation 
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passed in 200952 was perceived by mining companies as creating 
uncertainty in the legal environment because it gave 
discretionary privileges to local governments to determine 
environmental boundaries. The purported vagueness of the 
legislation and the lack of detailed regulation allegedly created 
too much room for subjective judgment, particularly by sub-
national governors who had the power to determine ‘upper 
limits’ to mining near rivers, above and beyond the 200 metre 
boundary established in the law (US Embassy, 2011: 24). This 
legislation was the subject of revisions by the government 
following the crisis of foreign investment, as part of the broader 
effort by policy-makers to increase regulatory certainty for 
mining companies and to increase gold production, which had 
dropped significantly following the enforcement of the legislation 
in 2011 (Fehrbach, 2013).  
Senior officials from the Ministry of Mining reinforced and 
legitimised the negative perspectives about local government 
held by mining companies. The Director of the Department for 
Strategic Policy and Planning acknowledged openly that ‘there 
have been cases where local governments demanded too much 
from mining companies,’ describing the needs of rural citizens 
and authorities as ‘infinite’ (author interview). These comments 
were in the context of discussing central state strategies to ‘make 
fences, limitations for local government’ (ibid). This paradigm of 
local governments as corrupt and self-interested also dominated 
policy discussions about company contributions to local 
development. At a World Bank and Ministry of Mining co-
sponsored workshop discussing the draft model of Local 
Development Agreements in November 2014, for example, local 
governments and citizens’ khurals were charged with short-term 
 
52 Law on the Prohibition of Mineral Exploration and Mining Operations at 
Headwaters of Rivers, Protected Zones of Water Reservoirs and Forested 
Areas, see Chapter Three.  
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thinking, rent-seeking and misuse of local development funds, 
over-charging mining companies for land, lack of legal knowledge 
and corruption, and very poor capacity for decision-making thus 
requiring the oversight of the central government (author 
observation, Multi-Stakeholder Workshop on Community 
Development Agreements).  
However, the corruption narrative ignores the ways that local 
governments were actively responding to the concerns of citizens 
about foreign access to mineral resources, displacement from 
customary land and environmental degradation caused by 
mining. The alleged cases of caricatured corruption (i.e., 
demanding flights and mink coats) ignore the more substantive 
and systematic responses that local governments made to limit 
extraction in their regions in response to pastoral land-use 
requirements and environmental concerns, or by requiring 
companies to invest in local infrastructure (i.e., hospitals, roads 
and schools).  
Stabilisation Mechanisms: Blurring Public-Private 
Boundaries and Strengthening Executive Authority 
in the Mining Governance Regime  
 
 
 
 
Photograph One (left): 
The Great Parliament (Ikh Khural) of Mongolia in Ulaanbaatar (author’s photo) 
Photograph Two (right): 
Provincial government building in Sukhbaatar city, Selenge aimag (author’s 
photo) 
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As institutions perceived to have generated instability for mining 
investment, both Parliament and local governments were 
targeted for reform under the State Minerals Policy 2014-2025. 
The primary input into the drafting of the Policy was from the 
Ministry of Mining, committed to revitalising investment in the 
minerals sector. While the stabilisation strategy was distinct for 
each institution in the sense that unique mechanisms were 
introduced to address specific issues, the Policy’s unifying logic 
hinged on the incorporation of resistant institutions into the 
extractive order through legal mechanisms and financial 
incentives. This incorporative intent was manifested by the 
introduction of private mining interests into the governance 
regime at both the central and sub-national levels of government 
(albeit in different ways) and the empowerment of the executive 
at the expense of representative institute at each level of 
government. 
Blurring the Public-Private Divide at the National 
and Sub-National Levels 
Making concerted and formalised efforts to consult stakeholders 
and rebuild relationships with investors was a key priority for the 
Ministry of Mining during the 2014 period of law and policy 
reform. As the Director of the Strategic Policy and Planning 
Department put it (author interview), 
I’d especially like to note that during the legal reform 
at this time, we were paying special attention to having 
discussions with our key stakeholders because, to be 
honest, we have a bad history of changing laws 
frequently and suddenly… Because the market 
conditions suddenly changed and the prices went 
down, we had no choice but to support industry and 
businesses. 
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These efforts appear to have been well-received by 
representatives from the investment community. The President 
of the Mongolian National Mining Association corroborated the 
view of the Director quoted above, stating that ‘stakeholder 
consultation’ was a key aspect of the new state policy (author 
interview).  
The intention to restore a confident and collaborative working 
relationship between the government and investors had both an 
international and a domestic aspect. Internationally, it involved 
Mongolia being ‘very active in terms of foreign relations with our 
neighbouring countries and other economic partners’ (Director, 
Strategic Policy and Planning Department, Ministry of Mining, 
author interview). In particular, with China, Mongolia has sought 
‘a very intense and close relationship’ since 2014, with currency 
swaps and the signing of long-term purchase agreements for 
mineral commodities (i.e., coal). In early 2015, Mongolia signed 
an Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan and by the end of 
the year was prepared to sign a Foreign Investment Protection 
Agreement with Canada. The Director described ‘competitive 
proposals’ for financing projects from Germany, Japan and the UK, 
as well as monthly meetings with the UK and Australian 
embassies ‘exchanging information and discussing about the 
ways in which we can proceed and cooperate’ (ibid). 
More remarkable, however, was the invitation to private 
stakeholders to participate in mining policy-making at the 
national level. In terms of stabilising the investment environment, 
the State Policy provided a policy and legal basis for establishing 
a multi-stakeholder Minerals Policy Council (MPC) under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Mining. A ‘balanced representation’ 
of government officials, investors, professional associations and 
civil society organisations were supposed to be included on the 
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MPC. According to a senior official in the Ministry of Mining 
(author interview),  
The Minister of Mining is head of the Mineral Policy 
Council. One third is government officials related to 
mineral policy (Ministry of Mining, MRAM, Ministry of 
Environment, Ministry of Finance), one third is 
company representatives, big and small; and 
academicians, researchers, civil society. 
The Director of the Mongolian National Mining Association holds 
the role of Vice Chairman, as the private sector counterpart to the 
Minister of Mining. The rationale of the council is to 
professionalise decision-making in the mining sector: ‘the main 
purpose of this Mineral Policy Council is to discuss and assess 
new legal reform proposals as a professional body’ and crucially 
to prevent legal reform: ‘if there is no support from this policy 
council, no legal reforms can be made in the mineral sector’ 
(Director, Strategic Policy and Planning Department, author 
interview). When asked what the principles will be used to 
evaluate whether support should be given for legal reform, the 
Director (ibid) explained that, 
They must act in a professional manner, without 
politicising issues… The decisions that are made by 
them must be directed to support industry, because in 
Mongolia… Any Parliament member can propose, 
initiate legal reform. But before discussion at 
Parliament, that initiation must go through this 
Mineral Policy [Council] and if that proposal gets 
approval then Parliament will discuss. Without the 
Mineral Policy [Council’s] revision and approval, 
[nothing] can go to Parliament.  
A senior policy-maker who had played a central role in the 
drafting of the State Minerals Policy, similarly described the role 
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of the Minerals Policy Council as preventing ‘election populism’ 
(author interview): 
We created a special council – policy council – 
consisting of different stakeholders… The policy council 
should review any suggested laws. So if they say no, it 
will be very hard [to get them passed]. In that way, we 
want to neutralise some election effects. 
The Minerals Policy Council thus provides a legislated space for 
investor representation in government decision-making, in 
addition to creating a systemic pathway for investors to lobby the 
government through the Ministry of Mining through the inclusion 
of private stakeholders on the council. Prior to the 2014 
commitment to the ‘consultation of stakeholders,’ the state’s 
engagement with the private sector had been ad-hoc and 
dependent upon the initiator of the law (President of the National 
Mongolian Mining Association, author interview).  
In the sub-national context, a similar story unfolded. The new 
State Policy also introduced Local Development Agreements 
(LDAs) within the broader goal of ‘supporting local development 
and protecting local community interests’ (Article 3.5). While the 
phrasing of the article goal suggests that the emphasis was on the 
“community,” I argue that LDAs were clearly intended by central 
policy-makers to function as another institutional mechanism to 
create a predictable investment environment. A senior policy-
maker in the Ministry of Mining (author interview) stated that the 
government want[s] to create and approve a long-term 
model... so the government can say [to local governors] 
“you [only] have the right to request certain things 
within a certain framework.” 
186 
 
In November 2014, the author attended a national policy 
workshop on LDAs sponsored by the Ministry of Mining, MRAM 
and the World Bank. It was attended by approximately one 
hundred representatives from major mining companies such as 
Rio Tinto and Anglo-American, local governments from around 
the country, the newly formed Anti-Corruption Agency, the 
Ministry of Mining, MRAM, Hogan Lovells, and a few private social 
consultancy organisations. The then Director of the Department 
of Strategic Policy and Planning at the Ministry of Mining stated in 
his introductory presentation that, ‘our country has become a 
mining country,’ adding that ‘without mining, many countries 
couldn’t have developed’ referring to Japan, Russia, Germany and 
England as examples. He emphasised that the Mongolian 
government needed to expand and enhance the scope of national 
geological surveying, and that the public and private sectors 
needed to work together more because the private sector was 
apparently bearing the majority of risk for mining projects. In his 
view, the central government needed to oversee local 
governments’ engagement with corporate stakeholders as local 
governors and governments occasionally refused geological 
surveys to be carried out in their jurisdictions and politicised the 
oversight of the central government to gain election favour with 
their constituencies. As the then Deputy Minister of Mining, E. 
Oyun, stated in an interview with Worldfolio (2014),  
There is a problem of miscommunication with local 
people, from the side of the government and from the 
side of the private industries… We want more 
involvement of local governments and we want them to 
use the mining revenues to benefit their local 
communities… This is a new approach that will help 
local people to see and feel the benefits of the mining 
industry… It is also good for miners, because [there] 
will be no anti-mining activities.  
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Local development agreements discipline local administrations 
by limiting the scope of their demands within a pro-extractive, 
pro-investor framework authorised by the Ministry of Mining. 
Sub-national administrations at the provincial, district and sub-
district levels have been a source of frustration to both mining 
companies and the pro-extractive agenda advocated by the 
Ministry of Mining since its formation in 2012 under the 
Democratic Party-led coalition government. Rural citizens’ 
frustration with the environmental impact of mining and a 
growing sense of discontent with the centralised distribution of 
mineral rents established in the 2006 Law had created a situation 
in which local administrations were often a primary opponent of 
mining. As the President of the Mongolian Investors Association 
(author interview) put it:  
All of a sudden local people started opposing mining 
projects in their territory because… they don’t benefit 
from mining. They [had] no benefits, no tax… 
everything [went] to the central government. 
While aimag and soum governments’ approval has been formally 
required for the approval of mining licenses by MRAM, it was 
their informal power to make financial demands on mining 
companies that led to significant exasperation on the part of 
investors. Thus, the investor-local government relationship had 
become a site of instability and political risk for investors, and 
tension between the central government and its sub-national 
administrations. LDAs as construed within the State Minerals 
Policy and formalised in the amended minerals law (2014) were 
intended to limit and manage public expectations of mining 
companies’ contribution to local development projects by 
creating a centralised template of local contracts. Local contracts 
have been designed to limit the “infinite” demands that could be 
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made by local people and administrations, and to make decision-
making more objective. 
While a general legal obligation on companies to ‘cooperate’ with 
local authorities in relation to local development priorities has 
existed since 1997, the nature of that obligation has shifted from 
an ad-hoc ‘consult and coordinate’ model (Article 33.1/1997 
Minerals Law), to multiple agreements on specific issues (Article 
42.1/2006 Minerals Law) to a single agreement (Amended Article 
42.1/2014 Minerals Law). The 1997 ‘consult and coordinate’ 
model placed local governments at the centre of local 
development, with extensive leeway to negotiate without 
oversight from the central government. The 2006 amendment 
limited the scope of local governments’ demands on mining 
companies to a narrower range of ‘specific issues,’ although there 
was still space for a mining impacted region to require 
agreements at different levels of local government depending on 
the scale of the project. The 2014 amendment, however, limits the 
scope of local governments’ leverage over the social contribution 
of mining companies by requiring a single agreement. It mandates 
companies to sign a single agreement with local authorities only 
on ‘matters of environmental protection, infrastructure and job 
creation, voluntarily supporting local community development’ 
(Article 42.1, emphasis added), legally placing the corporate 
partner to the agreement in the stronger bargaining position.  
The Ministry of Mining, in conjunction with the World Bank, 
initiated the development of a template for LDAs in 2014, along 
with model investment agreements, as the negotiation of both of 
these types of agreements have been fraught by conflict and 
generative of the kind of political instability so unattractive to 
investors. These models provide authorities and companies with 
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clear formulae for contract negotiation.53 The template of the 
Model Community Development Agreement (English translation, 
official draft) establishes firm parameters for the terms and 
manner of negotiation between local authorities and mining 
companies, requiring a separate public-private institution to 
govern the agreement – the “Relationship Committee” – which 
exists outside the municipal structure of local administrations. 
The Relationship Committee is supposed to be comprised of an 
executive representative of local government (the Governor) and 
representation from the mining company, with civil associations 
invited as observers to the agreement (ibid). Structurally, it is a 
hybridised agreement, as opposed to a clear public-private 
arrangement, because it incorporates the public and private 
sector into a structure that is decidedly public in its ramifications 
and yet private in process, with agreement-specific financial and 
dispute resolution mechanisms. Thus, despite their “community” 
rhetoric and its “public” connotations, LDAs model private 
contracts that tightly link the executive arm of local governments 
with that of the mining company. 
Within the framework of the agreement, LDA-specific financial 
and dispute resolution mechanisms are meant to be developed on 
a case-by-case base, with the basic guidance being that both are 
“independent.” This means that they are effectively insulated 
from public legal and political power. In financial terms, LDAs are 
like private development funds, accessible only through the LDA 
governance structure. While the template allows for different 
forms of legal review (independent mediation, private arbitration, 
court settlements), private investors are unlikely to opt for the 
national court system given the choice. The LDA template model 
is very long and detailed, resembling a complex contract. The 
 
53 The models were developed by Hogan Lovells, the global legal firm which 
won the bid from the World Bank.  
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complexity of agreements tends to indicate a lack of trust and an 
effort to protect company interests by covering all potential 
loopholes. In light of their structure and the intentions behind 
their creation in the Ministry of Mining, LDAs are evidently 
designed to protect company interests and facilitate extraction, 
rather than encourage a meaningful political process about 
mining in rural areas.  
In terms of the central state’s interest in LDAs, the rationale was 
clear. The Director of Strategic Policy and Planning at the Ministry 
of Mining explained to me in an interview that LDAs are 
essentially “fences” to limit local demands on mining companies: 
There were some cases where local governments 
demanded too much from companies. So, the Cabinet 
decided that we’re going to approve the model 
contracts of those rural developments, community 
developments… And [through] that example agreement 
we are going to make fences, limitations for local 
governments…Because the previous one was not 
officially approved by anyone, local governments could 
follow it, they could not follow. So the law last year we 
intentionally included regulation that the model 
contracts will be approved by Cabinet, local 
governments should follow that.  
The Director later emphasised at the National Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) Forum in Ulaanbaatar (author observation) 
that as the law develops in mining sector, so do the types of 
contracts available, portraying LDAs as a progressive legal 
development. In his view, LDAs were part of a legal framework to 
prevent change in mining policy, by creating clear timelines for 
decision-making and limited options for local governments and 
citizens. In another interview, in response to a question about the 
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purpose of LDAs, a senior policy-maker said that their purpose 
was to create clarity around the terms and conditions of ‘social 
investments’ from mining companies:  
It's very hard to distinguish [between] the social license 
to operate or [if] it's bribery. So we want to make it 
official. There should be a draft or model agreement, 
and they can just change the names, locations, maybe 
size of money or something like this. 
This statement was in the context of a discussion about mining 
companies’ frustration with local governments, the emphasis 
being on the corrupt demands of provincial and district 
authorities. In a very real sense, LDA’s are engaged in political 
‘boundary work’ (Li, 2007: 214), as institutional forms that serve 
‘the careful management of unruly or disruptive social forces, and 
the containment of political challenge (ibid).  
The introduction of LDAs dovetailed with recent changes to the 
revenue redistribution structure. The 2011 Integrated Budget 
Law introduced the possibility of a more decentralised model of 
financial redistribution from the state budget to local 
administrations to take account of the growing sense of 
discontent around the terms of subnational ‘revenue sovereignty’ 
in the context of ‘rapid economic growth’ (ibid: 26), driven largely 
by the mining sector in rural areas. Article 59.4 of the 2011 
Integrated Budget Law consequently stipulated that Local 
Development Funds in mining regions would be allocated up to 
ten percent more of the mineral royalties from the central 
General Local Development Fund than non-mining regions (ibid: 
18). The 2011 Budget Law, however, still maintained a significant 
degree of central control over the redistribution of mining license 
fees and royalties. In response to the fact that ‘the local 
government and local citizens don’t like to support mining or 
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geological activities’ (Officer, MRAM, author interview), a further 
incentive of direct revenue sharing of royalties and mining license 
fees was introduced in the 2014-2015 mineral sector reform. As 
of January 2016, 50% of mining license fees were allocated to 
aimag branches of local government in mining regions (with 25% 
going to soum branches). Formerly, only 5% of mining royalties 
would be redistributed to local governments through the Local 
Development Fund (LDF). While that 5% distributed through the 
LDF is maintained, additionally provincial governments in mining 
regions can expect to receive 20% of royalties and district 
governments to receive 10% through direct transfer.  
In conjunction with the introduction of LDAs, the financial 
incentives for local governments to approve mining licenses and 
work closely with mining companies increased monumentally. 
Both LDAs and direct revenue sharing mechanisms were 
portrayed by central state proponents (i.e., Ministry of Mining and 
MRAM) as positive shifts towards decentralised and participatory 
governance, where local governments have a greater sense of 
administrative control around both their budget and local 
spending priorities. However, as the interviews indicated, these 
“decentralised” legal mechanisms have been strategically 
deployed by pro-extractive institutions in the central state to 
curtail resistance to mining and get local governments “on board” 
with extractive development. Without evidence of “political” 
coercion, the central government has effectively eliminated cause 
for resistance by creating incentives for local elites (particularly 
governors) to support mining companies. This perspective was 
reinforced by the author’s interviews with personnel from local 
administrations in mining-intensive regions. According to the 
Director of Development Policy Department in Selenge aimag, 
80% of the aimag’s income was derived from taxes from the 
mining sector (author interview). A soum governor from 
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Bayankhongor aimag (author interview) emphasised the 
pressure and difficulty he was under to balance local citizens’ 
interests with those of miners, because of the link between 
supporting mining and receiving development funding from the 
central government. 
Deepening Executive Power in the Central and Sub-
National Branches of Government 
Alongside the strategic insertion of private interests into national 
and sub-national mining governance, decision-making authority 
was also relocated and reinforced in the executive spaces of the 
state since the 2012-2013 “crisis” in FDI. At the sub-national level, 
following on from the previous discussion, local development 
agreements have the effect of strengthening executive power, as 
well as introducing private extractive interests into the fabric of 
local development planning and policy. Governors were 
designated as the “representative” signing party on behalf of local 
communities, even though they are the least representative office 
in democratic terms. The incorporation of the executive arm of 
local governments into the LDA to the exclusion of other bodies 
like local parliaments insulates mining companies from more 
“demanding” parties; the structure of the agreements creates a 
strong incentive for governors to support the agreement. In 
response to the question “Is it better to work with the Governor 
or the local Parliament Chairman in relation to LDAs?”, the CEO of 
a Mongolian mining company (author interview, November 2015) 
responded: 
The Governor. It’s one person. The Chairman, with his 
cabinet, there are ten people, twelve people… but with 
just one governor, it’s one person, so what the hell, 
right?  
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LDAs also structurally encourage vertical stability for mining 
projects by incorporating governors as the co-signatory, because 
the appointment of governors is the prerogative of the governor 
of the higher level. A provincial governor is unlikely to approve a 
governor that would challenge the terms of the LDA that he or she 
signed, which would interrupt the flow of funding into the local 
budget. In this way, LDAs are likely to shift the balance towards 
state-management at the expense of self-government by 
incentivising the approval of pro-mining governors in sub-
national administrations.  
The centralising effect of LDAs is belied by their “decentralising” 
purpose as articulated in national policy, to provide a stronger 
institutional mechanism for local community engagement and 
direct distribution of social investment by companies. The central 
state appears to be absent from direct oversight of the process of 
LDA negotiation, apart from setting out a standardised template 
in accordance with the minerals legislation.  However, the power 
of the central government is expressed through the force of law 
(i.e., the legislated, compulsory nature of LDAs) and the financial 
incentives that they offer to the impoverished coffers of local 
administrations. LDAs do open up space for local administration-
company negotiation of direct community benefits, but within a 
tightened space of self-governing autonomy. For example, while 
MRAM still requires local authorities’ approval before issuing a 
mining license, the basis for a legitimate refusal has been 
restricted. As the Director of Strategic Policy and Planning at the 
Ministry of Mining (author interview) explained, 
Before issuing a license, MRAM sends a letter to the 
local government to hear their opinion and local 
governments can agree or they can disagree. But in the 
case of disagreeing, they must provide legitimate 
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foundations. Reasoning. … If they have any plans to 
protect an area for local protection, they must make a 
decision at the start not afterwards. 
The raised bar of legitimacy for refusing of mining licenses 
directly corresponds with the contentious history of local 
authorities strategically setting aside land for ‘special needs’ to 
legally block mining projects in their territories since the early 
2000s (Endicott, 2012). This new standard operates in 
conjunction with the predetermination of land for extractive 
development by the Ministry of Mining. The Ministry has 
designated 30% of national territory for exploration and mining 
licenses. This centralised determination of land was part of the 
2014 reforms to the minerals law and policy (see Table Two). 
While the land designated for extractive development was not 
supposed to ‘overlap with any environmental, cultural, historical 
things that need to be protected’ (Director, Strategic Policy and 
Planning Department, Ministry of Mining, author interview), 
mining-critical activists have contested this determination of 
land, e.g. the Centerra Gold Gatsuurt Project (Satke, 2015).  
The institutional infrastructure for mining within the Mongolian 
state expanded significantly after the investment crisis, 
strengthening and reinforcing a pro-extractive executive block in 
the state. Initially, in 1997, the Mineral Resources Authority of 
Mongolia (MRAM) was established as an ‘autonomous lead 
agency… to facilitate the implementation of the new minerals law’ 
(World Bank, 2006: 3). MRAM was given a large significant 
amount of implementation power and discretionary oversight of 
the minerals industry, particularly in light of MRAM’s authority to 
assign ‘extensive exploration rights’ (ibid) through its Cadastre 
Division. The general structure of MRAM has remained fairly 
constant since 1997, but the broader institutional context in 
which it is located has shifted markedly.  
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Before 2008, MRAM operated with a substantial degree of 
autonomy as a ‘quasi-independent agency, the acts of which did 
not require ministerial approval’ (International Business 
Publications, 2013: 129). However, in 2008, MRAM was 
institutionally relocated under the ‘direct authority of the 
Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy’ (ibid), now the 
Ministry of Mining. In the context of the 2006 amendments to the 
Minerals Law, this restructuring was seen as contributing a 
certain level of instability for investors’ rights, as MRAM was 
under the discretionary oversight of a central government 
ministry and some of its prerogatives regarding licensing 
procedures for ‘strategic deposits’ had been transferred to the 
ministry (ibid). In the context of the 2014 amendments to the 
Minerals Law, MRAM’s prerogatives have largely been returned 
to the original 1997 model, but MRAM has remained under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Mining.  
The new consensus on promoting FDI in the mining sector means 
that the significant implementation and administration powers of 
MRAM are now concentrated within a very pro-investment 
government ministry. Not only is MRAM the formal source of 
economic and environmental information about the mining 
industry in Mongolia, but MRAM’s Cadastre Division has the sole 
power to a.) ‘receive, register and make decisions with respect to 
applications for licenses’, b.) ‘collect service and license fees,’ c.) 
‘resolve boundary disputes between license-holders,’ and, 
critically, d.) ‘provide the public with access to the processes of 
issuing and reissuing licenses…’ (MRAM, 2017) While MRAM 
officials emphasised in interviews that it is simply an 
‘implementation agency’ (Officer, MRAM, author interview) it has 
sole decision-making authority regarding licensing, a monopoly 
on information about the mining sector, and is responsible for the 
overall economic sustainability of the mining sector (Head of 
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Mining Division, MRAM, author interview; Officer, MRAM, author 
interview). The empowerment of MRAM within the Ministry of 
Mining concentrates the state’s administrative and executive 
power to support foreign investment in the mining sector. 
This is particularly significant in light of the way that the Ministry 
of Mining has gained a position of institutional prominence in 
relation to the executive “core” of the state. The Ministry of 
Mining is a line ministry of the Ministry of Finance, which is one 
of four core executive ministries, along with the Ministry of 
Justice, the Ministry for Environment and Green Development, 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a product of the deepening 
relationship between the Ministry of Mining and the Ministry of 
Finance, the Ministry of Mining has also developed a very close 
relationship with the Central Bank by extension. This pro-
extractive formation linking the Ministry of Mining with the 
Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank helps to explain the new 
dominance of economic pragmatism in mining policy. As the 
Director of Strategic Policy and Planning put it (ibid), 
The Minister of Mining is now solely responsible for the 
development of minerals sector, and we have two 
agencies underneath of us – the Mineral Resources 
Authority of Mongolia (MRAM) and Petroleum 
Authority of Mongolia (PAM). Mongolian legislation 
requires involvement of Parliament at some levels, but 
we have a close relationship, basically, with Parliament 
because Parliament approved the State Policy on 
Minerals Sector. They were very cooperative in making 
those legal reforms last year [2014]. Of course, 
Parliament is a political institution and there are many 
ongoing debates, but generally we have basic 
consensus. We work very closed with the Ministry of 
Finance and especially with the Fiscal Revenue 
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Division, our key counterpart. Previously, the two 
ministries didn't have unified database, and numbers 
differed a lot - projections, forecasts, everything 
differed. Now we have regular meetings with them, and 
the numbers are now the same.  
Furthermore, the elevation of the Invest Mongolia Agency from its 
former position in the Ministry of Economic Development (now 
dissolved) to being supervised directly by the Prime Minister’s 
office as of 2014 exemplifies the government’s priority to 
encourage and protect investment through institutional 
reorganisation. 
The close relationship between the financial, investment and 
extractive ministries has been known to generate conflict with 
ministries with other goals, such as the Ministry for Environment 
and Green Development. However, while the purposes of the 
ministries differ – ‘we want to dig, they want to protect’ (ibid) – a 
sense of pragmatism and the necessity of cooperation following 
the economic crisis of 2013 helped to stabilise underlying 
conflicts. This was evidenced in the revisions made to the Law on 
the Prohibition of Mineral Exploration and Mining Operations at 
Headwaters of Rivers, Protected Zones of Water Reservoirs and 
Forested Areas (hereafter ‘the Law’), which had led to the 
cancellation of licenses for over two hundred mining projects in 
2011 (see Chapter Three, section “2009-2013: Optimism and 
Entanglement”). This law, pejoratively referred to as “Law with a 
Long Name,” was widely perceived by mining companies and 
government officials as a ‘half-baked’ (Environmental Adviser, 
Sustainability East Asia LLC, author interview) law that was 
completely unrealistic. The lack of clear regulations for the 
implementation of the law seemed to give local governments and 
the Ministry of Environment and Green Development (through a 
working group) too much discretion in the determination of 
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environmental boundaries, according to multiple sources. 
Consequently, since 2014, the Ministry of Mining worked closely 
with the Ministry of Environment and Green Development to 
reduce ‘discrepancies’ in decision-making and to think more 
realistically about ‘compensation and those types of financial 
issues’ (Director, Strategic Policy and Planning Department, 
Ministry of Mining, author interview).  
An important aspect of the pro-extractive consensus has been the 
effort to consolidate and centralise national geological 
information under the auspices of the Ministry of Mining and 
MRAM through the establishment of a National Geological Survey 
and designated Office, explicitly mandated by the 2014 
amendments to the Minerals Law. In the early 1990s, the 
socialist-era geological offices and laboratories were privatised 
along with many other SOEs. Consequently, the state as a whole 
lost a significant degree of control over national geological 
information. The discovery of Oyu Tolgoi, for example, was based 
on minerals mapping from the 1980s accessed by BHP Billiton in 
the early 1990s following the privatisation process. National 
geological information continues to be predominantly based upon 
socialist-era surveys from the 1970s and 1980s, conducted 
largely through joint-ventures with Moscow. In the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, private companies acquired new geological data 
through exploration activities, which the government has the 
right to receive upon request (Senior Policy-Maker, Ministry of 
Mining, author interview). Consequently, the current scope of 
national geological data is an assortment of rudimentary 
surveying from the socialist era and exploratory mapping of 
specific areas by private companies.  
Since 2014, consolidating and improving the quality of available 
geological information has been considered a top policy priority 
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by senior officials in the Ministry of Mining. In 2014, the then-
director of the Strategic Policy and Planning Department argued 
that more consistency was needed, as many mining companies 
had complained that local governments gave them conflicting 
geological information (Multi-Stakeholder Workshop on 
Community Development Agreements, author observation). This 
appears to be partly motivated by a desire to strengthen state 
control of the mining sector but also to attract investment, 
indicating a harmony of interests between the public and the 
private sector as the state seeks to enable extraction. As one 
senior policy-maker (Ministry of Mining, author interview) put it, 
In order to develop or attract foreign or large 
investments in the mining sector, one of the important 
things is to manage the exploration and regional 
geology. The mining companies are coming into the 
country… based on the information, they have a 
decision whether to make investment, to do the 
activity. So one of the most important [items of] 
information is geological baseline information, [to 
indicate] the potential of the country where you want 
to invest… Another thing is, of course, the legal 
framework: how stable, or how easy to get into. The 
Mongolian government has decided that attracting 
foreign investment is important, so therefore we need 
to promote our potential, our advantages. Therefore, 
the government has started to issue new exploration 
licenses [because] the amendment to the Minerals Law 
(2014) allows us to grant new exploration licenses.  
As of 2015, senior policy-makers in the Ministry of Mining 
favoured a 100% state-owned National Geological Office where 
the results from the recently initiated regional survey can be 
processed, particularly those which have been ‘accumulated in 
different formats and different times’ to be ‘delivered to different 
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stakeholders’ (Senior Policy-Maker, Ministry of Mining, author 
interview). Private stakeholders, however, apparently favour a 
public-private partnership model for the National Geological 
Office, similar to the Construction Office, to prevent total state 
control of strategic geological data.  
Conclusion 
Following the 2014 reforms, a demonstrable shift occurred within 
the architecture of the state in relation to the mining sector that 
insulates investment interests from “political risk” at both the 
local and central levels of government. On one hand, at both the 
central and local levels, there was a simultaneous insertion of 
private actors and direct representation of their interests within 
the structure of state governance of the mining sector through the 
Minerals Policy Council in the Ministry of Mining and LDAs in sub-
national administrations. These mechanisms represent a 
formalised rupture in the fabric of government, by legitimising the 
role of private actors, interests and norms within national public 
governance.  While this shift towards hybridised governance 
reflected the lobbying efforts of investors and their private sector 
groups such as the Mongolian National Mining Association and 
the Business Council of Mongolia, it also reflects the trajectory of 
executive strategizing within the state. Even at the “local” level, it 
is the centrally-appointed governor that has been elevated as the 
key actor to negotiate with mining companies. Despite the 
decentred appearance of LDAs, for example, these “local” public-
private “partnerships” are centrally mandated, enforced and 
structured. Thus, in addition to hybridisation, I have focused on 
the deepening cooperation and expansion of pro-extractive 
institutions in the executive arm of the state itself which have 
significantly increased in terms of scale, degree of ideological 
consensus and scope of decision-making power.  
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In this chapter, I have linked the various and innovative means by 
which “political” actors within the state have been undermined 
through the pro-extractive, anti-politics of “stability” following 
the 2014 recommitment to promoting FDI in Mongolia’s mineral 
sector. The process of undermining resistance and redistributing 
power within the state occurred in different forms, through the 
introduction of strategic public-private partnerships (i.e., Local 
Development Agreements), the softening of institutional 
boundaries between the state and corporate representation, and 
changes to national law and policy (i.e., 2014 reform to the 
Minerals Law and new State Policy on the Minerals Sector 2014-
2025). Although targeting disparate loci of resistance within the 
central state and between local and central governments, these 
processes are unified by the way that they smooth and stabilise 
the path for extraction. Within the state itself, private investment 
interests have become intertwined with strategic institutions of 
governmental authority, such as the Ministry of Mining and the 
offices of provincial and district governors. One way in which this 
has occurred is through the formation of hybridised institutions 
such as the Minerals Policy Council and Local Development 
Agreements that exist within the municipal structure (i.e., they 
directly affect public governance) but are structured on the basis 
of private interests and forms of law (i.e., multi-stakeholder, 
contractual models). Almost simultaneously, private interests 
were included within the space of government and representative 
“political” institutions were marginalised, demonstrating the 
state’s renewed commitment – vis-à-vis executive institutions – to 
enable FDI. 
Notably, these dexterous methods of stabilising the investment 
environment as implemented by the pro-extractive executive are 
“non-political” in form, despite their significant impact in 
structuring the plane of political legitimacy. By non-political, I 
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mean that these executive actors and institutions were deploying 
legal and financial measures rather than relying on overtly 
coercive means to achieve the goal of ensuring stability for 
investors. For example, by restructuring the redistribution of 
mining taxes, fees and royalties and making LDAs a legal 
obligation for local governments and mining companies, the 
strategic hand of the central state in facilitating financial 
dependency upon mining in rural areas was conveniently veiled. 
A complex arrangement of legal and financial incentives, buoyed 
by strong narratives of anti-corruption and anti-nationalism, gave 
the post-2014 pro-investment trajectory a “common sense” 
appearance. It became increasingly difficult for an alternative 
paradigm of economic development to be articulated by national 
actors and institutions. 
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Chapter Five  
New Boundaries of Inclusion and Exclusion: 
Governance Participation and the New 
“Social” Stakeholders of Mongolia’s Extractive 
Economy 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I focused upon the effect of the post-2014 
stability consensus on the state itself, and the way that protecting 
investors from political risk has reordered the balance of norms 
and power within central government institutions, and between 
central government and sub-national administrations. Overall, I 
argued that “political” norms and institutions have been side-
lined by the preference for economic rationality and executive 
power within the mining regime. This chapter transitions from 
this focus on the reorganisation of power within state institutions 
in relation to Mongolia’s extractive economy, to some of the 
effects of this reordering process on state-society relations.  
Transformations in law or state institutions necessarily affect the 
context in which people relate to legal and political authority, and 
to each other, as subjects of that order. In the process of 
‘conditioning local political economies and societies,’ (Cutler, 
2011: 30) transnational legal ordering can produce new ‘subjects 
and objects of legality, localised and delocalised social relations, 
territorialised and deterritorialised systems of rule, and hard and 
soft forms of regulation’ (ibid: 31-32). Thus, drawing on Cutler 
(ibid: 30), I argue that legal and institutional reordering to enable 
global economic integration inevitably ‘defines and regulates the 
terms of political engagement and contestation,’ as transnational 
forces ‘penetrate domestic politico-legal orders.’  
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In this thesis, I have already examined in some detail the way that 
the state-economy relationship in Mongolia has developed and 
changed over time, from the pre-socialist period up through the 
current period of global economic integration. Now I will turn to 
some of the effects of the current reordering on the relationship 
between the state and civil society. In the Mongolian case, the 
institutional sphere of civil society, formally distinct from the 
state and commerce, is a relatively new phenomenon. The 
protection of civic space from state interference was introduced 
through the political and economic liberalisation process in the 
early 1990s (Mendee, 2012; Fritz, 2002, 2008) and has appeared 
to flourish, indicated by the subsequent emergence of a plethora 
of NGOs (Byambajav, 2006). I take as my point of departure the 
institutionalised understanding of civil society as expressed in 
Mongolian law (and society), which differentiates it as a space of 
rights and responsibilities along classical liberal lines from the 
political (state) and economic (commercial) realms, although I 
hope to demonstrate that these clear conceptual lines between 
political, economic and social are highly problematic in practice. 
In this chapter, for instance, I examine the ways that civil society 
organisations have been disciplined by, as well as internalised, 
the post-2014 “stability consensus,” and highlight the way that 
corporate/financial institutions exercise an unprecedented 
degree of authority as “social” actors in fundamentally political 
processes of conflict resolution at the sub-national level.  
This chapter is an exploration of new boundaries around what 
potentially may or may not be legitimately contested by civil 
associations and citizens under the post-2014 order. The nascent 
nature of this transformation prevents hard and fast conclusions, 
but three distinct shifts are notable. Firstly, strong boundaries 
have been placed by the state on organised civic resistance to 
foreign investment and widespread extraction through the 
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criminalisation of “radical” environmental movements. Since 
2013, the path of legitimate engagement for civil society 
organisations has been limited to cooperative participation in 
governance, incorporated into multi-stakeholder mechanisms of 
consensus-building, alongside the state and the corporate sector. 
Secondly, corporate actors and IFIs have become powerful 
authorities in relation to the “social” governance of extractive 
development, demonstrated by the growth of corporate-led 
programmes to address disputes between companies and the 
local “community.” This development has been facilitated partly 
by local government-company collaboration in the framework of 
Local Development Agreements, and also through new strategies 
deployed by NGOs using non-state mechanisms to gain 
recognition (i.e., vis-à-vis the International Finance Corporation 
Performance Standards). Thirdly, and relatedly, the “social” 
governance of extractive development can be characterised by 
the rising dominance of corporate legal norms of recognition (i.e., 
stake-holding) and justice (i.e., balancing private interests). 
Together, all three of these factors work to generate consensus-
driven, corporate-dominant power relationships and establish 
new “rules of the game” for civic engagement with the state 
outside the purview of the national constitution. Ultimately, 
neutralised civil associations and the power of corporate actors 
and norms in the governance of citizenship enable extractive 
development by minimising the effects of resistance to it and 
managing dissent in more “constructive” directions through 
consensus-based mechanisms, sanctioned and sponsored by the 
state, the mining sector and its international financiers. This 
process of neutralisation and dissent management under the 
aegis of “multi-stakeholder solutions” was a critical piece of the 
post-2014 “stability consensus” that discursively and 
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institutionally erected and reinforced the ‘limits of the possible’54 
(Cox, 2002: 37) in Mongolian law and politics. 
Organised Civil Society in Mongolia: An Overview 
The 1992 Constitution expressly recognised the illegitimacy of 
state repression of collective organisation, guaranteeing the ‘right 
to form a party or other public organisations and unite 
voluntarily in associations according to social and personal 
interests and opinion’ (Article 16.10). A series of new laws after 
1992 guaranteed not only the protection of civic space but 
recognised civil society organisations – NGOs specifically – as a 
legitimate partner for the state in creating and implementing 
legislation, notably in relation to environmental protection 
(Danaasuren, 2010: 9). Specifically, the 1997 Law on NGOs 
(hereafter “the Law”) authorised legal space for civil society 
organisations to gain formal recognition as registered non-
governmental organisations, recognising both Public Benefit 
Associations and Mutual Benefit Associations (Articles 4.2 and 
4.3). The 1997 Law defined non-governmental organisations 
broadly as: 
An organisation which is independent from the state, 
self-governing, not-for-profit and established 
voluntarily by citizens or by legal persons other than 
State bodies (that exercise legislative, executive or 
judicial powers) on the basis of their individual or 
social interests and opinions. (Article 4.1) 
The Law still made provision, however, for the state to contribute 
‘financially and otherwise’ (Article 9.3) to the activities of NGOs. 
The majority of NGOs emerged following the passing of the Law, 
with 5,077 NGOs registered by September 2005 following a 
 
54 That is, ‘the strong bonds that hold the existing order together, and the 
influences that orient its direction of development’ (Cox, 2002: 37). 
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national survey commissioned by the Open Society Forum 
(Gombodorj and Batsuren, 2005: 3). Approximately 77% of NGOs 
in 2005 were based in Ulaanbaatar (ibid). In 2008, Mongolia’s 
Civil Society Council was established with four sub-councils, 
covering 1.) Environment, 2.) Education, Culture and Science, 3.) 
Health, and 4.) Defence (UNDP, 2012). Based on national 
statistics, the number of NGOs registered in Mongolia has always 
been remarkably high relative to the population (2.8 million), 
growing approximately ten-fold between 1997 and 2007 
(Mendee, 2012: 19). However, as Mendee (ibid: 20) points out, 
these numbers may be misleading. Since 2005, there has been a 
lack of national data on the composition of civil society, and the 
number of registered NGOs is likely to be significantly higher than 
those that are truly active (ibid). Furthermore, the Civil Society 
Council and its sub-councils suffer from a lack of visibility and 
coherence in relation to ‘representative, networking and 
coordination functions… due to lack of capacity in terms of 
financial and human resources’ (UNDP, 2012: 7). 
The limited levels of funding available from the state and the 
general lack of a culture of organised philanthropy in Mongolian 
society (Daanasuren, 2012) have given international NGOs and 
foundations with greater financial backing a high degree of 
influence within civil society in terms of shaping its norms and 
organisational mode (Byambajav, 2006). Consequently, 
Mongolian civil society, particularly in Ulaanbaatar, has tended to 
reproduce the coherent ‘structural pattern of international NGO 
networks’ (Katz and Anheier, 2006: 241) in form and activity 
(including the hierarchical relationships between international-
national-local scales, urban and rural areas). For example, 
Mongolian NGOs typically have membership links to international 
NGOs and networks, attend conferences, produce reports, depend 
on diverse avenues of donor funding (i.e., through transnational 
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organisational memberships, public sector grants and/or 
corporate contracts), and intervene in society via short-term 
projects that aim at policy and legal reform or “capacity building” 
among their target groups (ibid). The transnational NGO network 
in which Mongolian civil society largely participates is dominated 
by a specific discourse buoyed by the terms ‘participation, 
empowerment, local, and community’ (Fisher, 1997: 442) which 
connote an organic notion of the “social” without the sinister taint 
of ‘profit or politics’ (ibid).  
International NGOs were the first on the scene, so to speak, 
following Mongolia’s impoverishment as a result of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the marketization of the country’s economy 
(Byambajav, 2006; Rossabi, 2005). Not only this but organisations 
like the Soros Foundation, the Asia Foundation, World Vision, the 
Konrad-Adenauer Foundation, to name a few, occupy the unique 
position of being both directly engaged in civic activities and a 
primary source of funding for domestic civil society 
organisations. Thus, significant inequalities in power exist 
between organisations within civil society, with a relatively few 
number of organisations having privileged access to long-term 
funding. The concentration of financial resources in Ulaanbaatar-
based, foreign-funded civil society organisations creates a serious 
power disparity, with a few entrenched organisations at the top 
and a mass of short-term, small-scale associations competing for 
funding and support. Significantly for this analysis, international 
NGOs tend to support extractive development (i.e., mining) on the 
whole, with the caveat that it is carried out in a responsible 
manner.55 Despite the presence of a “real” space for civil society 
there is a danger of being overly positive about this development 
 
55 For example, the Asia Foundation promotes “responsible mining” in line with 
global good governance standards, as will be discussed in relation to its 
Responsible Mining Initiative and Engaging Stakeholders in Environmental 
Conservation Projects.  
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in terms of its actual impacts. “Social” actors such as NGOs may 
very well reinforce and legitimise the dominant pro-mining 
consensus as they are incorporated into the governing order for 
extractive development, as will be demonstrated in the following 
analysis.  
The Law and Politics of Exclusion in the Making of a 
“Civil” Society: Limiting Investor Risk from 
Environmental Activists  
In this section I argue that relations outside of the state – state-
society relations – have been stabilised to exclude more radical 
expressions of resistance from the Mongolian public. Despite 
constitutional guarantees preventing state repression of 
collective organisation and freedom of expression, the 
government has established new boundaries of legitimacy for 
those social movements that are resistant to foreign investors and 
widespread extraction, notably since the crisis of foreign 
investment in 2012-2013. These boundaries have been 
established through positive measures – financial and political 
incentives – but are backed by the threat of criminalisation, as the 
case of the Fire Nation movement demonstrates. This section will 
briefly provide the legal and political context for the development 
of organised social action and agitation around mining by 
resistant groups, and the ways in which the most radical elements 
have been excluded and “stabilised” for the purposes of 
diminishing risk for investors and mining companies. 
Civil Society Organisations in Mongolia and the 
Emergence of Environmental Activism around 
Mining 
1997 was a momentous year for Mongolia in terms of legal 
change. It could be termed “the Year of Liberalisation” with the 
passing of the 1997 Minerals Law and the Law on NGOs, which 
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respectively opened up the Mongolian minerals market to 
investment of unprecedented scale and further legitimised 
voluntary associations through legislation. Prior to the advent of 
the mining boom at the end of the 1990s, the majority of civil 
society activism was based in Ulaanbaatar. The majority of 
organisations were either international NGOs responding to the 
political opportunity for promoting democracy (e.g., the Konrad-
Adenauer Foundation and the Asia Foundation) and the social 
needs created through the transition process (e.g., World Vision, 
Save the Children), or Western-style NGOs ‘established and led by 
women’ (Byambajav, 2013) in Ulaanbaatar.  
In contrast to Ulaanbaatar’s centralised NGO-model of civil 
society organisation, the mining boom catalysed a unique 
mobilisation of activism (Byambajav, 2014:2), with collective 
action emerging from rural areas across the country where the 
impacts of mining and large-scale licensing had been felt most 
keenly. The input requirements of mining in terms of land and 
water not only created an economic conflict of interest with 
herders, but destabilised their entire social environment 
(Byambajav, 2012: 13). Suffering from the pollution and drying 
up of rivers, displacement from precious cultural and spiritual 
landmarks, and customary grazing land, small groups began to 
organise themselves to resist these changes in the early 2000s. 
These movements expressed resistance in various ways initially, 
through short-term direct action protests, such as roadblocks, 
hunger strikes, and lobbying within the Citizens Councils of local 
government (Byambajav, 2012, 2014; Upton, 2012). Their 
discourse was explicitly political, drawing on Mongolian 
nationalist associations with the local homeland (nutag) and 
rivers – ‘”the people of the one-river”’ (Byambajav, 2014: 1; 
Sneath, 2010: 253). The idea of Mongolia as a ‘motherland… in 
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which people have their roots’ has been described by Sneath 
(ibid) as a ‘core value in the national political culture.’  
Initially at least, the success of rural resistance was dependent on 
the political support of local authorities and the financial 
assistance of international NGOs, specifically the Konrad-
Adenauer Foundation which supported the first sustained 
environmental social movement in response to mining in 2002: 
the Onggi River Movement. In relation to local political backing, 
the consolidation of collective action to resist mining reflected the 
support of local institutions for the resistance movement. 
Byambajav (2012: 21), for example, credits local ‘”elites”’ and 
government officials for consolidating the efforts of local citizens 
in Tsenher soum (Arkhangai aimag, central Mongolia) into an 
organised resistance movement known as Aruin Suvraga (Sacred 
Suvraga Mountain). While senior citizens, teachers and a few 
other motivated citizens had attempted to gain central 
government attention and catalyse a systematic campaign against 
the mining company Mongol Gazar (“Mongolian Place”) (ibid), 
they were unsuccessful. It took the involvement of senior 
representatives from Tsenher soum’s Local Homeland Council 
and local governmental officials (notably the governor and 
environmental inspectors) to consolidate collective action 
strategies (ibid: 22).  
Similarly, in the case of the Onggi River Movement, the support of 
local authorities greatly aided the initial coalescence of the group 
as a fully-fledged – albeit small-scale – movement. In the author’s 
interview with a bagh governor who became a leader within the 
movement, he stated that his rationale for getting involved with 
the Ongii River Movement was on behalf of the local community 
‘because the whole community was affected by the mining… by 
joining to the civil movements I can support the local community 
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and its environment.’ He attributed the success of the Onggi River 
Movement in garnering popular support to the fact that the 
movement’s board was comprised of representatives from each of 
the eight soums (districts) along the Onggi River, who reached out 
to citizens, mobilising them for direct actions and petitions 
(around 6000, sent to central parliament members). He described 
the support of aimag and soum government as “very good”, 
stating that some of the original members of the River Movement 
board were originally soum governors themselves. In the early 
years (2001-2005), apart from soliciting the interest of the 
Konrad-Adenauer Foundation to provide assistance with 
resources, the Onggi River Movement and smaller parallel 
movements maintained institutional distance from Ulaanbaatar-
based NGOs. The River Movements were creative strategists, 
using a combination of informal and formal methods of protest. 
As Combellick-Bidney (2012: 287) puts it, ‘clashes between the 
River Movements and mining companies took the form of legal 
battles, rival stories in the media, and physical violence on the 
ground.’ 
In early 2006, a loose coalition of River Movements and other 
rural environmental NGOs was formed through a partnership 
with the Asia Foundation: The Homeland and Water Protection 
Coalition of River Movements (“River Coalition”). The Asia 
Foundation, as ‘the first non-profit organisation to be invited into 
Mongolia’ (Asia Foundation, 2016) in 1990, had become an 
entrenched civil society institution of sorts, with a “thick” 
development programme that ranged from direct service 
provision to public policy and governance support (ibid).56 Its 
 
56 In Mongolia, specifically, its programmes range from helping ‘to strengthen 
anti-corruption efforts and improve administrative reform; improve 
governance of cities and citizen engagement; increase gender equality; 
advance responsible resource use and environmental conservation; and 
support Mongolia’s multilateral foreign policy engagement’ (Asia Foundation, 
2016). 
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institutionalisation benefitted from its status as a regional NGO 
with sustained income from a variety of donors (i.e., foreign aid 
agencies, international financial institutions, corporations, and 
individuals). The recognition of growing environmental impacts 
and conflict caused by mining operations opened up 
environmental governance as a new field of engagement for the 
Asia Foundation. 
 
Different accounts of how the partnership between the River 
Coalition and the Asia Foundation emerged emphasise varying 
levels of initiative by the parties. There was a sense, particularly 
among the leadership of the Onggi River Movement, that 
coordination was needed to effect national-level policy change. 
The Onggi River Movement contacted the Asia Foundation, to 
provide financial and coordination support in creating an 
umbrella organisation to link these grassroots environmental 
groups. Seeking support from the Asia Foundation was a strategic 
step for the River Coalition to sustain nation-wide collective 
action, widen their influence and develop a central hub to provide 
resources and administer localised activities. The Asia 
Foundation, however, was not a neutral actor in this process, but 
took an active role in selecting the members of the coalition and 
setting the tone for the mode of engagement that the coalition 
should seek. 
 
The Coalition, aided by the Asia Foundation, ‘began exploring 
more cooperative, less confrontational approaches to dealing 
with mining-related issues’ (Asia Foundation, 2008), and 
developed seven principles to inform their legal advocacy: 
1. Establish socially and environmentally 
responsible mining in Mongolia; 
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2. Require open public access to information 
related to mining; 
3. Promote clear and transparent 
environmental impact assessment and 
decision-making on mineral development; 
4. Ensure that mining operations meet best 
international standards for environmental 
practices; 
5. Ensure that public monitoring and public 
audit compliance with environmental 
standards becomes normal practice; 
6. Ensure that environmental laws and 
regulations are adhered to and enforced; 
7. Ensure that Mongolia’s protected areas 
remain free from environmental damage 
(Asia Foundation, 2006). 
Notably, this consensus promoted a collaborative – rather than 
antagonistic – role for civil society in mining governance, focusing 
on transparency, inclusion and enforcement of the law. 
Previously, many of the River Movements had engaged in direct 
action protests and overtly political conflicts against mining 
companies, emphasising ‘the protection of the “local homeland” 
and its natural landscape’ (Byambajav, 2014: 2). The new agenda 
for the Coalition opened up opportunities for River Movements 
and other environmental NGOs to engage in legal advocacy and 
education-based campaigns, but increasingly delegitimised 
conflictual strategies. These values became the bedrock of the 
Responsible Mining Initiative (RMI), initiated by the Asia 
Foundation in 2006 following the formation of the River 
Coalition. A “grasstops” mechanism – ‘a framework for 
cooperative decision-making’ (Asia Foundation, 2008) – the RMI 
brought different stakeholders together with mutual interest in 
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“responsible mining.” As a multi-stakeholder NGO, the board of 
the RMI was composed of representatives from civil society, 
industry and government. Similar to the River Coalition, the RMI 
was founded on seven principles and values of “responsible 
mining” (ibid): 
1. Ensure multi-stakeholder engagement 
2. Transparency and openness  
3. Responsibility for the safety of people and the 
environment 
4. Investment in future development 
5. Ensure fruitful productivity and efficiency 
6. Humane and ethical 
7. Based on advanced and modern technology 
These seven principles assume that common ground could be 
found between different interest groups around the values of 
transparency, responsibility, growth, efficiency, humanity and 
technological progress. Furthermore, they gave inherent value to 
“multi-stakeholder engagement” and made shared responsibility 
a goal of the new multi-stakeholder collective, rather than 
targeting specific duty-bearers (i.e., the government). Leaders 
from the River Coalition were initially represented in the RMI, as 
were the Mongolian National Mining Association, Members of 
Parliament from opposing parties, the head of the trade union, 
and Oyu Tolgoi, among others. While on paper the RMI was 
remarkably impressive, allegedly “uniting” high-level 
stakeholders together around principles of responsible mining, its 
functionality as a decision-making forum was fraught with 
internal conflicts of interest between its members, notably 
between a faction of the River Movements and the Asia 
Foundation. Some of the River Movements perceived the Asia 
Foundation to be too heavy-handed in its facilitation of both the 
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River Coalition and the RMI (Daanasuren, 2012: 258) and the Asia 
Foundation found that some of its expectations for reciprocity 
were unmet (Consultant B, Social Development Specialist for the 
IFC, former Asia Foundation Consultant on the RMI, author 
interview).  
While undoubtedly there were inter-personal tensions that 
contributed to inter-organisational conflict, the mismatch 
between an overtly politicised and confrontational approach as 
expressed by the Onggi River Movement and the consensus-
driven ethos of the Asia Foundation became an insurmountable 
barrier to their continued cooperation. This conflict came to a 
head in 2008 when a group of the River Movements, led by the 
Onggi River Movement, publicly stated their ‘willingness to 
organise violent protest, if necessary, against poor mining in local 
regions’ (Daanasuren, 2012: 247). With the Asia Foundation 
unwilling to support this conflictual approach, the River Coalition 
splintered, with some movements following the Asia Foundation 
and others following the Onggi River Movement. The latter 
formed the United Movement for Mongolian Rivers and Lakes 
(UMMRL) in 2008. Despite the emergence of fragmentation 
between different approaches within mining-focused civil society 
organisations, the River Movements had the political support of 
large numbers of rural Mongolians, hundreds and even thousands 
of whom participated in direct action protests across the country 
(Combellick-Bidney, 2012: 287).  
Overall, the first six years (2005-2011) of organised resistance  to 
mining could be understood as a period of optimism for major 
transformation in the social and environmental regulation of 
mining.57 The River Movements had developed from very small, 
 
57 Notably, this period of activist optimism was a critical factor in 
“destabilising” the investment environment because the state revised mining 
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grassroots organisations into a larger coalition based in 
Ulaanbaatar, with significant donor funding and opportunities to 
influence policy-making at the national level, not only through the 
RMI but also through the Mongolian Environmental Civil Council 
(MECC). Established in 2008, the MECC developed in response to 
the national groundswell of small-scale environmental 
movements pioneered mainly through the activism of Ts. 
Munkhbayar and the Onggi River Movement (MECC Director, 
author interview). The MECC is a national umbrella organisation 
that functions as a ‘bridge’ (ibid) between the government, NGOs 
and mining-impacted citizens. While the MECC does not now 
solely focus on mining, the public response to the impacts of 
mining in the early 2000s galvanised its formation as a civic 
institution. The MECC has since established administrative and 
regulatory requirements regarding registration, as well as 
financial reporting duties in order to manage the numerous 
environment NGOs (700+), the majority of which are comprised 
of five to ten people (ibid). The MECC has also opened up avenues 
for smaller NGOs to gain funding from the Ministry of 
Environment and other donor organisations, and achieve greater 
visibility for their work at the national level (ibid).  
In addition to the MECC, the Law on Prohibiting Mineral 
Exploration and Extraction Near Water Sources, Protected Areas 
and Forests (“the Law”) was passed by the Mongolian Parliament 
in 2009 following years of advocacy by the UMMRL and the 
support of a few law-makers. As mentioned in Chapters Three 
and Four, this piece of environmental legislation became a critical 
focus for environmental activism between 2009 and 2013. This 
Law prohibited ‘mineral exploration and mining operations… at 
 
and environmental legislation partly in response to its increasingly vocal 
public about the negative impacts and lack of benefits from mining (see 
Byambajav, 2014: 5-6). For more details of the ‘destabilising’ effects of 
legislative change between 2009 and 2013, see chapter 3 of this thesis. 
219 
 
headwaters of rivers, protected zones of water reservoirs and 
forested areas within the territory of Mongolia’ (Article 4.1), 
although ‘deposits of strategic importance’ (Article 4.2) were 
excluded from this prohibition. Further, the Law gave the 
Government the right to delineate these boundaries, without 
specifying the precise limits or which branch of government had 
the right to do this (district, provincial or central). The lack of 
legal precision and openness to political discretion in the 
determination of environmental boundaries was the main point 
of contention for mining companies, as well as the requirement 
that licenses operating in these areas be cancelled (President of 
the Mongolian National Mining Association, author interview).  
However, the government did not enforce the law, leading to 
renewed public demonstrations, hunger strikes and the filing of a 
court case against the Government of Mongolia in a district court 
in Ulaanbaatar by the UMMRL in 2010. The Law had been 
unenforced by the government because it would lead to the mass 
cancellation of mining licenses in areas newly protected under 
the law and grant local governments discretion in the 
determination of environmental boundaries. The district court 
ruled that the government was not responsible for the 
environmental damage caused by mining companies, leading to 
protests from the public led by the UMMRL. In April 2011, one 
hundred herders on horseback wearing traditional deels and 
armed with bows assembled in a grand symbolic protest in 
Sukhbaatar Square outside of the Great Khural. With them, 
hundreds of citizens gathered and called for a national 
referendum after collecting signatures, which led to the lodging of 
an appeal of the 2010 judgment in the Supreme Court. The 2010 
district court judgment was overruled in October 2011, when the 
Supreme Court upheld that the government was responsible for 
environmental damages caused by mining operations, because it 
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had failed to enforce the new environmental law (Global Legal 
Monitor, 2011).  Following the Supreme Court order, the 
enforcement of the law by the government led to the immediate 
suspension of over 200 mining licenses, affecting up to 1800 
mining projects for extraction and exploration, provoking ‘intense 
opposition from miners’ (Mendee, 2013b).   
In 2013, the radical decline of confidence in the stability of 
Mongolia’s investment environment and downward spiral of 
foreign direct investment inspired the government to propose 
amendments to the Law, which would enable the majority of 
suspended licenses to become active again. The prospect of 
reform and word of ‘special sessions of Parliament to weaken the 
Law’ (UMMRL, 2014) led to the formation of a more radicalised 
Fire Nation group within the UMMRL. In September 2013, the 
Fire Nation group and eleven other associations protested again 
in front of Parliament because of proposed amendments to the 
Law: their self-proclaimed goal was ‘to save our nation’ having 
sworn to give their lives ‘for national rights,’ arguing that the 
Government was in breach of the Constitution as the guarantor of 
environmental protection and citizen’s rights (Munkhbayar, 
2014) (see Photograph Three below). 
According to a UMMRL Press Release (UMMRL, 2014), the 
government led by the Democratic Party had ‘declared that the 
“Law with a Long Name” was an impediment to economic growth 
and the Gold Mining Association of Mongolia promised to 
quadruple gold output in exchange for weakened protection of 
rivers.’ A shot was allegedly fired during the protest and ten 
members of the movement, including Ts. Munkhbayar, were 
arrested. On January 21st, 2014, he and four others were 
sentenced to over twenty-one years in prison on charges of 
terrorism (Tolson, 2014). The trial of these activists eschewed 
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constitutionally protected rights to fairness and effective 
representation, highlighted by the fact that the trial was held in a 
remote detention centre where the activists had been 
interrogated. 
Photograph Three 
 
 
 
 
It is important to note the way that the Fire Nation movement 
perceived themselves as defenders of the national democratic 
constitution and positioned themselves as citizen-activists 
defending their local homelands (see Byambajav, 2014; Sneath, 
2010). According to the formal Appeal to overturn the court’s 
ruling (UMMRL, 2014b), the defendants stated that they were 
willing to ‘resort to their own ways of handling this challenging 
situation’ in circumstances where they deemed that the ‘state 
becomes untrustworthy, when it ignores the rights of citizens to 
enjoy a healthy environment and turns living conditions and 
health into continuous suffering, when people are deprived of 
water, pasture land and wintering places.’  It is clear from the 
Appeal (ibid) that the Fire Nation movement saw themselves as 
availing themselves of the rights and duties enshrined in the 
national democratic constitution: 
Furthermore, as the events of September 16th 2013 
were a manifestation of the constitutional duty to 
protect its country and nature, an act of voluntary 
coming together of citizens of Mongolia to form a not-
 
Symbolic protest against the revision to the 
Law on Prohibiting Mineral Exploration and 
Extraction Near Water Sources, Protected 
Areas and Forests 
 (Source: Baikal Basin Information Centre, 
2017) 
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for-profit organization based on common views and 
beliefs (and should be taken as per clause 3.3, chapter 
3 of the Criminal Law “no one should be persecuted for 
his/her beliefs and views”), all charges should be 
dropped. 
As one of the leaders of the Onggi River Movement explained 
(author interview, November 2014), ‘the state has forgotten its 
reason for being.’ The purpose of the UMMRL, particularly under 
the leadership of Ts. Munkhbayar, ostensibly was to remind the 
state of its raison d’etre. Ultimately, the criminal sanctions of the 
state against the activists highlights the failure of de jure 
provisions in the national constitution to protect the civil and 
political freedoms of citizens, in contrast with the state’s renewed 
commitment to providing institutional protection for investment 
and investors’ rights as FDI plummeted.  
Stabilisation Mechanisms I: Exclusion through 
Institutional Disassociation and State 
Criminalisation  
The number of arrests were few following the 2013 protest 
events, but symbolic in terms of a shift in the state’s attitude 
towards dissident civic associations. The escalation of the protest 
movements between 2011-2014 coincided, and some would say 
were partially responsible for, the severe drop in foreign direct 
investment in 2013 and 2014. Their agitation for the enforcement 
of the environmental “Law with a Long Name” and the 
consequent suspension of mining licenses following the Supreme 
Court ruling signalled “state expropriation” to mining companies, 
a major sign of political risk in the investment environment. The 
criminalisation of the Fire Nation movement was an abrupt 
reminder of the state’s coercive power to re-establish boundaries 
around legitimate forms and expressions of civil society 
organisation.  
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The arrests of UMMRL leaders also led to its marginalisation 
within the MECC. In November 2014, at the National Forum for 
Environmental NGOs,58 some members of the MECC wanted to 
remain loyal to the charismatic activist Ts. Munkhbayar – 
‘Munkhbayar remains one of our heroes’ (author recording, 
President Damdinsuren, MECC, Speech at the 4th National Forum 
for Environmental NGOs, November 2014) –  while others pushed 
to create institutional distance from them to maintain the image 
of the MECC as a professional and cooperative environmental 
institution. This latter point was demonstrated pointedly at the 
Forum to which only MECC-approved NGOs were invited. In the 
opening panel, a board member of the MECC - former State 
Secretary for the Ministry of Environment and Green 
Development – argued that there was a need for NGOs that have 
legitimacy and recognition from the government to take greater 
responsibility for regulating environmental issues. He argued that 
NGOs needed to work harder and become more professional, 
citing the lack of competitiveness among domestic NGOs as the 
reason why international NGOs were given greater roles. Using 
the River Movements as an example of non-professionalism, he 
advocated for the development of a professionalised NGO sector – 
‘almost like a corporation’ – to spread specialised NGOs around 
the country: ‘we (MECC) need to produce the professional-level 
NGOs, giving them skills and capacity.’ He added that ‘we all have 
the same goal concerning the environment and nature, protecting 
it from harm, but we are making mistakes,’ saying that 
Munkhbayar’s damaged social and legal reputation reflected 
badly on the environmental NGO sector. 
The Director of the MECC explained in an interview with the 
author that establishing a non-conflictual and cooperative 
 
58 Author observed this Forum.  
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approach with the government was critical in terms of 
legitimising and expanding the scope of the organisation’s remit.  
The majority of the population thinks sometimes that 
the MECC is kind of the same as the street movement, 
but it's not. MECC is more about providing the right 
information based on investigation and strategy and 
research, so that they can provide knowledge to the 
citizens, how to protect their rights… how to amend 
some laws, how to change the constitution etc… The 
MECC is not a political organisation, so our main 
concern is to run this institute in a classic way. It is 
supposed to be separate from political ways, and also 
try to prepare the next generation to run the MECC for 
the future in a very right, independent way. MECC's 
main role and hope is how can we pass 
environmentally healthy food and environment to our 
next generation. This is our main concern. 
The Director emphasised that the MECC had become involved in 
environmental management rather than their previously 
‘judgmental’ approach because the government was more willing 
to listen when they are cooperative. The Director explained, for 
example, that  
In my personal opinion, our institution is the biggest 
NGO that could have a [big impact] on our society 
because our members, our board members, are mostly 
very welcome to advise [government] ministers. For 
example, the Ministry of Environment, Ministry of 
Mining and Ministry of Agriculture, all the ministers of 
their advisory meetings invite us to contribute our 
perspective.  
When asked whether cooperation levels have increased or 
decreased with the government, the Director was emphatic: 
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It has increased enormously… We give advice on how 
[mining projects] affect the natural environment, not 
only in the shorter term but also in the longer term. So 
we give input and also require environmental 
safeguard instructions. Not only that, but we also give 
input relating to the social and biological effects [of 
mining]. We give the advice for major decisions for the 
Ministry of Environment…The only advice or 
instructions given [from NGOs] are from the MECC. 
Environmental representatives from the MECC have also been 
included on the Minerals Policy Council, which was established in 
the 2014 amendments to the Minerals Law to help prevent 
legislative reform to the mining sector (see Chapter Four). The 
Ministry of Mining exclusively included environmental 
representation from the Mongolian Environmental Civil Council, 
reinforcing the status and institutional legitimacy of MECC-
registered organisations.  
While top-down civil society organisations like the Asia 
Foundation and the MECC have generally played a stabilising 
function within civil society, that role reinforced the state’s 
increasingly hard-line position on the appropriate boundaries of 
environmental activism from 2013 onwards. Environmental 
activists engaged in protest were regularly portrayed as corrupt 
trouble-makers by pro-extractive government officials. For 
example, a senior mining policy-maker responded to the question 
“How has civil society changed in recent years?” by saying, 
We have an Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative Council, headed by the Prime Minister, and 
one third [of the council] is from civil society. And they 
are maturing. We had a lot of civil society 
organisations [in the past] but some of them were very 
violent, they even took rifles, guns, explosives and tried 
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to attack the government because they believed the 
government was betrayed by the multinational 
corporations. They believe that the government is not 
for the people, just for the multinationals. Some of the 
so-called civil society organisations… it’s kind of like a 
civilised robbery (author interview).  
He described the civil society organisations as ‘rent-seeking’ by 
protesting against mining companies in order to get paid off, 
reinforcing the negative discourse around activism in the 
Mongolian media (see also Byambajav, 2015: 6).  
Stabilisation Mechanisms II: Inclusion through 
Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue, Consensus-Building 
and the Narrative of “Shared Responsibility” 
The post-2014 climate of civil society engagement can be 
characterised by the virtual monopoly of a “governance 
participation”59 paradigm, which envisions a formal role for civil 
society in both the production and implementation of governance, 
crucially in collaboration – rather than confrontation – with 
industry and government partners. In this paradigm, NGOs and 
social movements are legitimate to the extent that they are a 
constructive voice within the mining governance framework itself. 
This new pattern contrasts with the way that the UMMRL and its 
allies lobbied for law reform within local and national state 
institutions, expecting the state to take direct, political 
responsibility for the negative effects of mining.  
While conflictual social movements have been marginalised, the 
central government has given international organisations and the 
corporate sector political and legal space to provide consensus-
 
59 I specifically use the term “governance participation” rather than 
participatory governance, as the latter suggests that governance is constituted 
by its participants, rather than the Mongolian case where the governance 
system appears to be pre-constituted in a pro-mining direction, regardless of 
the participation of civil actors. 
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based alternatives to ameliorate discontent with mining projects, 
particularly in rural areas. A specific narrative of social 
responsibility characterises the post-2014 “inclusive governance” 
paradigm, supposedly shared between “stakeholder” groups and 
informed by global mining governance norms and practices. The 
following section will give a brief overview of key aspects of 
global norms and practices for the social governance of the 
mining sector, which infuse the state’s governance paradigm for 
civil society organisations in Mongolia. This will be followed by 
three key case studies of the transnational transmission of these 
norms and practices into the Mongolian governance context 
through the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), 
the Integrated Mineral Resource Initiative (supported by 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)) 
and the South Gobi Water and Mining Industry Roundtable 
(supported by the World Bank’s IFC).  
Socialising the Market or Marketising the Social? 
Governing “Political Risk” for Mining Projects 
through the Norms and Mechanisms of Corporate 
Social Responsibility 
In 2002, the International Institute of Environment and 
Development (IIED) published a report, Breaking Ground: Mining, 
Minerals and Sustainable Development, on the role of the mining 
industry in relation to ‘the global transition to sustainable 
development’ (IIED, 2002).  The IIED was commissioned by the 
World Business Council at the behest of nine multinational 
mining companies60 to ‘achieve a serious change in the way the 
industry approached today’s problems,’ (IIED, 2016) known as 
the Global Mining Initiative (GMI). The Breaking Ground report 
 
60 The nine companies involved were Anglo-American, BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, 
Codelco, Newmont, Noranda, Phelps Dodge, Placer Dome, WMC Limited. Of 
these nine companies, six (Anglo-American, BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, Phelps 
Dodge, Placer Dome and WMC Limited) have invested in Mongolia’s mineral 
sector.  
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has had a profound shift in affecting the global discourse of 
mining governance towards a connection with social and 
environmental sustainability. Dr. John Groom, representing 
Anglo-American, the mining multinational, in the GMI, reflected in 
2012 (Buxton, 2012: 7) that,  
The drivers for the GMI were a clear recognition that 
mining companies had problems of access to land, and 
access to markets, and cost of capital. The fundamental 
underlying reason was the reputation of the industry. 
To tackle this we would have to work with others and 
improve the way we worked. This is what drove 
[Breaking Ground] and started the process of 
stakeholder engagement. None of the problems have 
gone away, but the dialogue is much better informed 
and infinitely more constructive.  
While the shift in principles has not always led to changed 
practice (Buxton, 2012), it has led to the development of a range 
of norms in the area of corporate socio-environmental 
governance, notably an emphasis on gaining a ‘social license to 
operate,’ local (vs. national) obligations, 
transparency/information sharing, gaining community trust and 
stakeholder participation. These emerging governance norms in 
the wake of the Breaking Ground report have been 
institutionalised globally in important ways by the international 
organisations, financial institutions, development agencies and 
corporate bodies that have played a strategic role in Mongolia’s 
mining governance regime.61 Large multinational mining 
 
61 The United Nations Global Compact provides an overarching framework for 
sustainable businesses, with which specific industry bodies collaborate such as 
the International Council for Mining and Metals, which will be discussed below. 
The United Nations Global Compact has a General Assembly mandate to 
promote ‘responsible business practices and UN values among the global 
business community and the UN system’ (UN Global Compact, 2017), in line 
with the Ruggie Principles on Business and Human Rights. In light of the UN 
Guidelines and Guiding Principles, voluntary frameworks for global finance 
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companies that have been operative in Mongolia, such as Rio 
Tinto and Anglo-American, subscribe to voluntary codes of 
corporate practice promoted by global industry bodies. For 
example, the International Council on Mining and Metals 
(ICMM)62 promotes ten voluntary standards for mining 
companies based on principles of sustainable development, 
making positive social contributions and encouraging 
‘collaborative action between governments, companies and civil 
society’ (ICMM, 2017).  
The World Bank has played a particularly strong role in the 
promulgation of its ‘social development model’ in Mongolia, 
characterised by ‘approaches seeking to engage local stakeholder 
in participatory schemes, new “partnership” initiatives between 
the private sector and civil society, as well as new monitoring 
responsibilities assigned to both the state and the private sector’ 
(Hatcher, 2014: 13). The International Finance Corporation of the 
World Bank63 is a major financier of the Oyu Tolgoi mining 
project, which has led to the introduction of its eight Performance 
Standards on environmental and social sustainability into the 
 
have been created, such as the Equator Principles. As of 2016, eighty-four 
financial institutions have adopted the Equator Principles, which is ‘a risk 
management framework, adopted by financial institutions, for determining, 
assessing and managing environmental and social risk in projects’ (Equator 
Principles, 2017). The Equator Principles are globally applicable in the area of 
project finance and have ‘promoted convergence’ among multilateral financial 
institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
and export credit agencies (ibid). The Equator Principles also incorporate 
World Bank guidelines and IFC standards into its UN-based standard-setting 
regime, reflecting the intertwined nature of these institutional developments 
(Equator Principles, 2013). In a similar vein, international organisations have 
created voluntary frameworks for companies that subscribe to the new ethos 
of social sustainability. In line with the UN framework, the International 
Standards Organisation (ISO) produced a specific voluntary standard in 2010 – 
ISO 26000 – on social responsibility to encourage businesses to ‘go beyond 
legal compliance’ when it comes to ‘contributing to sustainable development 
(ISO, 2014).  
62 The ICMM body itself is the result of the landmark Mining, Minerals and 
Sustainable Development Project, established in 2001. 
63 The IFC is the private arm of the World Bank which finances private-sector 
led economic development.  
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Mongolian governance context. These standards incorporate 
principles of sustained “community engagement” and “impact 
assessment” into the terms of investment contracts with private 
entities and give recourse to a grievance mechanism for 
populations impacted by development projects (i.e., its 
Compliance Advisor Ombudsmen), should a company fail to 
uphold these standards.  
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is 
another significant global governance initiative to promote the 
transparent and accountable management of revenues derived 
from natural resources. It developed out of ‘the intersection of a 
number of complementary agendas and overlapping 
transnational networks, particularly those concerned with 
corruption, conflict, and corporate social responsibility’ (Haufler, 
2010: 54). However, it addresses these concerns through a 
market-based mechanism of ‘disclosure’ (ibid), based on the 
assumption that ‘[transparency] makes markets work more 
efficiently; enhances trust and cooperation; strengthens 
institutions; [and] reduces corruption and mismanagement,’ 
(ibid: 55) among other things.  
The EITI has had a significant degree of influence in shaping 
notions of accountability in Mongolian mining governance. 
However, officially registered in Norway as a non-profit 
organisation, the EITI operates globally. Based on a correlation 
between resource wealth and corruption, the EITI creates an 
international standard whereby participating governments 
disclose the amount that they receive from companies, and these 
companies disclose what they have paid (EITI, 2017). It was 
initiated by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2002, in 
response to an emerging consensus among the global 
development community of international financial institutions, 
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NGOs, and prominent development economists about the 
corruption effect of dependency on natural resources, a key 
element of the “resource curse” (Aaronsen, 2011: 52-53). Thus, 
since its inception, the EITI has been intended by its proponents 
to serve as a global anti-corruption standard. The EITI framework 
has gradually become more comprehensive over time, with the 
introduction of the revised EITI Standard in 2013, which ‘makes 
better linkages to wider reforms’ in each country, according to the 
Head of the EITI Secretariat (Moberg, 2013). This ‘contextual’ 
approach is a hallmark of the revised Standard, which goes 
beyond original reporting expectations, to include balancing what 
governments received overall with what companies paid. The 
revised Standard requires disaggregated reporting, to include 
details of individual payment type as well as specification of 
company, government agency involved and the particular project. 
It also brings SOEs, subnational transfers to local governments 
and social spending by companies into its transparency remit. 
Countries are encouraged to go beyond the minimum reporting 
duties set out in the standard, to include other critical areas of 
governance.  
The idea of a socially responsible extractive industry has also 
been adopted by international development agencies as well as 
global industry and finance bodies. A relevant example of this for 
the Mongolian context particularly is that of the Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the 
German ‘federal enterprise’ that provides ‘international 
cooperation services’ (GIZ, 2017) in over 130 countries. 
Predominantly commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, GIZ also works closely 
with private partners, ‘fostering successful interaction between 
development policy and trade’ (GIZ, 2017b). GIZ’s core value is 
the promotion of sustainable development more generally. In the 
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Mongolian case, this value is expressed through the Integrated 
Mineral Resource Initiative (IMRI) by supporting the creation of 
‘platforms to facilitate constructive communication between the 
local population, local government and businesses’ (GIZ, 2017c). 
Within the multiplicity of institutional contexts for “socially 
responsible” business practice, the mechanisms and norms that 
are proffered for the mining sector reinforce each other and are 
essentially uniform in substance. The mechanisms of making 
mining companies socially responsible in this framework are 
information-sharing systems (including transparent impact 
assessments), multi-stakeholder platforms for dialogue and 
collaborative monitoring processes, which reflect corporate 
values of negotiation and “due diligence.” While many initiatives 
are voluntary, some protocols are enforced through investment 
obligations to financial institutions, such as the International 
Finance Corporation’s Performance Standards. These avenues of 
redress, however, are ‘soft’ in nature, preferring conciliatory 
measures such as mediation rather than the formal adjudication 
of disputes. For example, the World Bank’s CAO is not at third-
party independent mechanism; it reports directly to the President 
of the World Bank and is comprised of World Bank employees. 
Despite the diversity of opportunities for corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and the various levels of obligation 
companies can accede to, I was hard-pressed to identify CSR 
norms and practices in the global governance toolkit that are not 
basically market instruments, ‘strategic tool[s] to achieve 
economic objectives, and ultimately, wealth creation’ (Garriga & 
Mele, 2004: 53). I do not mean to discount the ethical intentions 
of individuals working to enhance the social responsibility of 
mining companies, but I would argue that the material function of 
global CSR norms and mechanisms, at least as practiced so far in 
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the Mongolian mining context, has been to secure access to 
“natural resources” and protect the process of extraction, both in 
mineral and surplus value terms. As Vogel (2005: 2-3) put it in 
The Market for Virtue,  
There are many reasons why some companies choose 
to behave more responsibly or virtuously in the absence 
of legal requirements. Some are strategic, others are 
defensive, still others may be altruistic or public-
spirited… But in the final analysis, CSR is sustainable 
only if virtue pays off. The supply of corporate virtue is 
both made possible and constrained by the market.  
In the following section, I will examine the way that global norms 
and practices have been transmitted into the Mongolian context 
through three key projects: the EITI, GIZ’s Integrated Mineral 
Resource Initiative (IMRI) and the IFC’s South Gobi Water and 
Mining Industry Roundtable (SGWMIR). In particular, I will 
discuss the way that the norms of community engagement and 
collaboration inform the practice of “multi-stakeholder 
management” in the context of these projects, noting the powerful 
role of norm transmission played by the international institutions 
and organisations behind them. These projects have been chosen 
as case studies because they evidence the power of international 
institutions (e.g. IFC) and organisations (e.g. GIZ, EITI) in setting 
standards and introducing new “socially responsible” governance 
practices in the mining sector that have the sanction of the state, 
in contrast with some sections of ‘politicised’ civil society (i.e., the 
River Movements) which have been delegitimised.  
The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative: 
Win-Win-Win?  
What is the [EITI’s] theory of change, as it were? The 
constitution of a multi-stakeholder dialogue and 
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group… to increase accountability and development for 
the country. There are a number of key tangible 
benefits, really. The first is to support evidence-based 
debate. One must agree on the facts and get all three 
stakeholder groups to agree on the basic facts of the 
sector. This makes for good debate and good policy. On 
the other hand, by having these three stakeholder 
groups on these national commissions - multi-
stakeholder groups - one sees a process of trust-
building... We also see a process of improved 
community relations, and perhaps our friends from 
Mongolia can tell us a bit more about this through 
their process of sub-national implementation. By 
collecting information that is relevant to communities, 
one increases the understanding of these communities 
and creates links between national and sub-national 
communities, government and companies. 
- Alex Gordy, EITI Country Manager for East Asia, 
speaking at the G7 Fast Track Partnership 
Conference on the EITI, author observation 
The EITI promotes a multi-stakeholder model of accountability 
through an anti-corruption framework. It creates opportunities 
for some form of accountability within a market-based paradigm, 
through the production of transparent information about revenue 
payments and receipts in resource-rich economies (Haufler, 
2010). However, a significant underlying motive of this 
transparency drive is to remove political risk from the business 
environment, by targeting state corruption. As Aaronsen explains 
in relation to the ‘limited partnership’ of the EITI (2011: 51), 
‘corporate executives are increasingly aware that corruption not 
only affects profits, but also increases business risk.’ Notably, the 
framework of corruption that animates the EITI focuses on 
holders of public power (i.e., state institutions), although private 
companies are encouraged to declare their payments as well.  
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The EITI has been increasingly recognised as a ‘founding 
principle’ (Sh. Tsend-Ayush, Ministry of Mining quoted in Carter 
and Davaanyum 2015b) to shape accountable state-society 
relations in the development of Mongolia’s mining policy. The 
EITI in Mongolia is comprised of two multi-stakeholder 
organisations – the National Council and the Working Group – 
and a national office of the EITI Secretariat based in Ulaanbaatar. 
Sub-national Working Groups are in the process of being 
established within mining regions, to expand the EITI to inform 
‘dialogue between mining companies, mine-affected communities 
and local government’ (Adam Smith International, 2014).  
The National Council functions as the coordinating and 
monitoring body of the EITI, chaired by the Prime Minister and 
his deputy, the Minister of Mining, with a mandate to meet at least 
once a year. Civil society, industry and governmental 
stakeholders are equally represented on the Council with ten 
seats respectively. The Working Group functions as the main site 
of EITI governance implementation, meeting at least four times a 
year. Similar to the National Council, each group of stakeholders – 
civil, corporate and governmental – are equally represented in a 
body of thirty-three members. In a recent Asia Pacific Memo 
(Carter and Davaanyam, 2015), the Stakeholder Superintendent 
at Oyu Tolgoi LLC described the EITI as a ‘platform where 
government, civil society and extractive company sit together in 
equal level, with equal rights, with equal responsibility.’  
The EITI’s multi-stakeholder approach creates institutional space 
for the expression of interests related to mining, representing 
different sectors – economic, political, civil – and also the specific 
agendas of powerful organisations from that triad. The emphasis 
on equality of standing and responsibility appears to offer a 
significant political opportunity for civil organisations to address 
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political and economic actors from a position of strength. At one 
level, this is true: the EITI is a helpful institutional development in 
the sense of tracing revenue flows and mitigating bare-faced 
corruption on the part of the state or mining companies.  
However, apart from counting numbers within the agreed 
framework, the EITI does not offer a platform to contest the way 
in which accumulation or redistribution of mineral rents occurs 
in the first place. It functions as an oversight mechanism and a 
data generator, which arguably also contributes to the stability of 
the investment environment by giving other investors indicators 
of the state’s corruption performance. Furthermore, information 
and data tend to be portrayed in the EITI in technical terms, but 
agreeing on “facts” is not a simple exercise. Furthermore, the anti-
corruption framework of the multi-stakeholder model of the EITI 
reinforces clear divisions between political (government), 
economic (industry) and social (civil) arenas. The reality of 
hybridised governance in the mining sector, with corporate 
actors having increasing influence, particularly in the 
implementation of governance at the level of impact, means that 
the actual configuration of power in the mining sector is not 
adequately conceptualised – or held to account – in the EITI’s tri-
partite framework.  
As one mechanism of many, the EITI’s limited focus on 
transparency may be appropriate and helpful. However, the EITI 
is the major “accountability” institution in Mongolia’s mining 
sector at the national level, and has recently been introduced at 
the sub-national level. This is an incredibly powerful position for 
a global governance framework to hold in relation to Mongolia’s 
mining governance regime. The EITI’s narrow focus on 
developing cross-sector consensus on financial data and revenue 
transfers averts attention from broader processes of 
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entanglement between the state and investors within the new 
extractive political economy (see Chapter Four).  
The Integrated Mineral Resource Initiative and the 
GIZ: Institutionalising Multi-Stakeholder Norms 
and Practices in the Mining Sector64 
For long-term sustainable development, it is of utmost 
importance that all Mongolians can benefit from their 
country's resource wealth. Therefore, it is crucial to 
have in place a reliable business environment and to 
ensure good governance. Let me repeat. It is crucial to 
have in place a reliable business environment and to 
ensure good governance…The German EITI 
partnership fits well into our bilateral cooperation 
with Mongolia to support sustainable development 
[for] almost 25 years.  
- H. E. Gerard Thiedemann, Ambassador of the 
Federal Republic of Germany to Mongolia, 
speaking at the G7 Fast Track Partnership 
Conference on the EITI, author observation 
The GIZ, Germany’s development implementation agency, has 
played a key role in supporting the EITI in Mongolia since 2014 
under the auspices of its Integrated Mineral Resource Initiative 
(IMRI). Initially, in 2010, the GIZ’s work in Mongolia was mainly 
focused on supporting the Mongolian government through its 
Investment Policy Advisory Service programme, as well as 
working with mining companies on their CSR efforts. This 
programme was expanded in terms of its remit and financing 
following a visit from the German Minister for Development and 
 
64 The data for this section was acquired through attendance at the GIZ-
sponsored ‘G7 Fast-Track Partnership Conference on the EITI’, November 10-
11th 2015, analysis of GIZ promotional publications for the Integrated Mineral 
Resources Initiative (IMRI), and an interview with a senior representative from 
the IMRI project.  
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Economic Cooperation, Dirk Niebel. Minister Niebel advocated 
that an additional three million euros be committed ‘for advisory 
services and training in connection with development-oriented 
use of Mongolia’s mineral deposits’ (BMZ, 2010). In a meeting 
with the Mongolian Minister for Mineral Resources and Energy he 
stated that, 
The best poverty reduction tool is endogenous 
economic development. The mineral resources sector is 
the key to this. We want to support Mongolian efforts 
to exploit the country’s resources in an 
environmentally responsible way so that there are 
lasting benefits for the population. At the same time it 
is important to note that the rule of law and good 
governance constitute essential conditions that are 
vitally necessary when trying to woo foreign investors, 
particularly medium-sized enterprises. (ibid) 
While Germany itself has no mining companies and is closing its 
own coal industry in 2018, the IMRI supports broad-based social 
and economic development through ‘capacity building’ in public 
institutions and providing expertise on the sustainable 
management of mineral revenues (GIZ, 2017c). Prior to the 
elections in 2012, the IMRI worked primarily with a partner 
agency in the government – the National Development Innovation 
Committee – which was directed by the Prime Minister’s office. 
Following the disbanding of this committee in 2012 after the 
election, the IMRI shifted focus from national level governance to 
supporting sub-national administrations in Mongolia’s aimags to 
engage with mining companies, local businesses and civil society 
organisations in their jurisdictions. However, the IMRI is still 
supported institutionally by the Ministry of Industry and the 
Ministry of Mining.  
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The IMRI provides training and support for each of four 
stakeholder groups in sub-national jurisdictions (mining 
companies, local businesses, civil society organisations and 
government) to enable a relatively even plane of negotiation, 
which was the initial focus of the programme (2011-2014). The 
purpose of this training and support is ultimately to enable the 
formation of ‘multi-stakeholder platforms’ (GIZ, 2015) and to 
facilitate ‘public-private dialogue’ under the rubric of the 
Integrated Community Development Partnership (ICDP) concept 
(GIZ, 2015: 3-7). The aimag administrations are supposed to hold 
the “public” position in the dialogue, and the three other 
stakeholders are treated as “private.” In the ICDP concept, each 
stakeholder group is supposed to constitute itself 
organisationally and choose representatives who will engage in 
the facilitated negotiation of an “Inclusive Sustainability 
Agreement,” as a basis for negotiating LDAs as required by 
national law.  
The ICDP concept and platform has a unique place among other 
multi-stakeholder initiatives led by donor organisations in 
Mongolia, which tend to focus on specific issues or groups, such 
as revenue transparency, environmental civil society and herders’ 
rights. In contrast, the ICDP concept extends multi-stakeholder 
dialogue to a new level by trying to institutionalise its 
organisation and practice in a way that includes most local issues 
related to the mining sector: effective public governance, the 
functionality of the local economy, sustainability of the 
environment and local social priorities. The rationale of the 
“inclusive” aspect of the ICDP maintains that the solution to the 
economic, environmental and social problems that arise with 
mining must be collective and collaborative. According to a senior 
representative at the IMRI (author interview), this collaborative 
approach can be a challenge to develop in practice, given the 
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reality of power disparities between different stakeholder 
groups:  
It’s not possible to solve [all these problems] as an 
individual stakeholder group. “One against the other” 
clearly doesn’t work. No matter how loud they shout 
and how radical their activities are, people understand 
that it needs a kind of inclusive approach… The 
problem is that their relationships are clearly 
asymmetrical. Asymmetrical when it comes to 
knowledge, when it comes to power, when it comes to 
money, when it comes to other resources. 
Consequently, the express purpose of the first phase of the ICDP 
project was to develop the negotiating power of each stakeholder 
group prior to a multi-stakeholder dialogue so that its outcomes 
could be as fair as possible:  
We find it necessary to create some sort of 
fundamental basic principle knowledge of the topics 
[to be negotiated] before we send them into the arena, 
so that they have a reasonable chance to meet on a 
level playing field and understand each other and 
speak the same language… (ibid) 
In this way, the IMRI ‘aims at a harmonisation of interests 
between these interdependent actors in the public and private 
sectors’ (GIZ, 2015: 5). Similar to the EITI, the aim of the IMRI is 
to create a sense of mutual interest between civic, state and 
corporate actors. However, the model of “public-private dialogue” 
resembles a private negotiation of a contract, where each actor is 
responsible to negotiate their position and the outcome is a just 
one, as long as each party has sufficient resources and knowledge. 
Similar to Local Development Agreements (see Chapter Four), the 
ICDP concept that underpins the IMRI rests on the ambiguous 
notion of “stakeholding.” While the IMRI has made a laudable 
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effort to ‘level the playing field,’ it contains social conflict in 
mining-impacted regions within a distinctly business-like mode of 
deliberation, representation and decision-making, vis-à-vis the 
interaction of “stakeholders.” As Crane et al. (2008: 90) put it,  
The notion of a “stakeholder” is, on the surface, very 
simple, but at heart, deceptively complex. 
Despite being ubiquitous in corporate governance and 
management discourses, the process of determining ‘what 
constitutes a legitimate stake, and how different stakes should be 
evaluated’ (ibid) is far from straightforward. As White (1996: 7) 
argues, there are two questions related to who participates and 
what level of participation a stake gives to its holder. This 
process-related complexity is particularly exacerbated when the 
concept is deployed beyond the boundaries of a corporate 
organisation, to include diverse groups of actors with non-
economic stakes in the future of a mining project. Particularly 
when the coordinator or initiator of “multi-stakeholder 
negotiations,” such as GIZ, is not local to the “community,” there 
are serious risks that local complexities and hierarchies (e.g., 
gender, livelihood base, political affiliations, age) will not be 
recognised in the formulation of stakeholder groupings (see also, 
Li, 2007: 192-229).  
In this sense, the stakeholder concept is an imposed concept: it is 
not indigenous to local social or political institutions but derives 
its value from its “business-friendly” association with corporate 
governance. While the stakeholder framework may be 
appropriate for intra-organisational conflict in companies where 
employees are already participants in the organisation, it poses 
significant normative and practical problems when laid over pre-
existing socio-political governance arrangements. For example, 
employee stakes in an organisation are mediated clearly by 
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employment status and contractual relations with the employer. 
In contrast, the determination of stakeholder status for a 
particular project within a representative democratic system of 
national governance is a deeply ambivalent process. It is difficult 
to draw boundaries around the sphere of impact, particularly for 
large mining projects, and even when boundaries are decided 
upon, it is yet another ethical and practical question of how to 
engage stakeholders in a participatory process. Who is engaged? 
On what terms? Participation, as White (1996: 7) argues, ‘can 
take on multiple forms and serve many different interests.’ This 
dilemma is particularly exacerbated in light of the fact that, in the 
case of the IMRI, it is an influential Western development 
organisation doing the “engaging” with rural populations. 
Not only does the concept of stakeholder participation obscure 
the very political process of “multi-stakeholder negotiations” in 
general, but more specifically displaces “community” relations 
from their social context and into a new market-friendly 
arrangement. Despite the “social” and “community” discourse, 
these arrangements are a unique technique of governance for the 
purposes of protecting the mining economy from political risk. As 
Li (2007: 234) puts it, the emphasis on community in the 
governance of development projects belies a deeply political 
motivation, that of making ‘collective existence intelligible and 
calculable’ for the purposes of risk assessment.  
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The International Finance Corporation and the 
Multi-Stakeholder Water Management in Mining 
Project65: Critiquing the “Social” Power of Mining 
Companies  
‘If you have the social license to operate, all the 
[mining] activities will go better, right?’ (IFC 
Consultant A, author interview) 
As discussed earlier, the IFC occupies a strategic place in the 
global governance of mining projects through its Performance 
Standards, which are social and environmental responsibility 
obligations enforced through investment contracts for 
development projects. In Mongolia particularly, the World Bank 
Group as a whole66 has been an active institutional agent in the 
formation of Mongolia’s mining regime (Hatcher, 2014: 140). As 
described in Chapter Two, the World Bank played a pivotal role in 
the development of Mongolia’s 1997 Minerals Law and inaugural 
investment conference that same year. Since then, the World 
Bank has provided critical institutional development assistance 
and foreign direct investment promotion in conjunction with the 
government of Mongolia, ‘targeting the overall policy, fiscal, legal, 
regulatory and institutional frameworks for the mining and 
extractive sectors’ (ibid: 111). Furthermore, as a major financier 
of the Oyu Tolgoi project, the IFC has become a key institutional 
actor in the area of socio-environmental governance as its CSR 
standards have been introduced into the Mongolian context 
through this nationally strategic project. The Oyu Tolgoi project is 
 
65 The data for this section has been acquired through cited IFC publications 
and in-depth interviews with IFC consultants on this project.  
66 The World Bank Group includes the World Bank (national development 
assistance), the International Finance Corporation (development through 
investment in the private sector) and Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (political risk insurance guarantees for private investors and lenders).  
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also insured by the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency.67  
In 2012, the IFC initiated the first phase of its South Gobi Water 
and Mining Industry Roundtable (SGWMIR) project after 
consultation with its client, Oyu Tolgoi, in the context of growing 
conflict between the company and local residents around water 
and other issues of socio-environmental impact. For example, in 
December 2012, a group of herders impacted by the Oyu Tolgoi 
project made a complaint to the Compliance Advisor Ombudsmen 
of the World Bank Group. Soon thereafter, in 2013, the khural of 
Umnogov aimag passed a resolution to ban the use of 
groundwater for mining projects,68 in the context of growing 
public anxiety about the depletion of water resources. Following 
the 2013 legal conflict around groundwater, an IFC Discussion 
Paper (Darling et al., 2014: 34) stated that ‘mining companies 
realised they needed a platform to identify shared challenges, 
successes and common ground for collaboration on the social and 
technical management of water in the South Gobi.’  
The SGWMIR project set up two roundtables for mining 
companies in the South Gobi region, one for company ‘decision-
makers’ and another for ‘boots on the ground’ (ibid) staff who 
work in areas like community relations. The goal of both 
roundtables was ‘three-dimensional’: to 1.) develop ‘short and 
medium-term action plans to improve internal alignment’ 2.) ‘use 
multidirectional communications on water management’ and 3.) 
 
67 Political risk insurance offered by MIGA covers ‘five non-commercial risks’: 
1. currency inconvertibility and transfer restrictions, 2. expropriation by the 
state, 3. war, terrorism and civil disturbance, 4. State breach of contract, and 5. 
Non-honouring of financial obligations. (MIGA, 2015) Notably, demand for 
‘political risk insurance products’ has doubled since 2010 (MIGA, 2015b.) 
68 Umnogov aimag is the most intensive region of extraction in Mongolia, given 
the volumes and range of minerals – coal, copper, gold – that lie in this large 
region of the Gobi desert. At least thirteen mining companies are currently 
operating in the province, which is home to two of the largest mining projects 
in the world: Oyu Tolgoi (copper and gold) and Tavan Tolgoi (coking coal). 
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‘co-managing knowledge and other resources with other 
decision-makers’ (ibid: 8) which correspond with shared risks, 
shared realities and shared responsibilities. ‘Internal alignment’ 
refers to ‘raising awareness of the responsibilities, realities, and 
risks of water management across business functions’ (ibid). 
Amongst other things, internal alignment entailed a process of 
information sharing between mining companies about water 
management techniques and engaging in what is called ‘peer-to-
peer learning’ (ibid: 34). The aim of this process was to 
standardise mining companies’ approach to water management 
by developing ‘symmetric standards and policies’ (ibid). This 
process culminated in February 2016 with the signing of a 
Voluntary Code of Practice (VCP) by eight mining companies 
operating in the South Gobi. 
Among the signatories of the VCP are significant operators in the 
Gobi, including Oyu Tolgoi, Erdenet Tavan Tolgoi and Energy 
Resources. These three major mining companies are all in receipt 
of financing from either the IFC or the European Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development, which entails social and 
environmental responsibilities through investment performance 
standards. The VCP includes nineteen obligations which cover 
participatory monitoring programmes, grievance mechanisms for 
residents, the impact of mining on water for pastureland, the 
transparent measurement and publication of water data ‘in a 
format accessible to local communities’ (Elbegsaikhan, 2016). The 
Government of Canada, the EBRD and the International Council 
on Mining and Metals provided external support for the 
development of the VCP (IFC, 2016), again highlighting the role of 
international institutions and organisations in providing the 
institutional foundation for “socially responsible mining.” 
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The implications of this development are significant in the sense 
that it evidences the normative standard-setting power of global 
governance actors like the IFC and the institutional consolidation 
of corporate power in a strategic extractive region. Rather than 
having mining companies at odds with each other, the SGWMIR 
sought to enable collaboration between companies over their 
shared “risk” as water-dependent companies. The project also 
sought to standardise their approach to operate as a semi-
cohesive bloc in relation to regional water governance. More 
specifically, in the case of Mongolia, the development of corporate 
roundtables through the SGWMIR directly enhances their 
lobbying power on the multi-stakeholder councils for the newly 
formed River Basin Administrations (RBAs) which allocate 
permits for medium to large-scale water use (i.e., for mining 
projects). This is an implicit part of the IFC strategy. Notably, the 
World Bank has supplied the development funding for the 
creation of three strategic RBAs in the South Gobi through its 
Mining Infrastructure Investment Support Project (P118109). 
These are the most controversial RBAs, given the extent of power 
local governments have to lose through the delegation of 
decision-making authority to these new administrations which 
are supposedly determined by hydrological as opposed to 
political boundaries (IFC Consultant B, September 2014). One of 
the hoped-for outcomes of the SGWMIR was to institutionalise 
representation of the companies involved in the consultative 
councils for the RBAs (ibid). 
The second dimension of the SGWMIR focused on mining 
companies’ communication strategies with the local population 
and soum/aimag authorities. The amelioration of anxiety about 
water through dialogue with local residents is seen by the IFC as 
crucial to the stability of mining projects. According to the IFC’s 
2014 Water, Mining and Communities report, gaining ‘tacit 
247 
 
community approval of a project, specifically around water and a 
company’s stewardship of it, can play a direct role in a 
government’s decision to grant additional exploration or mining 
licenses and necessary water use permits’ (IFC, 2014: 15). The 
IFC puts this ‘social and political license’ forward as an important 
‘value driver’ for companies to engage (ibid). One of the core 
stated objectives of using ‘multidirectional communication’ is to 
use ‘communication and engagement as a form of risk 
management’ (ibid: 25) In this framework, companies produce 
objective and scientific knowledge about water, whilst still 
engaging with ‘trust and empathy’ (ibid) to ‘assuage fears, 
suspicions and anxieties.’ (ibid: 17).  
Thirdly, not only must the local nomads’ perceptions be adjusted 
to face “the facts,” but they are offered the opportunity to become 
co-managers with mining companies through participatory 
monitoring. The logic of ‘co-managing knowledge and other 
resources’ (ibid: 8) is evidently supposed to develop a sense of 
shared responsibility for the future of water. For example, in 
addition to participatory monitoring in the South Gobi as part of 
the SGWMIR project, an Integrated Water Resource Management 
training module (ibid: 35) was offered by the companies to 
‘broader stakeholder groups – government, civil society, 
communities, academia and media’ for the purpose of ‘building 
knowledge for informed and increased co-management of water.’ 
The Report (ibid: 17) puts it this way:  
Educating the community about technical aspects of 
mining and water, understanding traditional beliefs 
and the community’s use of water, incorporating those 
values and uses into water management, and providing 
opportunities for stakeholders to participate in the 
development and monitoring of water plans can reduce 
misconceptions. 
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The SGWMIR is thus imbued with the global discourse of CSR, 
particularly through the distinctively “social” – as opposed to 
political – language of “community”, “social license” and 
“participation.” The inherent hierarchy of the relationship created 
by the imbalance in economic and discursive power between 
large-scale mining companies and the predominantly pastoralist 
residents of the South Gobi is not overtly addressed within this 
conception of their “social” relationship. The SGWMIR is framed 
by the IFC as a “win-win” solution for companies and 
communities, without an evaluation of how such an initiative 
could expand and consolidate the influence of the private sector 
on critical aspects of water governance and the terms of its 
contestation.  
Drawing on the discussion of the IMRI case study, there is strong 
reason to be wary of the language of community and participation 
in the SGWMIR project. It obscures the reality of ‘boundary work’ 
(Li, 2007) in these “collaborations,” where conflicted relations are 
re-translated into collaborative terms without transforming the 
‘material roots’ (Li, 2007: 263) of the conflict. Even though the IFC 
and corporate facilitators of a participatory process like the 
SWGMIR may put the community at centre stage in the name of 
autonomy, participation and empowerment, the deeper function 
of such initiatives is evidenced in the motivations of the project 
initiators. As the quotes from the IFC Report (2014) indicate, the 
driving purpose of the SWGMIR, like many participatory 
programmes initiated by the World Bank (see Li, 2007: 230-269), 
is to “help” local communities learn ‘how to conduct themselves 
in competitive arenas, and [make] appropriate choices’ (ibid: 
263) in the context of a market economy.  
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Summary of Case Studies 
In the Mongolian context, the emerging global framework of 
norms and practices around what is considered socially 
responsible corporate behaviour has been influential in shaping 
the way that mining companies systematically engage with 
Mongolian citizens. In the absence of a national legislative 
framework for the impacts of mining on critical aspects of rural 
social life (i.e., herding livelihoods, the cultural and spiritual value 
of land and water) (Erdenebolor & Baigal, 2012),69 international 
institutions and organisations have introduced global governance 
norms and mechanisms in conjunction with investors and mining 
companies to ameliorate conflict around mining projects. The 
localisation of the social impacts of mining implicates the state 
because of its active role in limiting these conflicts to provincial 
and regional spaces of negotiation. In turn, this localisation has 
enabled the entry of global governance norms into rural political 
environments.  
The amelioration of local social conflict by IFIs and international 
organisations has introduced a new “social” frame to corporate-
citizen relations that still operates along (political) lines of 
exclusion-inclusion. For example, groups of residents impacted by 
mining projects become the “affected community,” but the 
boundaries about who is included in “the community” are 
determined on a case by case basis in the context of negotiations 
between companies and local representatives (Erdenebolor & 
Baigal, 2012).  This process naturally depends upon political 
decisions about which level of local government to engage, which 
civil society organisations to include and which ‘other’ 
community groups to recognise as legitimate representative of 
the “community” (ibid: x). Fundamentally, the substance of 
 
69 Apart from the provision for local development agreements in the Minerals 
Law (see Chapter Four) and the new template for LDAs, there is no specific 
legislation to address or assess the social impacts of mining.  
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Mongolian citizenship for rural communities is in the balance, as 
corporate and state institutions and actors try to find 
collaborative solutions to the problem of local “political risk” to 
mining projects. The reality is that the ideal of multi-stakeholder 
negotiations are, in fact, riven by local hierarchies around 
“community” representation, not helped by the local perception 
of inequality in their treatment by different mining companies 
(ibid: vi).  
The coercive quality of projects like the SWGMIR and the IMRI is 
subtle, as they contrast with the top-down mode of state 
bureaucratic planning backed by military power, characteristic of 
the socialist period of state transformation. However, in the new 
era of the extractive market economy, these social governance 
schemes have their own coercive power, seeking influence over 
local knowledge, consent and cooperation, exercised through 
economic forms of material and normative power. ‘Empowerment 
is still a relationship of power’ (Li, 2007: 275), just as 
participation is an inherently political issue: ‘there are always 
questions to be asked about who is involved, how, and on whose 
terms’ (White, 1996: 14). The fairly ubiquitous notion of 
“community capacity building” – i.e., ‘that communities need to be 
enabled to actively present and protect their interests’ 
(Erdenebolor & Baigal, 2012: vii) – uncritically accepts the 
governing power in that “empowerment.” Furthermore, 
“community” access to corporate processes of recognition and 
redress is usually determined by whether or not they have 
experienced “direct” or “indirect” impact by the project or by 
having a special status.  Again, this depends upon recognition by 
the company and the strategic representation of impacted 
populations by their political representatives and NGOs, as a 2012 
research study of ‘social impacts and stakeholder interactions’ in 
mining-impact areas attested (ibid).  
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For example, herders impacted by a mining project may be given 
special group status by a company even in the absence of state 
recognition.70 The standards against which claims can be made by 
communities are based on one or a combination of the following: 
the company’s private principles, global industry values and 
shareholder standards imposed through investment contracts on 
the company (for specific examples of claims, see Gobi Soil NGO 
2013; 2013b; CAO, 2017). In this way, mining companies and 
banks can become political and juridical actors in the governance 
of sub-national claims, depending on the orientation of the 
particular company to the global governance milieu of norms and 
mechanisms. The spread of corporate norms and mechanisms 
does not occur evenly across all mining projects in Mongolia, but 
substantively depends upon the company involved, its obligations 
to its shareholders and particular organisational ethos. While 
utilising multi-stakeholder channels may have strategic value for 
local residents and civil society organisations in the short-term, 
the trajectory of a consensus-based terrain for state-corporate-
civic relations, backed by the state’s coercive power, is more 
significant for this thesis.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have analysed the process by which parameters 
for civic engagement in the governance of the mining sector 
following the crisis of foreign investment in 2012-2013 have been 
established through state action and corporate initiatives. The 
crack-down on confrontational protest and resistance to 
widespread mining coincided neatly with the government’s 
renewed commitment to stabilising the investment environment 
from the unstable influence of “nationalist” politicians in 
 
70 This is especially the case where companies are financed by institutions such 
as the IFC or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which 
have specific protocols for dealing with impacts on people with ‘land-based’ 
livelihoods (i.e., IFC Performance Standard 1). 
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Parliament and “corrupt” local governments under the 2014 State 
Policy on the Minerals Sector. This stabilisation impetus also 
extended to non-state institutions, particularly dissident NGOs 
and social movements that had engaged in and encouraged direct 
action protests against the government and specific mining 
projects. Major donor organisations withdrew financial and 
political support to these associations, which were ultimately 
side-lined within the Mongolian Environmental Civil Council 
following the arrest and imprisonment of five River Movement 
leaders under charges of environmental terrorism. This violent 
closure of political space for dissident civic mobilisation has left 
consensus-based alternatives, primarily informed by global 
norms and mechanisms, as the dominant modus operandus. 
These consensual frameworks, exemplified in the three case 
studies examined in the second half of this chapter, may have 
some immediate utility for mining-affected populations, but are 
fundamentally part of an enabling constitutional framework for 
extractive development. The “social” has been effectively co-
opted into the apparatus of pro-extractive governance, despite 
the rhetoric of inclusion and “community engagement.” The 
implications of the state’s stabilisation agenda in the extractive 
sector for the overall democratic constitution of the Mongolian 
state will be analysed further in the next chapter.  
  
253 
 
Chapter Six (Conclusion)  
New Constitutionalism on the ‘Final Frontier’: 
Some Implications for the National 
Democratic State of Mongolia 
 
Introduction 
 Mongolian politicians have now learnt the lesson 
that they can damage the economy with too much 
resource nationalism. 
-  O. Chuluunbat, Former Vice-Minister of 
Economic Development (quoted in Oxford 
Business Group, 2015) 
The previous four chapters provided an empirical overview of 
Mongolia’s integration into the global minerals economy through 
the lens of state transformation and transnational legal ordering. 
The overarching theme running through all four chapters is the 
negotiation of the state’s relationship with capital over time: 1.) 
through the transition to industrial capitalism and alignment with 
the Soviet Union (1921-1990); 2.) in the post-socialist context of 
democratisation and dependency upon multilateral financial 
institutions; 3.) through dependency on foreign direct investment 
and mineral exports; and 4.) by consolidating Mongolia’s 
reputation as a competitive and stable destination for foreign 
investment in the mining sector. Chapter Two set out the 
historical complementarity between state formation, production, 
and accumulation in the Mongolian context, noting that the 
creation of an economic sphere as separate to the political was a 
gradual process achieved during the socialist period. The post-
socialist transition process institutionalised and deepened this 
separation through the marketisation of Mongolia’s economy in 
the early 1990s. Chapter Three provided a chronological 
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overview of the main legal and political dimensions of investor-
state conflict between 1994 and 2014, specifically the way that 
the revisions of the mining regime reflected a form of 
constitutional bargaining between the state, and its national 
political constituency (voters) and its transnational economic 
constituency (foreign investors). In 2012-2013, Mongolia suffered 
a major crisis of foreign direct investment in its mining sector as a 
result of investor backlash against the alleged “resource 
nationalism” of the state, which was compounded by the 
downturn in global commodity prices for minerals and Mongolia’s 
huge burden. I argue that the “economic” crisis of FDI functioned 
as a constitutional crucible to strongly shape, if not resolve, the 
conflicted sense of national and global priorities within the state, 
firmly establishing the primacy of protecting the flow of global 
capital, along with investors’ rights and preferences, over other 
socio-political interests and economic possibilities. The state’s 
primary dependency on foreign capital consolidated the global 
ordering process that had begun following Mongolia’s integration 
into the global minerals market as an exporter of primary 
commodities in the late 1990s. 
In Chapters Four and Five, I analysed institutional and normative 
reordering processes along three different axes of state power: 
within the central state itself (intra-institutional); between 
national and sub-national levels of government (inter-
institutional); and between the state and civil society (state-
society relations). Some might argue that these three axes of 
reordering could be analysed as separate phenomena, but I argue 
that they make comprehensive sense in relation to an underlying 
reorientation of the state to transnational capital in the context of 
global economic integration. The Mongolian navigation of its 
“global” position in relation to transnational capital investment is 
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the underlying social context in which these three distinct but 
interrelated programmes of reform took place.  
This chapter concludes the thesis by examining the overall 
processes and implications of the current “global capitalist” phase 
of state transformation in Mongolia. The 2014 legal and policy 
reforms in the mining sector, where the state reverted to a liberal 
model of economic regulation, should be understood as a process 
of transnational legal ordering (Shaffer, 2014), with significant 
constitutional implications for the democratic state of Mongolia. 
Despite the ongoing inter-dependency of capitalist accumulation 
and the legal-political frameworks provided by the state, there 
are losses for national democratic forms of the state as it 
reorients towards accumulation strategies based on harnessing 
global capital flows. I will firstly argue that the 2014 reforms to 
Mongolia’s mining regime should be conceptualised as a 
transnational legal ordering process, and then outline the 
democratic losses and risks at stake in such a transformation.  
Transnational Legal Ordering 
As I outlined in Chapter One, integrating into the global economy 
requires a huge amount of political and legal change for national 
states, so much so that economic integration has been framed in 
the literature as an emergent form of “new constitutionalism” 
because of its ‘constitution-like’ (Schneiderman, 2013: 6; 
Schneiderman, 2008) characteristics and effects (i.e., redrawing 
the boundary of legitimate state action in the economy). In 
Chapter One, I indicated some of the legal dimensions of 
economic integration into the global minerals economy. I 
highlighted aspects of domestic legal reform and entry into a 
complex ‘interlocking web of rules and rule-enforcing structures’ 
(Schneiderman, 2008: 25) that exists in the transnational space of 
international economic law, bilateral and multilateral investment 
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treaties and contracts, “soft” global governance norms, and cross-
border commercial transactions. As Shaffer (2014: 4) proposes, 
transnational law generally refers to ‘legal norms that apply 
across borders to parties located in more than one jurisdiction.’ 
This helpfully includes not only public and private international 
law as separate categories, but also the ‘interaction of publicly 
and privately made law’ (ibid, emphasis added). A complex array 
of regulatory norms regulate the global economy, some public, 
some private, some binding, some non-binding. According to 
Shaffer (ibid: 1-2), viewing global economic integration as a 
transnational legal ordering process recognises the way that 
‘these norms are constructed, carried and conveyed, always 
confronting national and local processes, which may block, adapt, 
translate or appropriate a transnational legal norm.’  
The socio-legal approach to the study of transnational legal 
ordering tends to focus on transnational norms as a ‘source of 
legal change within a national legal system’ (ibid: 5). In the 
Mongolian context, I have examined the way that the stability of 
the legal and political environment has become a normative 
prerequisite for law and policy-making in the mining regime in 
the context of the FDI crisis in 2012-2013. The primacy of 
stability, not only as a guiding principle for law and policy 
development but also as a catalyst for structural reform, indicates 
that a more profound transformation has occurred within the 
institutions of the state in relation to the market. In his book, 
Transnational Legal Ordering and State Change (2014), Gregory 
Shaffer outlines five ‘dimensions of state change’ that indicate a 
process of transnational legal ordering (TLO) (2014: 23). Before 
outlining these dimensions, it is important to note that the 
process-approach to TLO emphasises the ‘production of legal 
norms and institutional forms in particular fields and their 
migration across borders, regardless of whether they address 
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transnational activities or purely national ones’ (ibid: 6). It is 
consequently a ‘methodological concept’ that provides ‘an 
analytic means for assessing transnationally induced change in a 
globalised world’ (ibid: 7). In the Mongolian case, I am interested 
in the way that global economic norms, specifically political risk 
mitigation (i.e. regarding the stability of the political and legal 
environment), have effectively penetrated Mongolian law, policy-
making, and state-society relations. Shaffer (ibid: 12) notes that 
transformations can equally be said to occur whether it is a 
symbolic legal change (‘on the books in terms of constitutional, 
statutory or administrative law revisions, or the creation or 
restructuring of agencies and courts’) or a change in ‘legal and 
organisational practice’ (emphasis added). Given that the 2014 
“stability reforms” in the Mongolian mining regime were 
relatively recent, it is difficult to determine concrete practical 
effects, apart from the apparent redistribution of decision-making 
authority within the state, new roles in governance for the mining 
sector, and the institutionalisation of civil society. The long-term 
practical effects of these changes should be the subject of further 
study at a later stage. However, for the purposes of this thesis, the 
recognition of significant symbolic change and indications of 
limited practical effects for the state is sufficient within Shaffer’s 
framework to constitute a process of transnational legal ordering. 
As previously mentioned, Shaffer’s analytic framework for TLO 
has five dimensions, which can be expressed in ‘symbolic’ and/or 
‘practical’ modes. These are: 
1. Changes in substantive law and practice; 
2. Changes in the boundary between the state, 
the market, and other forms of social 
ordering; 
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3. Changes in the institutional architecture of 
the state; 
4. Changes in professional expertise and 
expertise’s role in governance; and  
5. Changes in associational patterns, 
institutionalised through transnational 
accountability mechanisms with their 
accompanying normative frames (ibid: 23).  
The following section will briefly situate the empirical findings of 
the previous three chapters within Shaffer’s analytical framework 
in order to indicate the extent of an overall reordering process 
within the Mongolian state, before assessing its implications and 
concluding the thesis. Shaffer’s framework of transnational legal 
ordering provides a nuanced analytical lens to identify multiple 
transnational processes and agents that can impact the state, both 
institutionally and normatively. As I explained in Chapter One, the 
notion of transnational legal ordering offers a way to move 
beyond the binaries (i.e. national/international, local/global, 
public/private, political/economic) which have shaped the 
majority of our language for law, capital, and the state. It also 
emphasises the way that the laws of exchange and ‘acquisitive 
motives’ have ascended to a position of dominance in terms of 
organising social relations in market economies (Ebner, 2011: 21; 
Polanyi, 1944/2001: 71-72). As Ebner (2011: 22) puts it,  
Contract serves as the decisive feature of this dis-
embedded economic sphere. Indeed, the rules and 
regulations of exchange constitute the institutional 
order of the market process.  
Stabilising Mongolia’s Investment Environment as a 
Process of Transnational Legal Ordering 
In the context of Mongolia’s mining regime, I argue that a 
significant re-ordering shift is demonstrable since the 2012-2013 
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crisis of investment/investor confidence. Since this crisis, the 
power of investors in relation to the state has prevailed politically 
and institutionally. Consequently, institutions within the state 
that provide the necessary architecture for a favourable 
investment environment have been strengthened, while those 
that are seen to threaten investor interests (e.g. through the 
politicisation of mining investment) have been neutralised. Intra-
state neutralisation was the subject of Chapter Four, in which 
various institutional loci of resistance, particularly legislative and 
deliberative organs of national and sub-national government, 
were curtailed. A major consequence of the new stability 
consensus within the state was the targeting of conflictual civil 
society organisations, which were increasingly perceived as 
agents of political risk and instability between 2004 and 2013. 
The criminalisation of a few environmental activists and the 
‘mainstreaming’ of NGO engagement in “governance 
participation” has served to neutralise the de-stabilising effects of 
civil society on state-investor relations, as analysed in Chapter 
Five.  
In the context of mining governance in Mongolia, we can see all 
five dimensions of a transnational legal ordering process at work 
in the 2014 reform process. The overall change in the direction of 
protecting investor rights and interests from national and local 
sources of political-legal instability was effected through a.) 
substantive legal reform affecting the balance of state-investor 
rights and responsibilities; b.) the redefinition of the appropriate 
boundary of state action in the market; c.) the strengthening of 
executive power at the expense of legislative/deliberate power 
within the state; d.) the privileging of technical expertise and 
“objective” decision-making in the governance of the mining 
sector; and e.) an institutionalised shift from conflictual to 
collaborative forms of association between the state, mining 
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companies, and civil society through tri-partite multi-stakeholder 
models of accountability. These five indicators of change 
correspond with each of the five dimensions of TLO outlined 
above. The following discussion will be structured upon each of 
these five dimensions in turn, for clarity, although naturally they 
reinforce each other in practice as will be noted when relevant. It 
makes sense to analyse these elements separately in order to 
show the way that state transformation cuts across the three 
relational axes of reordering that were analysed in Chapters Four 
and Five, connected to the configuration of central state power, 
central-local state relations, and state-society relations vis-à-vis 
environmental NGOs.  
A. Substantive legal reform 
One of the clearest conduits of the “stability norm” following the 
2012-2013 crisis was substantive law reform. At the end of 2013, 
a new investment law was passed, and the 2006 Minerals Law 
was amended in 2014 to reflect the normative and regulatory 
goals of the 2014-2025 State Policy on the Minerals Sector. The 
new investment law replaced the Foreign Investment Law and 
the Strategic Entities Foreign Investment Law (SEFIL)71 
 
71 SEFIL was passed in May 2012, asserting a stronger role for the state in 
relation to investment, particularly that coming from foreign state-owned 
SOEs. The Law introduced the concept of “strategic sectors”, which included 
banking, telecommunications and finance in addition to mining. The more 
controversial provisions of SEFIL included:  
1. the requirement of Cabinet approval to purchase shares above 33% 
in a company in a strategic sector,  
2.  the requirement of Parliamentary approval for a.) state-owned 
investors to purchase a majority share in a strategic entity and b.) 
state-owned investors planning to invest more than 100 billion 
tugriks (approximately US $71 million) (Edwards, 2013) 
3. Cabinet approval for any transaction that had the possibility of 
controlling or diminishing the market price of mineral exports 
(Viverito and Hankin, 2014) 
4. Disclosure of ‘ultimate beneficial shareholders’ (Hogan Lovells, 
2013)  
In addition to these provisions, the government was given a variety of new 
prerogatives regarding the appointment of boards of directors of strategic 
business entities (Viverito and Hankin, 2014) 
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(Buxbaum and Surenjav, 2014: 326). These laws had given 
Cabinet and Parliament fairly far-reaching rights of review 
regarding the purchase of shares, state-owned investments, large-
scale transactions, and board appointments for ‘strategic business 
entities.’ Similarly, under SEFIL, investors in strategic sectors had 
unprecedented obligations to disclose shareholders and equity 
holdings.  
In contrast, the 2013 Investment Law had the explicit purpose to 
‘protect the legal rights and interests of investors in the territory 
of Mongolia, to establish a common legislative guarantee for 
investment, to encourage investment, to stabilise the tax 
environment, to determine the rights and obligations of investors 
and the competences of a government body related to 
investment’ (Article 1). Under the new investment law, anti-
discrimination measures were introduced that guaranteed the 
equal treatment of foreign and domestic investors, and reduced 
restrictions on license trading. Crucially, it removed approval 
processes for foreign private investment (Hogan Lovells, 2013c: 
1). Furthermore, the 2013 Investment Law introduced general 
rights to tax stabilisation and international arbitration. 
Previously, access to tax stabilisation and alternative dispute 
resolution were accessible only on a case-by-case basis, through 
the framework of investment agreement negotiations. Specific 
quorum measures also protect the new investment law to prevent 
legal change, particularly during election cycles. The new 
investment law is also protected by specific quorum measures to 
prevent legal change, particularly during election cycles; a two 
thirds Parliamentary majority is required to amend this specific 
law. 
In early 2014, the government introduced the State Policy on the 
Minerals Sector (2014-2025), with the explicit goal of limiting the 
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state’s role in the mining sector to that of regulation and 
management, instead of pursuing direct shares in mining projects 
as it had done since 2006. Substantive amendments to the 2006 
Minerals Law to enhance ‘private sector-led development’ and to 
reduce the role of the state can be seen in the introduction of 
provisions for the state to trade its direct shares in mining 
projects for special royalties, depending on the outcome of 
negotiations with the license holder. The state formalised its 2014 
policy commitment to stabilising the investment environment by 
offering general tax and non-tax incentives, and by reducing 
bureaucratic steps in gaining investment permissions and mining 
licenses (e.g. through the Invest Mongolia Agency). The 2014 
amendments to the Minerals Law also clarify compensation 
duties for government authorities which use their powers to 
interrupt or delay mining licenses, particularly addressing the 
timing of compensation to licence-holders. According to revised 
Article 14.4, compensation from any government authority must 
be paid within one year, even when land has been set aside as a 
specially protected area by local authorities. In the latter case, if 
compensation has not been paid, exploration/exploitation may 
continue. 
Several substantive changes to minerals legislation affect the 
rights and duties of local governments in relation to mining 
companies. For example, the 2014 amendments to the Minerals 
Law legislated mandatory Local Development Agreements 
between local governments and mining companies at the sub-
national level, specifying a limited number of issues that could be 
addressed (environmental protection, infrastructure 
development, and employment). As discussed in Chapter Three, 
the balance of negotiating power was addressed in the 
amendments, in favour of the investing party. For example, 
regarding Local Development Agreements, the investor cannot be 
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compelled to contribute above a ‘voluntary’ level (Article 42.1). 
Furthermore, revisions to Article 15.1 increased the scope for 
reconnaissance for minerals exploration on land set aside for 
special purposes/protection by local governments (Minter 
Ellison, 2014). While local authorities still have the right – vis-à-
vis the Land Law – to set land aside for local needs, the substance 
of this right is arguably undermined by the new provision in the 
Minerals Law that local governments compensate mining 
companies within one year should their decision conflict with a 
mining license. These new provisions and amendments provide a 
substantive legal basis for the protection of investment and 
investors’ rights in Mongolian law, shifting the balance away from 
the kind of “nationalist” prerogatives that undermined investor 
confidence between 2006 and 2012.  
B. Changes in the boundary between the state and 
the market, and other forms of social ordering 
The 2014 law and policy reform process introduced a host of new 
rights for investors, providing a juridical foundation for very 
political policy boundaries that articulated a reduced role for the 
state in relation to the market. The substantive changes to mining 
and investment legislation described in the section above were 
part of a broader political and policy shift to reorient the state 
towards investment as a stable regulator. As outlined in Chapter 
Three, the stated goals of the State Policy on the Minerals Sector 
(2014-2025) (hereafter “the Policy”) are to ‘strengthen private 
sector development’, ‘establish a stable investment environment’, 
and ‘strengthen the international competitiveness of the 
Mongolian mining industry’ (Otgochuluu, 2016: 68). As the 
Oxford Business Group put it, ‘the policy frames the state’s role as 
one of support and encouragement for the private sector, with its 
role limited to regulation and supervision’ (Oxford Business 
Group, 2015b). The Policy encourages a shift to a governance 
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culture that emphasises the importance of ‘human capital, 
corporate governance, business ethics and rule of law’ 
(Otgochuluu, 2016: 74). In this way, the Policy sets out a symbolic 
normative boundary of appropriate state behaviour in relation to 
the market. 
Creating a market-friendly approach to mining governance was 
not simply a normative project; it underpinned wider market 
reform. In order to practically strengthen the marketisation of the 
economy and to limit state intervention – in the name of 
economic stability and competitiveness (Article 3.7.4 and 3.7.5) – 
the Policy proposed the establishment of a ‘special purpose fund 
for mining sector income generated to the state budget,’ meaning 
that the state’s access to mining income would be institutionally 
limited, as opposed to ordinary state income. The World Bank has 
played a key role in advising the Ministry of Finance regarding the 
establishment of a sovereign wealth fund, as part of its broader 
agenda ‘to build government and public support for more 
disciplined fiscal policy’ (Robbins and Smith, 2014: 3). The Policy 
also discouraged direct state involvement in mining projects, 
recommending instead that SOEs be converted into public 
companies that run as commercial entities, guided by principles 
of corporate governance in the selection of management (Article 
3.7.2 and 3.7.3). In particular, this can be seen in the partial 
privatisation and commercialisation of Erdenes Mongol LLC, 
which represents state interests in mining projects.  
In 2015, a new state energy policy (2015-2016) was passed, with 
the core pillar being the privatisation and restructuring of state 
property (Woolley, 2015). One of the key principles for the 
reform was ‘efficiency and productivity,’ expressed as 
‘privatisation, market regulation and technological innovation’ 
(ibid). In late 2015, the State Property Committee in charge of 
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regulating SOEs in Mongolia was dissolved, in order that SOEs 
could operate with a commercial mandate. Notably, in August 
2016, an Investor Protection Committee was established ‘to 
protect investors’ rights and interests, promote cooperation 
within the legal framework of Mongolia, minimise foreseeable 
risks and facilitate settlement of disputes swiftly’ (Amartuvshin, 
2016). According to a statement published by LehmanLaw, an 
international law firm, this move was perceived as ‘another 
positive step for Mongolia and for potential foreign investors… If 
the committee works as planned it could significantly reduce 
costs and mitigate risks for foreign investors in major projects in 
the country’ (ibid). 
Furthermore, the ‘100 Days of Reform’ led by Cabinet that 
followed the promulgation of the new State Policy on the Minerals 
Sector included a range of market reforms not only related 
specifically to the minerals sector, but also enhancing Mongolia’s 
overall reputation as a supportive destination for foreign 
investment (Hogan Lovells, 2014c). The liberalisation of capital 
markets, including securities, transfer of pledges, and registration 
reforms affirmed the priority of protecting foreign capital 
interests, stimulating trade, and expanding financing options for 
investors. For example, Mongolia’s capital markets were made 
more competitive internationally through the adoption of 
international standards related to financial markets and 
securities. In June 2014, the Financial Regulatory Commission 
signed the International Organization of Securities Commissions’ 
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning 
Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information. 
This significantly increased the competitiveness of Mongolia’s 
capital markets internationally through standardisation 
(Buxbaum and Surenjav, 2015: 325).  
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Moreover, it is worth noting that the investment crisis in 2012-
2013 and the state’s consequent difficulty in regaining the 
confidence of investors prompted a major debt crisis, culminating 
in a structural adjustment for the state, facilitated by the IMF and 
China. In late 2016, Mongolia’s overall debt burden was estimated 
at approximately USD 23.5 billion (200% of GDP), with 
government debt at USD 8.4 billion (70% of GDP) (Hornby, 2016). 
While commodity prices increased (as in the case of coal) or at 
least stabilised (as in the case of copper) in 2016 (Benard, 2016), 
it was not enough to balance the trade deficit in addition to debt 
repayments. Facing the first major debt repayments on its bonds 
and swap agreements in 2017, the Mongolian government was on 
the brink of default. In January 2017, after a brief negotiation, the 
IMF coordinated approximately USD 5.5 billion worth of debt 
financing for the Mongolian government to prevent default, which 
included an extension for Mongolia’s currency swap agreement 
with China, which had been set to expire in August 2017 
(Edwards, 2017).72  
A key consequence of this structural adjustment, which has its 
origins in the investment crisis of 2012-2013, has been the 
strengthening of fiscal and monetary institutions (i.e., the Central 
Bank) and the creation of new limits on government spending. 
The introduction of ceilings in government spending, which exist 
prior to the approval of the national budget by Parliament (e.g. 
Fiscal Stability Law), is an important ‘shift of functions’ 
 
72 The increasing role of China in relation to Mongolia’s debt burden and 
currency stability is part of the development of a ‘comprehensive strategic 
partnership’ between the two states (Turmunkh, 2016). Mongolia has strategic 
importance for China’s Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road (“One 
Belt, One Road”) project, which aims to expand and integration economic 
regionalism in Eastern, Southeastern and Central Asia, as well as Eurasia 
through development finance and infrastructural expansion for regional trade 
networks ‘connecting China with neighbouring countries and regions’ 
(Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some 
Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform, Article 26, 
Section VII, cited in Tao 2015).  
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(Anderson, 2005: 21) from the political to the economic, as the 
Central Bank gains institutional primacy in relation to the budget. 
While Parliament still approves the budget, its decision-making is 
structured by ‘market principles’ (ibid), eschewing 
redistributionist or otherwise “political” approaches to resource 
allocation (ibid). 
C. Changes in the institutional architecture of the 
state  
One of the major aspects of change in the state following the 
2012-2013 investment crisis was the strengthening of executive 
power in relation to the mining sector. As analysed in Chapter 
Four, Parliament had played a major role in “destabilising” the 
investment environment by regularly amending the minerals law 
or passing new legislation, such as the Strategic Entities Foreign 
Investment Law (2012) and the Law on the Prohibition of Mineral 
Exploration and Mining Operations at Headwaters of Rivers, 
Protected Zones of Water Reservoirs and Forested Areas (2009). 
Members of Parliament had also initiated the renegotiation of the 
Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreement (OTIA), signalling insecurity of 
contract and tenure for investors. The 2014 stability reforms 
recalibrated the balance of power between different organs of the 
state in relation to the mining sector, by limiting Parliament’s 
power to revise new pro-investment legislation (i.e., the 2013 
Investment Law) and introduce new bills that could affect the 
minerals sector. In the case of the Investment Law, it was as 
straightforward as introducing a higher quorum (two-thirds 
majority) for that particular law.  
However, with a view to more generally preventing swift legal 
change, the 2014 amendments to the Minerals Law legislated the 
formation of the Minerals Policy Council (MPC), a multi-
stakeholder body working under the auspices of the Ministry of 
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Mining. The MPC was supposed to review any legal or policy 
changes to the minerals sector prior to parliamentary debate, 
allowing investor and mining association representatives to have 
advisory input in the mining governance regime. Follow-up 
communications with the original Vice President of the MPC (N. 
Algaa, President of the Mongolia National Mining Association) 
confirmed that the council has been convened three times since it 
was officially instituted in 2015, to review draft amendments 
(personal communication, February 2017). While he noted that 
the new government (as of June 2016) has not been paying much 
attention to the council,  
The Prime Minister’s cabinet has established a new 
council to deal with the claims and appeals of 
investors. In general, the government is trying its best 
to improve the relationship with foreign investors 
(ibid).  
The creation of a similar council under the Cabinet in addition to 
the MPC (attached to the Ministry of Mining) indicates the 
ongoing priority of the government to protect and promote the 
interests of foreign investors, despite the change in political 
power resulting from the Parliamentary election in June 2016.  
In a similar way, Local Development Agreements were designed 
to function as hybridised governing spaces where investors and 
local authorities can negotiate and find common ground about the 
role of mining companies in local development. While there is a 
public-private element to these new forms of deliberation at the 
central and sub-national levels of government, they represent an 
architectural transformation within the state, whereby investors 
and mining companies have a formalised role in governance as 
“partners” and “collaborators” with the executive office of local 
governments in relation to specific issues. At the sub-national 
269 
 
level, the nomination of district and provincial governors as the 
signatories of local development agreements further consolidates 
the proactive relationship between executive authority and 
mining.  
Additionally, pro-investment spaces of executive power have 
been strengthened in the central government, specifically the 
Ministry of Mining, the Ministry of Finance, and the Mineral 
Resources Authority (MRAM). The decision-making powers of the 
Ministry of Mining and the Mineral Resources Authority were 
expanded, and two new agencies were formed: the Invest 
Mongolia Agency (IMA), and the National Geological Office. The 
IMA, as the implementation agency of the Investment Law, is in 
charge of the approval process for investments (IMA, 2014: 60) 
and is directly supervised by the Prime Minister’s cabinet, thus 
effectively streamlining decision-making into a one-step process 
at most.  
D. Enhancement of professional expertise and its 
role in governance 
In line with the new emphasis on easing investment restrictions 
and separating mining governance from nationalist politics, the 
2014 reforms promoted a stronger role for technical and 
professional expertise in governance. For example, Article 2.1.1 of 
the State Policy on the Minerals Sector (2014-2025) stipulated 
that one of its principles with regard to the minerals sector is 
objective decision-making: 
to base any decision with respect to the legal and tax 
environment on the results of research and analysis, to 
ensure long term sustainability of the policy in 
minerals sector and to ensure that the legal interests of 
participants are not negatively affected.  
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In line with this principle and ‘within the framework of improving 
the legal environment for the minerals sector’ (Article 3.1), the 
State Policy commits to promoting ‘international initiatives for 
transparent and responsible mining and social and economic 
impact assessment’ (3.1.7). It also supports the 
professionalization of research in the minerals sector (i.e. through 
teams of qualified engineers) (3.1.8), and a ‘shift to international 
standards for the evaluation of minerals deposits.’ In October 
2014, Mongolia became a member of the Committee for Mineral 
Reserves International Reporting Standards (CRIRSCO). While 
there is nothing intrinsically wrong with improving factual 
accuracy with the collection of geological data collection, the 
intentions behind such an exercise are the critical factor. In 
CRIRSCO’s case, I argue that it is yet another mechanism to enable 
further marketisation of the economy, by furthering the rational 
(quantitative) basis for exchange (see Ebner, 2011). 
For example, the rationale behind CRIRSCO is to strengthen and 
develop communication of the ‘risks associated with investment 
effectively and transparently in order to earn the level of trust 
necessary to underpin its activities’ (CRIRSCO, 2017). CRIRSCO 
reports are based on mineral reserve estimates and exploration 
progress, in order to enhance ‘market-related and financial 
investment’ (ibid) through standardisation. In line with these 
developments, the State Policy also calls for the 
professionalization of a minerals board – comprised of ‘qualified 
experts’ (3.1.11) – to facilitate and enforce international reporting 
standards. In January 2014, the Mongolian Professional Institute 
of Geosciences and Mining was established as a non-
governmental organisation. Finally, in line with the 2013 
Investment Law’s provision of international arbitration for 
investors, the State Policy recognises the need for the 
development of a ‘dispute resolution system that is consistent 
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with international standards’ (3.1.12), requiring the training of 
‘qualified lawyers, economists, experts and arbiters.’  
E. Change in associational patterns instituted 
through transnational mechanisms of 
accountability with accompanying normative 
frames  
The 2014 stabilisation reforms effectively repositioned political 
issues as “economic,” “legal,” or “social” within the governance 
regime to prevent politicised discourse or activities from 
disrupting the stability of the investment environment. The 
institutionalisation of distance between spaces of representative 
democracy and mining governance on the one hand, and the 
legitimation of multi-stakeholder politics as a collaborative 
alternative to politically risky social conflict on the other, are both 
symptomatic of a deeper process of political neutralisation to 
protect the market. For example, formerly political aspects of 
mining investment, which involved democratic processes of 
deliberation and review, have been re-determined as issues of 
economic administration, and institutionally relocated in 
executive agencies and ministries, outside formal political control. 
The strengthening of executive power in relation to investment 
and the creation of hybridised spaces of governance within the 
Ministry of Mining and local governments reinforces the 
deepening alignment between state and capital investment 
interests. Furthermore, national political conflict – characterised 
by systematic processes of election and representation, debates 
around the boundaries of the public interest, and infused with the 
language of national political community – has been transferred 
to alternative stakeholder-based forums which are issue-, 
identity-, and interest-based in their orientation. These 
“governance participation” alternatives are based on direct 
negotiating power, akin to a commercial transaction of 
272 
 
stakeholders, in which all parties have nominally equal value 
based on their private interests.  
The depoliticising impetus behind the 2014 reform effort, and the 
emphasis on technical, objective, and the associated emphasis on 
professional decision-making, has also affected the relationship 
between civil society organisations, mining companies, and the 
state. As analysed in Chapter Five, one of the targets of the 2014 
“stability consensus” was to place stronger limits on the role of 
environmental NGOs and rural activism in relation to the mining 
sector. In part, the state has aided the institutionalisation of NGOs 
through criminalising “radical” movements on the one hand, and 
through offering a legitimate place for NGOs to have influence 
upon the mining governance regime vis-à-vis the Mongolian 
Environmental Civil Council on the other. The shift in role from 
activism to expertise for environmental civil society is important, 
as it signals the relative strengthening of NGOs as governance 
partners with the state and the private sector within a pro-
extractive framework. Furthermore, the legitimation of 
transparency-based, multi-stakeholder models of accountability 
at the national and sub-national levels, as part of a “responsible 
mining” discourse, breaks new ground in terms of who represents 
the public interest: the government or NGOs? The emphasis on 
stakeholding, negotiation, and collaboration for mutual benefits 
has shifted the antagonistic encounters between competing 
interest groups to new ‘multi-stakeholder’ fora, ushering in 
market-friendly representation and rule-making around 
company-“community” conflicts.  
F. Summary 
The brief recapitulation above highlights key aspects of the 2014 
reform process to regain investment and investor confidence in 
Mongolia’s minerals sector. The relationship between state and 
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capital grounds the five aspects of TLO, indicated along three axes 
of institutional reordering studied in this thesis. Within this 
broader context, a boundary-shifting and redrawing process has 
occurred that enables the Mongolian state to suppress and even 
evade the social conflict which had destabilised the political and 
legal conditions for investment between 2006 and 2013. By 
closing avenues of risk and establishing a new hierarchy of 
priorities, while still permitting limited outlets for contestation 
through institutionalised forms of civil society, the Mongolian 
state has consolidated a positive overall orientation towards 
transnational capital. Fundamentally, this positive orientation has 
been made relatively secure through legal and financial 
mechanisms that either incentivise or enforce the cooperation of 
national and civil institutional actors which could otherwise 
present a challenge. When situated within Shaffer’s framework of 
transnational legal ordering (TLO), the diverse ways in which the 
norm of legal and political stability (for investors) has infused 
law, state institutions, state-market relations, and civil society 
becomes apparent. In the previous three chapters, I analysed the 
stabilisation process along three key axes (within the central 
state, between central and local governments, and state-society 
relations). However, in the next section I will focus on the overall 
effects of this case of new constitutionalism on the democratic 
state of Mongolia.  
Prior to doing this, though, it is timely to ask the counterfactual 
question. A sceptical reader might be unconvinced that a process 
of deep transformation was catalysed by the crisis of 
investment/investor confidence in 2012 and 2013. Conceivably, a 
sceptic might not see the underlying connection between the legal 
and political reforms targeting diverse actors and institutions 
undertaken since 2014. My response to the sceptic would be to 
ask the following: if there had been no decline in foreign direct 
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investment and a “crisis” of investor confidence associated with it 
in 2012 and 2013, would the post-2014 governance configuration 
be present? While there are certainly domestic factors at play in 
affecting the responsiveness of the government to investor 
interests, removing the ‘transnational story’ (Shaffer, 2014: 2) 
would arguably produce a very different outcome for Mongolia’s 
mining regime. Without an externally imposed crisis, there would 
have been no incentive for such stringent reform of national law 
and politics. Why would political elites such as members of 
Parliament voluntarily support legislation that reduces 
parliamentary powers in relation to the mining sector? Why 
would a cross-party consensus have emerged so suddenly (in the 
wake of falling investment), when many politicians and parties 
were previously known for their anti-FDI platforms?73 The 
sudden recognition that ‘we are the cause of the economic crisis’ 
(Prime Minister Saikhanbileg quoted in Mongolian Economic 
Journal, 2014) does not reflect an organic process of change, but 
rather a pragmatic response to a new reality: ‘These hard times 
are lessons. The biggest lesson [is that] we need investment, we 
need to support business activities’ (Director of Strategic Policy 
and Planning, Ministry of Mining, author interview). 
 
73 After foreign investment continued to spiral downwards in 2014, Prime 
Minister N. Altankhuyag was ousted by a parliamentary vote of no-confidence 
on the 5th of November. By the end of November, a new Prime Minister, C. 
Saikhanbileg, had been appointed from the ranks of the Democratic Party and 
formed a ‘super coalition’ (Hornby, 2014) with the opposition (the Mongolian 
People’s Party), the Justice Coalition, and the Civil-Will Green Party to regain 
foreign investment and prevent further economic crisis. With foreign 
investment having dropped from USD 4.45 billion in 2012 to $508 million in 
2014 (Kohn, 2015), a multi-party consensus emerged across the political 
spectrum to remove barriers for investors and to make evident Mongolia’s 
commitment to supporting private-sector led development of its minerals.  
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Assessing State Transformation after the FDI Crisis: 
Implications for Democratic Politics, the Rule of 
Law, and National Sovereignty 
It would be inaccurate to suggest a “hollowing out” of the state or 
even an overall weakening in the Mongolian case, given the 
evident expansion of pro-market legality and the increase of 
executive power in relation to the minerals sector, alongside the 
state’s role in re-engaging investors. However, the cost of 
insulating the mining sector from political and legal risk is also 
borne by certain components of the state; in this case, democratic 
institutions and norms. In this section, I will examine the 
redrawing of the boundary between the “political” and the 
“economic” within Mongolia’s mining regime and examine the 
risks that such a redrawing pose for the future of democratic 
politics, the function of the rule of law and Mongolia’s relative 
sovereignty as a nation-state. 
“Who Cares About Politics?” Setting out the 
Democratic Significance of the New Political-
Economic Boundary in Mongolia’s Mining Regime 
The crisis of investment (confidence) led to the deepening 
separation between the political and the economic spheres within 
Mongolia’s market democracy. In general, the liberal democratic 
model can be said to be premised upon the distinction between 
two spheres of power: the economic and the political (Wood, 
1995: 234). The former is distinguished from the latter in the 
mode of its power relations as ‘not dependent on juridical or 
political privilege’ (ibid) but rather dependent on ‘the power of 
appropriation, exploitation and distribution.’ In Polanyi’s words 
(1944/2001: 71), ‘a market economy is an economic system 
controlled, regulated, and directed by market prices.’ Economic 
power in a market democracy is distinguished by its relative 
freedom from the direct control of the state. Although the state 
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may attempt to shape market activities through regulation, this is 
not the same as state control. Wood (1995: 235) puts it this way:  
As with most kinds of freedom, there may have to be 
certain restrictions or regulations on it to maintain 
social order; but it is still a kind of freedom. 
Consistent with this observation, investors in Mongolia’s mining 
sector were largely not contesting the state’s right to regulate the 
sector per se, but rather its substance and manner in which 
regulation was imposed. It was the state’s interference in the 
market ‒ by assuming direct stakes in mining projects 
(designating them as “nationally strategic” as opposed to simply 
“valuable”) and imposition of some controls ‒ which was the root 
cause of investor-state conflict. These political behaviours within 
the market were deemed inappropriate in the economic sphere, 
particularly the nationalist use of law to legally legitimise the 
state’s behaviour. Consequently, the 2014 reforms were devised 
to rebuild investor confidence. Not surprisingly, the way to 
achieve this goal in a market economy is to demarcate the 
boundary of appropriate state behaviour in relation to the 
economic sphere in general. This demarcation effort has two key 
implications for democracy, in practice and as a normative ideal.  
Practically speaking, the new consensus to protect the minerals 
market from national “instability” means that fewer legal and 
policy issues are available for national contestation or review, 
either by transferring decision-making power to different 
institutions or by creating strong financial incentives and/or legal 
barriers to keep them from becoming “politicised.” These 
practical measures have already been explored in some depth in 
previous chapters, for instance, the “locking in” of local 
governments’ support for mining projects through financial 
incentives and new legal institutions (i.e., LDAs). Limiting local 
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budgets, whilst providing the opportunity for local governments 
to receive more from the state through national budgetary 
allocation if they support mining licenses in their jurisdictions, 
constitutes another incentive structure. The new possibility to 
generate capital independently of the central state through LDAs 
and local fee payments from mining companies reinforces this 
incentive structure. Regarding negative incentives, local 
governments are now burdened with new time pressure to 
compensate mining companies within a year should their decision 
to protect land conflict with mining licenses, localising financial 
pressure to effectively prevent such measures. As the Head of the 
Mining Division at MRAM put it, local governments need to have 
‘a good reason’ to reject mining licenses, based on objective 
factors (author interview). In this way, the more fundamental 
question of “do we want mining in our districts and regions?” 
shifts to the more instrumental issue of “how can we benefit the 
most from mining in our districts and regions?” By raising the 
requirements for legitimate restrictions on mining, the baseline 
moves from questions of “if” to questions of “how,” constituting a 
closure of political space as well as the possibilities of alternative 
development pathways (Schneiderman, 2013; Anderson, 2005: 
147).  
While I have used the case of local governments here, similar 
examples abound in the central state regarding the use of a 
combination of incentives and negative pressure to limit the 
state’s “political” involvement in the mining sector. In a sense, it 
no longer seems that popular to be a populist. The legitimacy of 
executive power in the state has grown since the FDI crisis, as 
public frustration mounted over the state’s seeming inability to 
effectively manage and administer the economy. As a prominent 
civic advocate explained (author interview), people seem to be 
‘moving away from the essential things that we chose [after 
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communism], such as democracy and human rights.’ In particular, 
he warned that ‘young people are forgetting the danger of 
authoritarianism,’ citing new studies that give evidence of this 
worrying trend. For example, the Asian Barometer conducted a 
survey to measure the extent of ‘detachment from 
authoritarianism’ between 2001 and 2016 (Asian Barometer, 
2016), discovering that more than 64% of Mongolian citizens now 
support the removal of Parliament ‘in favour of rule by a strong 
leader’ (ibid), as opposed to 40% in 2001.74  
The growing public cynicism about politics thus dovetailed with 
criticism from investors and the mining industry about the 
government’s “unprofessional decision-making”. This reinforced 
the necessity of redistributing the state’s power in the mining 
sector towards investment promotion, legal implementation and 
regulation, licensing procedures, and administrative 
management, as opposed to the state playing a direct role as an 
owner or shareholder in mining projects. Significantly for 
democracy, parliamentary power has been constrained by the 
shift of most decision-making capacities to pro-extractive 
ministries and agencies, which have opened advisory and 
consultation spaces to investors in order to provide input on 
general policy-making trajectories (e.g. the Minerals Policy 
Council under the Ministry of Mining). 
The shift of state power in relation to the country’s most strategic 
economic sector has normative significance, apart from the 
practical implications of making the legal environment more 
investor-friendly. Decision-making and norm-generating power 
has shifted from legislative, representative and deliberative 
spaces in the state, one hand, to executive, appointed and 
 
74 During my fieldwork, cynicism about Parliament and politicians was present 
in informal conversations, particularly with young people.  
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technocratic spaces on the other. By targeting representative and 
legislative spaces as being too “political” with regard to the 
country’s most significant economic sector, the 2014 reforms 
communicate an implicit message about the legitimacy and value 
of politics in democracy. The preservation of investor confidence 
as a new baseline for legitimate politics homogenises the scope of 
policy options and interventions available for the state, 
privileging the freedom of the market as opposed to the freedom 
of the national demos. As Polanyi (1944/2011: 60) warned, the 
creation of an economic sphere regulated by export competition 
and price relegates society to the position of ‘adjunct’ to the 
market, where the security and stability of market relations take 
primary position. To put it simply, the scope of national 
democracy has been limited in Mongolia in relation to market-
protecting preferences of transnational capitalists. 
As Schneiderman (2013: 165) argues, the loss of openness has 
significant negative implications for democratic political life, 
because it signals the almost permanent closure of alternatives. 
While it is possible and even necessary for closure to occur within 
democratic polities as a sign of self-rule – ‘not everything can be 
contested all of the time’ (ibid) – the insulating impetus of 
transnational legality seeks to permanently exclude political 
processes from influencing the global market. Schneiderman 
argues convincingly that the inherent value of democracy, with its 
ideals of ‘collective self-revisability’ (ibid), is its systemic 
openness to change (ibid: 165, 15). In this sense, the underlying 
undemocratic issue with the transnational legality associated 
with economic globalisation is that it seeks to (permanently) 
place itself beyond the reach of the democratic domain.  
The affirmation of pluralism (i.e. diverse conceptions of “the 
good”), particularly when it comes to significant areas of public 
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law and policy-making, can be understood as a core norm of 
democracy; political processes provide a unified system to 
express the diverse interests and needs of “the people.” This 
unity-diversity dynamic is a critical part of democratised 
collective life; the elements of unity (e.g. through universal 
categories such as citizenship) which create a “we” can then be 
nuanced by the reality that “we” do not all share the same 
interests, perspectives or values. While not wishing to 
‘romanticise politics’ (Spicer, 2010: 51), the value of values-
pluralism contained in democracy at its most basic is precisely 
that the reality of social complexity acts as an antidote to coercive 
attempts by states to totalise their subjects into one objective 
unit. Furthermore, Spicer (2010: 62) makes the argument that an 
instrumental approach to public administration which seeks to 
‘downplay if not actually deny’ the political character of 
governance can ‘erode our sense of moral responsibility’ (ibid) to 
the “demos” (i.e., the people).  As Spicer (ibid: 64) puts it, 
The rhetoric of instrumental rationalism in public 
administration… hides moral choices from the view of 
administrators by focusing their attention single-
mindedly on technical questions about how to best 
accomplish some pre-defined set of measurable goals, 
missions, or ends… it can foster the idea that those 
whom the administrator must deal with – citizens, 
politicians, and other administrators – are not human 
beings as such but are mere objects to be manipulated 
at will. 
Returning to the Mongolian case, the idea that citizens and their 
representatives were incapable of contributing to effective policy 
because they lacked sufficient knowledge was a common theme 
among “stability” reformers. As one of the main contributors to 
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the State Policy on the Minerals Sector (2014-2025) put it in a 
recent policy brief (Otgochuluu, 2016: 2): 
Ultimately, only educated voters can assist in creating 
a political environment that enables the formulation of 
government policy geared towards effective regulation 
and sustainable development. To do this, policy-makers 
must acknowledge the degree to which the country’s 
socialist past and semi-nomadic traditions shape policy 
debates, and adopt a communication strategy that 
allows for a constructive national discussion of the role 
of mining in Mongolia’s new economy.  
In my interviews with senior government personnel, semi-
nomadic culture was regularly associated with a lack of discipline 
and consistency, not helped by Mongolia’s socialist heritage; 
citizens allegedly have high expectations for the state to provide 
welfare, services and generally redistribute mineral rents on a 
universal basis. As the quote above suggests, the perceived 
benefit of an educated mass was that the public will consequently 
not make unreasonable economic demands of the state (i.e., by 
agitating for direct redistribution), having appropriate 
understanding of the challenges of navigating the boom and bust 
cycles of commodity markets. This expert emphasis on the 
making of a “reasonable” (i.e., market-friendly) public reinforces 
the dominance of economic values in mining governance, such as 
avoiding government overspending during “boom” cycles in 
commodity markets and preventing legislative change to support 
foreign investment flows. The instrumental, rationalistic thinking 
at work in state administration denies its very political nature, 
augmented by the fact that its proponents work mainly in the 
opacity of executive institutions. Consequently, this technocratic, 
anti-political discourse remains institutionally protected from 
being challenged by other perspectives and rationalities. Thus, 
282 
 
there is strong reason to be wary of the lure of ‘anti-politics; it 
originates in a ‘technological “style of thought” that promises to 
“rescue mankind from the lack of certainty and the glut of 
compromises in politics”’ (Spicer, 2010: 68, citing Crick, 
1962/1993: 92).  
Thus, when the political sphere experiences closure of any 
significant degree (e.g. in relation to mining and resource 
distribution in Mongolia’s case), we can logically argue that this 
amounts to a substantive ‘undoing’ (Brown, 2015) or, at the very 
least, a de facto reconstitution of democracy. This point was 
expressed cogently in an interview with a prominent NGO 
advocate as the cost of preferring expertise and professionalism 
over politics in decision-making. While careful not to idealise 
politicians in Mongolia, this interviewee recognised the 
distinction between a critique of political leadership and the 
exclusion of politics and political institutions (e.g. Parliament) in 
relation to the mining sector. By excluding politics, pro-stability 
lobbyists and reformers did not adequately recognise the 
democratic values at risk, apart from national control over 
strategic resources. Mongolian politicians now take pride in 
describing themselves as ‘so pragmatic’ but he noted the lack of 
political principles: ‘they [political parties] are divided in terms of 
business groups, without ideology.’ This observation has some 
merit when one looks at the policy platforms of the two major 
political parties following the FDI crisis; they both supported, and 
continue to support, private-sector-led development and the 
promotion of foreign investment in the mining sector. The 
contraction of the political spectrum across political parties 
reinforces the stability of mining law and policy across election 
cycles, which were formerly a source of anxiety for investors. This 
can be clearly seen in the way that the 2016 elections did not lead 
to the reform of the 2014 “stability consensus,” even though the 
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Mongolian People’s Party, opposition to the Democratic Party 
(the main political force behind the 2014 reforms), won the 
election. Thus, in the Mongolian case, rather than complementing 
the representative system by incorporating authentic avenues of 
public participation into the heart of the mining regime, the 
“stability consensus” embodied in the 2014 reforms shifted the 
balance of state power in the opposite direction, strengthening its 
‘bureaucratic, administrative and coercive apparatuses’ (Held, 
2006: 196). Under the new regime, it is no longer legitimate to 
contest an export-oriented, foreign-investor-friendly mining 
sector, or to encourage direct state intervention in the minerals 
market beyond the facilitation of extraction by providing a 
“reasonable” jurisdiction for investment to occur. This shift marks 
a normative closure for democratic politics, by homogenising a 
formerly more heterogeneous political debate, and by limiting the 
scope of redistributive intervention by the state.  
Before concluding this section, it is important to mention the 
extent to which the strategies of organised civil society might 
ameliorate the anti-politics of the mining regime. Unfortunately, 
so far, the increasingly institutionalised nature of NGOs, as 
examined in Chapter Five, has left the new political-economic 
boundary relatively uncontested. Civic actors and institutions, 
like the MECC, structured as they are by the boundaries of foreign 
donor and state funding, largely concentrate on aspects of the 
process of extractive development, such as revenue transparency, 
environmental impact assessments, monitoring mining projects, 
and representing “community” interests in LDAs. While these are 
important issues, NGO advocacy does not challenge the pro-
investment orientation of the state or the anti-political direction 
of state mining policy. In this sense, the current organisation of 
civil society does not fundamentally enhance the ‘accountability 
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of power’ (Anderson, 2005: 147) but rather contributes to making 
the new order hegemonic.  
NGOs can inadvertently reproduce distrust of national politics by 
presenting themselves as a more trustworthy alternative to 
national political representation through multi-stakeholder 
politics. Despite the subtlety of its introduction in Mongolia’s 
mining regime, stake-holding offers a new orientation to political 
representation and participation. On one hand, it opens up the 
possibility of wider participation and inclusion of different 
interest groups in the negotiation of a particular issue based on 
the idea of having a “stake” in it. On the other hand, stakeholder 
politics is yet another example of arena-shifting in Mongolia’s 
mining regime, where conflict gets relegated to specifically “non-
political” forums designed to contain and resolve it. Particularly 
at the sub-national level, NGOs have gained prominence as 
governing institutions for “participatory” initiatives, like local 
development agreements and environmental co-monitoring with 
mining companies. However, it is difficult to assess the benefit(s) 
of participation, particularly when the initiatives are offered by 
the private sector, who have their own “business case” reasons to 
engage. Rather than reflecting the organic, grassroots politics that 
participatory governance is supposed to generate, NGOs can be 
complicit in furthering “governance participation,” a ‘perverted’ 
(Santos and Avritzer, 2007: lxix) form of popular engagement 
wherein participation is bureaucratised and professionalised, 
without genuine democratic scope (i.e. that which offers the 
possibility of systemic change) (Schneiderman, 2013: 165).  
For example, there is a great deal of opacity about the actual 
process by which NGOs receive a community mandate for 
representation in local development agreements. NGO activists 
can also become governance technicians, as ‘a matter of 
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instructing people in the proper practice of politics’ (Li, 2007: 25), 
even under the seemingly progressive framework of participation 
which connotes a ‘people-centred’ approach (White, 1996: 6). The 
role of NGOs as agents of participation is particularly ambivalent 
when they are institutionally circumscribed by the state to pursue 
a limited range of activities in partnership with state 
organisations and mining companies. Participation can become a 
way to mobilise and organise citizens in “constructive” directions, 
rather than reflecting a genuine democratic process that is 
attentive and open to local perspectives. As White (ibid) incisively 
puts it, ‘sharing through participation does not necessarily mean 
sharing in power.’ Thus, to conclude, the programmatic, project-
based and stakeholder-oriented approach of current civil society 
efforts in relation to mining render them largely ineffective 
against the structural reorientation of the state towards foreign 
capital in Mongolia. Furthermore, NGOs can also act as a potential 
force for deepening the anti-political trajectory of mining 
governance. Of course, the hegemony of the stability order is not 
immune to challenge, but a strong disciplinary incentive structure 
protects the mining regime legally, politically, and socially. 
A New Rule for the Rule of Law? Stability as the 
New Grundnorm for Mining Law and Policy 
The role of law has been alluded to as an instrument of constraint 
upon the scope of democratic politics in relation to the mining 
regime, but the significance of this point merits further analysis. 
The new anti-politics described in the previous section,  alongside 
the expansion of what is considered “economic” as opposed to 
political (for national democratic purposes), has occurred 
through legal development. Legal solutions to investor confidence 
have also been the focus of central policy-making for the mining 
sector. The centrality of law to the 2014 “stability” reforms 
reflects an assumption about the law’s relationship with politics, 
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namely that it is a relationship of constraint. Using law to 
constrain politics and to enable ‘an economic sphere with its own 
power relations not dependent on juridical or political privilege’ 
(Wood, 1995: 234) remains the function par excellence of legal 
liberalism, the legal ideology that accompanies liberal democracy 
and economics. In this ideology, the rule of law mediates the 
boundary between the political and the economic, as the juridical 
guarantor for the existence of an economic sphere, based on the 
supposedly rational exchange of price value, against the political 
sphere, based on irrational power and interest (May, 2014: 68).  
While we know that the division between the political and the 
economic is not so clear in practice, the idea of the rule of law as 
securing space for the market to operate has major ideological 
purchase in the governance of the global economy (May, 2014: 
63). As Wood (1995: 30) puts it,  
Absolute private property, the contractual relation 
that binds producer to appropriator, the process of 
commodity exchange – all these require the legal 
forms, the coercive apparatus, the policing functions of 
the state… the differentiation of the economic sphere 
means simply that the economy has its own juridical 
and political forms whose purpose is purely ‘economic.’ 
The rule of law, from a market standpoint, is not political, even 
though it is enforced by the state, because it does not interfere 
with the market or impose non-economic imperatives upon it. In 
fact, markets are dependent upon a certain variety of the rule of 
law for their very existence. As Ebner (2011: 22) puts it, 
The rise of the market as a set of hegemonic 
institutions which shape the modern exchange 
economy coincides with the rule of law, which implies a 
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reduction of social relations to the regulation of 
property and contract. 
The rule of law, in this view, is supposed to protect the market 
from any political and legal influences that are not economic in 
purpose. Thus, in this view, the rule of law is not actually about 
protecting the market from the state per se, but from particular 
forms of “illegitimate” state behaviour in relation to the market; 
the market would not actually exist if it were not juridically 
protected and enabled by the state (Polanyi, 1944/2001). As 
Wood (ibid: 31) astutely concludes, ‘the differentiation of the 
economic and the political in capitalism is, more precisely, a 
differentiation of political functions themselves and their 
separate allocation to the private economic sphere and the public 
sphere of the state.’ 
In relation to Mongolia’s mining regime, one of the major 
dimensions of the purported crisis of investor confidence was 
growing doubt about the state’s commitment to the rule of law. 
However, this allegation stems from an emergent ideology of the 
rule of law in a globalised economy (Jayasuriya, 2001), which 
implies the active positive protection of private property rights by 
the state. The rule of law, at its most basic, could also be 
understood as the prevention of arbitrary exercises of power by 
the state. Within national democratic states, this used to be the 
general framework for the rule of law – the prevention of 
arbitrariness by the state against its own citizens. On the basis of 
this more minimalist definition of the rule of law, the state should 
be under no obligation to formulate investment-enabling laws 
and policies, particularly for foreign investors. In fact, the law 
could be changed to permit direct state involvement in the 
economy and, as long as the conditions are met regarding 
universal application, due process, and non-arbitrariness, this 
type of state action could fit the criteria for the rule of law. 
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However, in a context where states participate in a global market, 
the rule of law takes on a whole new meaning, regulating the 
state’s interaction with economic actors outside the boundaries of 
its own jurisdiction. As Jayasuriya puts it (ibid: 448),  
At the heart, then, of the transformation of the 
[national] sovereign model is the separation of the 
territorial state and law.  
A major implication of the “stability consensus” in Mongolia is 
that it imposes a particular definition of legitimate legal action by 
the state in relation to the market. Not only were investor rights 
and preferences protected and promoted, but the public rights of 
the state to legislate in its own interest were curtailed. 
‘Thresholds of legitimate behaviour’ (Schneiderman, 2013: 35) 
based on the stability of the legal environment and principles of 
non-intervention in the minerals market were actually well above 
the minimum criteria for the recognition of the rule of law by a 
national state. However, as I have been arguing throughout this 
thesis, Mongolia’s dependence on foreign capital has made the 
state vulnerable to processes of ‘global’ state transformation. 
Furthermore, the legal dimension of Mongolia’s extractive 
reordering is a fundamental part of what renders it ‘constitution-
like’:  
It holds separate the political and economic to ensure 
that the economic remains uncontaminated by the 
political, and the rule of law stands between them: 
markets are facilitated by the legal structures of 
property, contract and other laws… In this sense, the 
pre-commitment to the rule of law limits and shapes 
any subsequent reformist dynamic (May, 2014b: 153).  
Where previously the Mongolian government promoted legal 
change in relation to the mining sector whilst maintaining a 
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national conception of the rule of law, the post-2014 reforms 
implicitly presume the stability of the legal environment as new 
criterion for the rule of law. In this sense, a version of the rule of 
law that privileges the stability of the investment environment 
functions as the new basic norm upon which the new extractive 
order rests. Citing Kelsen (1923/1998: 13), May (2014: 65) 
argues that the sign of a basic norm, or grundnorm, is that it exists 
as ‘”the highest rule of law creation, establishing the unity of the 
entire system, [and] is indeed on hand for the issuance of other 
legal norms, but it must itself be assumed to be presupposed as a 
legal norm and not issued in accordance with other legal norms.”’ 
The stability of the investment environment has never been 
legislated, but it is the a priori intent, purpose, and normative 
rationale for governance post-2014. This is a remarkable ‘hidden’ 
(ibid: 69) constitutional development, in the sense that a shift in 
the basic governing norm reflects the fact that a fundamental 
reordering process has taken place. As May (ibid) argues, citing 
Gill (1998: 25, 30), what is actually ‘hidden’ is not simply the 
emergence of a new normative basis for governance, but ‘the 
manner in which powerful (class) interests shape the forms of 
political economic relations that can be established.’ 
Vulnerability in the Global Economy: Lessons from 
Mongolia  
Is Mongolia’s experience of global economic integration simply a 
“perfect storm” of factors that are particular to this case, or are 
there some broader comparative insights present? More simply, 
what is the value of a single, relatively obscure case for the study 
of the political and legal reordering that accompanies global 
economic integration? I argue that the value of the Mongolian 
case lies in its extremity, as an example of the level of impact that 
foreign direct investment can have as a lever against national 
legal and political institutions, and of the extent to which the logic 
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of foreign investment protection can penetrate capital-importing 
states. The fundamental dependency between state and capital is 
revealed in contexts where the state imports capital; the limited 
room for manoeuvre highlights the centrality of capital-access to 
the range of policy options available for the state to regulate the 
economy. An “extreme” case study does not exaggerate the 
transformative potential of global economic integration for the 
state; rather, it reveals the forceful capacity of transnational 
capital in relation to the national state.  
In the Mongolian case, we can see the real tension emerge 
between a national democracy and its increasingly globalised 
economy partly because Mongolia does not exert strong capital 
influence itself. It is thus a striking example of the democratic 
vulnerabilities involved in export-oriented, foreign investment-
dependent development strategies. Protecting investment from 
political and legal risk may threaten a number of important 
dimensions of national life, particularly the promises of popular 
power, representation, pluralism, and (relative) sovereignty. 
Thus, to quote Ferguson (1990: 257-258), a more extreme case 
study can act ‘as a clarification, just as the addition by a computer 
of “extreme” colours to a remote scanning image does not distort 
but “enhances” the photograph by improving the visibility of the 
phenomena we are interested in.’ 
While the effects of global economic integration might be extreme 
in the Mongolian case, it is not because the Mongolian state 
resisted the marketisation, privatisation or liberalisation of the 
national economy. The Mongolian state, since its post-socialist 
transition, has been very committed to market-based economic 
development and, as explored in Chapter Three, boasted one of 
the most liberal frameworks for mining investment by the late 
1990s. Thus, Mongolia’s “perfect storm” occurred after the state 
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had subscribed to Washington Consensus in the 1990s and 
undergone “structural adjustment” to enable the creation of a 
market space of economic exchange that was institutionally 
distinguished from the state. In this sense, the extremity of the 
Mongolian case was not caused by its lack of enthusiasm for 
global market integration. Even during the “resource nationalist” 
period of mining governance, the government was not radically 
anti-market or anti-foreign investment (see also Hatcher, 2014). 
The renegotiation of the mining regime (2006-2012) was an 
attempt to redraw the boundary in the state-market relationship 
between the political and the economic, but did not mark a radical 
break with the trajectory of the neoliberal state as an entity that 
supports such a division (Harvey, 2005). In light of this, the 
harshness with which the recalibrating efforts of the government 
have been reversed and nationalist sentiments expelled from 
governance discourse is testament of the coercive potential of 
global economic integration for small states heavily dependent on 
foreign investment.  
Conclusion 
It is difficult to “conclude” this thesis; Mongolia is really only just 
at the beginning of the extractive neoliberal order that has been 
recently instituted. At the moment, the country remains formally 
democratic, and it seems that the efforts the Mongolian 
government took to regain investor confidence have begun to 
make some impact in improving the state’s standing in relation to 
foreign investors. However, following the evidence presented in 
this thesis, it is difficult to be optimistic about Mongolia’s future 
as a global exporter of minerals. Beyond pragmatic questions of 
regaining investment in the short-term, a concern lingers that the 
Mongolian people have lost a meaningful voice, as well as 
ownership rights, in the governance of their natural resources as 
a result of the state’s capitulation to the demands of transnational 
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capitalists. Furthermore, the state’s financial capacity to 
effectively diversify the economy by investing in value-adding 
infrastructure for the mining sector (e.g. copper smelters) is 
currently hampered by new fiscal limits on spending and looming 
debt repayments. To be sure, there still may be opportunities to 
increase national public benefit from the mining sector. The 
stewardship of these opportunities will depend very much on the 
skill of Mongolian political leadership in maintaining a long-term 
perspective as they negotiate with foreign investors, and the 
political will to redistribute resources to the Mongolian public.75  
The purpose of this chapter has been to summarise and weave 
together the analytical threads of the whole thesis and to develop 
some of the implications for democratic politics and law that are 
at stake in Mongolia’s integration into the global minerals 
economy. Of course, only a limited amount of time has passed 
since the “crisis” of investor confidence, but already significant 
‘symbolic’ shifts are evident in Mongolian law and politics, 
alongside a demonstrable level of ‘practical’ change within 
Mongolia’s mining regime (Shaffer, 2014: 12). As summarised in 
the first part of this chapter, all five dimensions of a transnational 
legal ordering process (Shaffer, 2014) are evident in the 
Mongolian case as a result of the pro-investment “stability” 
consensus. These include: substantive legal reform in minerals 
and investment legislation; new scope for the market in relation 
to the state; the redistribution of institutional power to executive 
and administrative state institutions; an increase in the state’s 
value of professional expertise and international standards; and 
new patterns of ‘multi-stakeholder’ modes of association, 
between the state, investors/mining companies, and civil society. 
 
75 I plan to compose a short policy brief based on some of the issues raised in 
this thesis to send to the government officials, NGOs, corporate and IFI 
representatives who participated in the research project. 
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These dimensions of reordering reflect the shift in power along 
the three key institutional axes analysed in the previous two 
chapters: within the central state; between the central state and 
local governments; and between the state and organised civil 
society. Designed to resurrect investor confidence after the 
collapse of FDI in 2012-2013, these diverse mechanisms promote 
and guarantee the stability of the investment environment to 
varying degrees. Some aspects, such as national legal reform, have 
an immediate impact on the investment environment, while 
others, such as the promotion of tri-partite collaboration between 
state, corporate, and civic actors, have more long-term normative 
implications. In either case, the combination of legal reform, a 
new pro-FDI discourse, and the introduction of new governance 
norms amounts to a holistic process of state transformation.  
In the second section of the chapter, I argued that the costs of 
state transformation are borne by the democratic institutions and 
norms of the state, notably the rule of law, which has been 
subordinated to a new basic norm: legal change is illegitimate if it 
presents political risk to investors. In Mongolia, the bar of what 
constitutes political risk was set fairly low; the claim of “resource 
nationalism” was levied against a state that maintained a broadly 
pro-investment position even as the government strengthened 
aspects of state control within a neoliberal market framework 
(see also Hatcher, 2014; Lander, 2013). Despite the rhetoric of 
"it’s economic, not political,” the stakes are high: the constitution 
of the national state of Mongolia. 
While no formal constitutional reform has been made to 
Mongolia’s 1992 constitution, the practice and norms of politics 
and law, as well as the scope national autonomy in relation to 
foreign investors, have been significantly affected by the FDI 
crisis. Notably, this transformation has been largely implemented 
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by state actors and institutions, reinforcing the point that ‘as 
institutions, national states are becoming deeply involved in the 
implementation of the global economic system’ (Sassen, 2007: 
33). Importantly, however, Sassen notes that, depending on the 
outcome of the ‘negotiations between the global and the national’ 
(ibid: 22), there is a change in ‘the meaning of the state’s exclusive 
authority over that territory’ (ibid: 33).  
Consequently, it is no small matter that the interests and rights of 
a transnational economic constituency – investors – have been 
inscribed into national law and protected by the state. The 
inordinate influence of investor preferences on the trajectory of 
law reform in Mongolia’s mining regime reflects a new 
hierarchical balance between the state’s national and 
‘supraterritorial’ (Scholte, 1997: 430) constituencies. These are 
fundamentally constitutional issues, relating to state sovereignty 
(Article 1), the vesting of state power in citizens alone (Article 3), 
and pluralistic economic development (Article 5). However, the 
“economic” frame of Mongolia’s mining transformation disguises 
its profound political dimensions, making it all too easy for the de 
facto constitutional implications of Mongolia’s globalised mining 
economy to be ignored or not even recognised. 
The Mongolian case study offers a stark example of the 
transformative power of global capital in relation to national 
states, in the context of the global economy. It provides an 
empirically informed example of state transformation in a global 
era based on a tangible encounter between the national state and 
global processes of investment. I argued in this thesis that the 
democratic aspects of the national Mongolian state have suffered 
from their encounter with processes of “new (global) 
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constitutionalism,”76 which privilege the protection of private 
property rights and capital mobility to sustain and benefit global 
markets.  
  
 
76 Recalling its definition in the introductory chapter, new constitutionalism 
refers to ‘the politico-juridical project associated with disciplinary 
neoliberalism and market civilisation that seeks to lock in the power of capital 
through a series of pre-commitment mechanisms and disciplines’ (Gill & Cutler, 
2014: 320). 
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Appendix One - Schedule of Interviews  
 
Government (17) 
Former Deputy Director of Legal Policy Department, Ministry of 
Justice, and Member of the Oyu Tolgoi Working Group prior to the 
signing of the Investment Agreement (October 2015) 
Senior Policy-Maker, Ministry of Mining (November 2015) 
Director, Strategic Policy and Planning Department, Ministry of 
Mining (October 2015) 
Head of Environment and Geology, Mining Inspection 
Department, General Agency for Specialised Inspection 
(November 2015) 
Head of Mining Division, Mineral Resources Authority of Mongolia 
(November 2015) 
Officer, Economic Research and Tax, Mineral Resources Authority 
of Mongolia (MRAM) (October 2015)  
Senior Officer, Investment Policy and Assessment Division, Invest 
Mongolia Agency (November 2015) 
Former Economic Advisor to N. Altankhuyag when he was Deputy 
Prime Minister of the coalition government of the Mongolian 
People’s Party and Democratic Party (2008-2012) (November 
2015) 
Managing Director, Erdenes Mongol LLC (November 2015) 
Chief Legal Officer, Erdenes Mongol LLC (November 2015) 
Senior Investment Analyst, Erdenes Mongol LLC (November 
2015) 
Head of Monetary Policy, Mongol Bank (November 2015) 
 
 Local Government Personnel  
Director of Development Policy Department, Governor’s Office of 
Selenge Aimag (November 2015) 
Soum Chairwoman, Dornogovi Aimag (October 2015) 
Soum Governor, Bayankhongor Aimag (October 2015) 
Environmental Inspector, Bulgan Soum, Hovd Aimag (October 
2015) 
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Environmental Inspector, Oinch Soum, Hovd Aimag (October 
2015) 
Organised Civil 
Society/Consultancies/International 
Financial Institutions (11) 
Director, Economic Policy and Competitiveness Research Centre 
(November 2015) 
Executive Director, Mongolian Environmental Civil Council 
(November 2014; October 2015) 
Director, Bayankhongor Branch of the Mongolian Environmental 
Civil Council (October 2015) 
Environmental Adviser, Sustainability East Asia LLC (November 
2014) 
Consultant A, Infrastructure and Natural Resources Advisory 
Services for the IFC (World Bank Group) (November 2015) 
Consultant B, Social Development Specialist for the IFC (World 
Bank Group) (September 2014) 
Senior Representative, Integrated Mineral Resource Initiative, GIZ 
(January 2016) 
Lead Community Relations Consultant for Oyu Tolgoi LLC 
(August 2014) 
National Committee on Gender Equality (October 2014) 
Prominent civic advocate (November 2015) 
Vice President, United Movement for Mongolian Rivers and Lakes, 
Bagh Governor, Uverkhangai Aimag (November 2014) 
 
Mining and Investment Organisations (6) 
President, Mongolian National Mining Association (November 
2015) 
President, Association of Investors in Mongolian Mining 
(November 2015) 
CEO, Foreign-Invested Mining Company (January 2015) 
General Manager, Mongolian Office, Sumitomo Corporation 
(November 2015) 
334 
 
Deputy Director, Resource Strategy and Innovation, Oyu Tolgoi 
LLC (November 2015) 
Environmental Manager, Oyu Tolgoi LLC (November 2014) 
Forums Observed 
2014 
Multi-Stakeholder Forum on Herding, Mining and Climate (hosted 
by the Centre for Socially Responsible Mining (CSRM) and the 
Mongolian Environmental Civil Council), 29th September 2014 
- Approximately forty participants representing herders’ 
associations, local governments (aimag and soum), environmental 
NGOs, and the Ministry of Environment and Green Development 
Water Policy Discussion, hosted by the Mongolian Environmental 
Civil Council) 11th November 2014 
- Approximately 15 participants representing environmental NGOs 
discussing perspectives on different aspects of water policy, 
including related to the mining sector 
Multi-Stakeholder Workshop on Community Development 
Agreements supported by the Ministry of Mining, the World 
Bank’s Mining Investment Infrastructure Support Project (MINIS), 
and the Sustainable Development Strategies Group (SDGS), 7th 
November 2014 
- Approximately 70 participants representing local governments 
(soum and aimag), the Ministry of Mining, Mineral Resources 
Authority of Mongolia, the Anti-Corruption Authority, 
international social consultants and social/environmental NGOs. 
4th National Forum for Environmental NGOs hosted by the 
Mongolian Environmental Civil Council, 24th November 2014  
- 300+ representatives from environmental NGOs, as well as 
representatives from the Mongolian Environmental Civil Council, 
and the Ministry for Environment and Green Development  
2015 
“Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining Economic Contributions into 
Local Development” Annual Regional Workshop, hosted by the 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), 
Bayankhongor Aimag, 21st-22nd October 2015  
- Approximately 70 participants representing local governments 
from Western Mongolia, including khural chairpersons, governors 
and development specialists, and local environmental NGOs 
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G7 Fast Track Partnership Conference on the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative, hosted by the Ministry of 
Mining and the German-Mongolian Development Cooperation 
Organisation, and implemented by the German Development 
Corporation (GIZ), 10th-11th November 2015 
- 100+ participants representing the Ministry of Mining, the 
German Development Corporation (GIZ), the EITI International 
Secretariat, EITI Mongolia Secretariat, Corporate Social 
Responsibility consultancies, the Mongolian National Mining 
Association, EITI Secretariat representatives from Myanmar, 
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, among others 
5th National Corporate Social Responsibility Forum, hosted by the 
Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Mining and the German-
Mongolian Development Cooperation Organisation, and 
implemented by the German Development Corporation (GIZ) 11th 
November 2015. 
- 60+ participants representing the Ministry of Labour, Ministry of 
Mining, Ministry of Finance, German Development Corporation 
(GIZ), UNICEF, Neville Tiffen and Associates, National Mining 
Association, Minter Ellison, Oyu Tolgoi, among others 
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Appendix Two - Sample Interview Questions 
 
Central Government Interviews (Ministry of Mining, Mineral 
Resources Authority of Mongolia, Erdenes Mongol LLC, Invest 
Mongolia Agency, General Inspection Agency, Central Bank) 
Which national institutions are responsible for developing and 
implementing policy frameworks? How are responsibilities 
distributed and coordinated across institutions? 
Are there conflicts between the priorities of different ministries in 
relation to the mining sector?  
What are the strategic goals of the State Policy on the Minerals 
Sector (2014-2025)? 
What are the main challenges to foreign investment?  
Why did investment decline so suddenly in 2012? Was this due 
mainly to commodity prices, or did the state’s regulation of the 
mining sector have a role to play?  
What factors are considering in the mining licensing process? To 
what extent are local governments included in the decision to 
issue mining licenses?  
What is the institutional relationship between the Ministry of 
Mining and the Mineral Resources Authority of Mongolia? 
How would you describe “good governance” in the mining sector? 
In your view, what has the central government gotten “right”/ 
”wrong” in the governance of mining in recent years? How has the 
legal environment changed?  
Is the label “resource nationalism” unfair to describe the policies 
and actions of the government in recent years? 
Are investors having an undue influence on national law and 
policy-making? 
What do you see as the main challenges to the development of a 
responsible and economically sustainable mining sector? 
How important are local governments in mining governance? 
What are their responsibilities?  
Similarly, what role do you see for NGOs in governance, if at all?  
To what extent is collaboration between mining companies, the 
government, and civil important in mining governance? What do 
you see as the role for each of these groups? 
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Local Government Interviews (Aimag and Soum)  
How important is the mining sector for regional/local 
development?  
Would you like to see more mining or less in your province? 
What should be the role of the central government in rural 
economic development?  
How are mining governance responsibilities distributed between 
different branches of local government?  
How are local concerns about mining address by local 
governments? 
What is the remedy for negative social and environmental 
impacts from mining?  
To what extent can local governments limit mining in their 
jurisdictions?  
How dependent are local governments upon mining? Are there 
financial incentives to approve licenses in your region?  
How are mining rents distributed? Are all mining rents 
redistributed via the central budget, or some revenues paid 
directly into local budgets? 
In your view, what are the opportunities and risks in Community 
Development Agreements?  
How are competing pressures from the mining sector, local 
residents and central government managed? 
 
Environmental Civil Society 
In your view, what are the main challenges in the mining sector 
today?  
How has the role of the state and mining companies changed over 
time?  
What is the role of civil society in mining governance?  
Part of the government action strategy is to increase cooperation 
between NGOs and the government. How has this policy been put 
into practice, if at all?  
What opportunities are available to expand the role of NGO’s in 
governance? 
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What sort of issues arise when engaging in multi-stakeholder 
processes with mining companies and governments? How can 
problems be overcome? 
To what extent is civil society a safeguard for the public interest 
in relation to mining? Are NGOs more responsive to citizens than 
government representatives? 
Do all NGOs share the same goal?  
What are the conditions for registering with the Mongolian 
Environmental Civil Council? What is the structure of 
representation within the MECC? 
How do citizens access their local MECC council? What is the 
relationship between local MECC council and local khurals?  
What points of institutional access do NGOs and/or the MECC 
have with central and local branches of government? 
 
Investor/Mining Company Representatives 
From your perspective, what was the cause of the sudden decline 
of foreign investment in 2012 and 2013?  
How would you describe the actions of the government in 
relation to the mining sector?  
What is your opinion of the reforms since 2014 to regain investor 
confidence?  
What points of institutional access do mining and investor 
representatives have with the Ministry of Mining and the Invest 
Mongolia Agency, as well as other government institutions?  
How would you describe the relationship between mining 
companies and local governments, and local communities? In 
your view, what issues are Local Development Agreements 
addressing? What benefits might they offer, if any? 
How would you describe the relationship between investors and 
the government after 2014? Has it improved?  
How easy is it to invest following reform to the Investment Law in 
2013?  
What are the main priorities in negotiating investment 
agreements?  
What was your opinion on the controversial actions of the 
government, such as Strategic Entities Foreign Investment Law in 
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2012 and the attempt to renegotiate the Oyu Tolgoi Investment 
Agreement? From your point of view, is there any legitimate basis 
for the state to reconsider its relationship with foreign investors?  
What should the role of the state be in relation to such an 
important economic sector? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
